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A bstr a c t
These essays look at determinants of inflation and policies to control it at different stages 
of transition. It attempts to determine what factors have shaped the inflationary process, 
how successful were the policies adopted to control inflation, and what policy 
conclusions can be drawn from the experience of transitional economies. The first paper 
analyzes central bank independence in transitional economies, regarded as key for a 
successful monetary policy making. The results show that the central bank independence 
started to influence inflation only after the initial transitional shocks.
The next two papers analyze monetary transmission mechanisms in less advanced 
economies, choosing Georgia and Romania as examples. The papers estimate structural 
models of inflation. The results show that, in the case of Romania, inflation was driven by 
a monetary expansion. Interactions between real and monetary developments were 
limited when inflation was high. In Georgia, where the dichotomy between the real and 
monetary sectors is also evident in the data, the tight control over the exchange rate was 
crucial for maintaining a low-inflation equilibrium.
The third paper focuses on inflation in advanced transitional economies, analyzing 
transmission mechanisms and assessing the implementation of inflation targeting in the 
Czech Republic and Poland. The results show that the exchange rate has played a 
significant role in the transmission mechanism, suggesting that the behavior of this 
variable should be carefully watched even under an inflation targeting regime.
The last paper in the thesis analyzes the credibility of inflation targets, which is 
the main factor affecting the costs of disinflation under the inflation targeting framework. 
The paper attempts to identify to what extent inflationary expectations in Poland were 
guided by announcements of the targets. The results show that the credibility of the 
targets increased after the introduction of inflation targeting, but dropped quickly after the 
target was missed.
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1 Intro ductio n
Controlling inflation has proved to be a difficult task for many transitional economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The end of central planning was associated with severe 
macroeconomic disequilibria, which led to an outburst of inflation after price 
liberalization. The effects of the initial shock lasted longer than expected, and when the 
high inflation finally declined, it still remained well above the level consistent with price 
stability. The process of reducing inflation from moderate to low levels was long and 
costly even in the most successful economies.
While the shock related to price liberalization was a unique feature of the 
transition environment, inflation in subsequent years is more amenable to standard 
macroeconomic policy analysis. High inflations were usually associated with excessive 
monetary expansion. Persistent moderate inflations were often linked to stubborn 
inflationary expectations. The standard features of the problem called for typical 
solutions, such as monetary tightening and various policies to break the inertia in 
expectations.
These essays look at determinants of inflation and policies to control it at different 
stages of transition. I attempt to determine what factors have shaped the inflationary 
process, how successful were the policies adopted to control inflation, and what policy 
conclusions can be drawn from the experience of transitional economies.
The first paper1 sets the stage for the analysis by determining what institutional 
and political features have played a role in explaining inflation and how such influences 
varied over time. If inflation was driven largely by exogenous shocks and pre-transitional 
disequilibria, a standard monetary policy analysis—even with certain modifications as 
pursued later in the essays—would be inadequate. Defining the time when monetary 
policy started exerting influence on inflation is important to avoid misspecification in the 
subsequent analysis.
The paper concentrates on central bank independence, regarded as key for 
successful monetary policy making, but also considers other elements characteristic for
1 Published in Economics of Transition (Maliszewski, 2000)
the transitional environment. Overall progress in transition, the fiscal position, and the 
adoption of a stabilization program supported by multinational organizations are 
considered as determinants of inflation. Testing for the effect of central bank 
independence together with these variables is interesting on its own and comparable to 
several studies conducted on other sets of countries. Given the fact that independent 
central banks are also likely to pursue a more restrictive monetary policy, these tests can 
also be regarded as a way to determine when this policy started playing an independent 
role in shaping inflation in addition to early transitional shocks, fiscal policy and external 
commitments.
This paper was one of the first attempts to analyze the institutional and political 
determinants of inflation, controlling for more elements than its predecessors and fully 
exploiting time-series and cross-sections variability in the data. The latter improvement is 
particularly important given the likely changes in the role of monetary policy over the 
period.
The results show that central bank independence, and therefore monetary policy as 
well, started to influence inflation after the initial transitional shocks; subsequent chapters 
in the thesis analyze the mechanism of this relationship. Again differentiating between the 
determinants of inflation at various stages of transition, the next two papers analyze the 
monetary transmission mechanism in less advanced economies, choosing Georgia and 
Romania as examples. The following two papers2 turn to the problems faced by the 
relatively more advanced economies, illustrated by the Czech Republic and Poland.
In the two cases of the less advanced transition economies, the countries faced 
different initial conditions and chose different policies in their quest for price stability. 
Romania inherited a fully centralized planned economy, with politicians mistrusting the 
market and society exhausted by the previous policy of restraining domestic demand to 
fully repay the country’s foreign debt. These conditions led to a slow path of reforms, 
loose fiscal and monetary policy, subsidization of state owned enterprises, and
2 The paper on Romania is based on the joint paper with Nina Budina, Georges de Menil 
and Geomina Turlea, issued as DELTA Working Paper 2002/15 and forthcoming in 
Journal of International Money and Finance. The paper on Georgia was issued as IMF 
Working Paper WP/03/212 and invited for resubmission to the published in Applied 
Economics.
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consequently persistently high inflation. Georgia faced a break up of trade links with 
other Soviet Union countries, a hike in previously subsidized energy prices, civil wars, 
severe depression, and consequently a burst of hyperinflation. The hyperinflation was 
brought to a halt by exchange rate based stabilization combined with fiscal tightening.
Despite the inferior initial conditions, Georgia managed to achieve a lower and a 
more stable inflation quicker than Romania. What drove inflation in these two countries 
and why did Georgia manage to stabilize faster?
The papers search for answers by estimating structural models of inflation based 
on money demand and exchange rate equations and carefully analyzing the exogeneity 
status of key variables. Given the extensive monetary financing of fiscal deficits and 
direct credits to state-owned enterprises, it is likely that monetary expansion from these 
sources was driving the persistent inflation in Romania. Exchange rate policy was 
accommodative, keeping the real exchange rate stable. To account for these features of 
the Romanian economy, the model focuses on imbalances between money demand and 
supply as a primary determinant of inflation and tests for the exogeneity of money. In 
Georgia, the design and implementation of the stabilization program suggests a dominant 
role of the exchange rate in inflation developments, with fiscal policy subservient to 
maintain exchange rate stable. The model takes this feature into account by explicitly 
analyzing the role of the exchange rate, and the exogeneity status of both the exchange 
rate and money. To keep the model simple, given the small available sample, output is 
assumed to be exogenous in this case.
Both models use standard econometric techniques, but their value added lies in the 
choice of countries and in their careful specification. In both cases the papers present the 
first thorough analysis of inflation in countries representative of large groups of similar 
transition economies. The specification is tailored to their different characteristics and 
utilizes prior knowledge about the behaviour of the economies. This prior knowledge, 
which singles out the main characteristics of these economies, helps to find a balance 
between the limited sample size and the scale of the model. From a methodological 
standpoint, the model analyzing inflation in Georgia is also based on firmer economic 
foundations than similar models estimated for other transition economies.
The results show that in both cases inflation has been consistent with priors. In the 
case of Romania inflation was driven by monetary expansion, and interactions between
-11  -
the real sector and monetary developments were limited when inflation was high. In 
Georgia, where the dichotomy between the real and monetary sectors is also evident in 
the data, tight control over the exchange rate was crucial for maintaining low-inflation 
equilibrium.
Contrary to these examples, in more advanced transitional economies with lower 
inflation the links between the real and monetary sectors are likely to be stronger and a 
further disinflation may be costly. In addition, interactions between monetary and 
exchange rate policies become more complicated when transition progresses, with capital 
movements reducing the scope for independent monetary policy.
The next two papers turn to an analysis of inflation in the more advanced 
transition economies, replacing systems of controlled exchange rates by a new policy 
framework of inflation targeting. The new framework has been employed to reduce the 
costs of disinflation and to maintain control over inflation, while lowering the probability 
of exchange rate misalignments and related sudden changes. Inflation targeting seems to 
be an attractive alternative to other policy regimes. In addition to the benefits of a more 
flexible exchange rate, it does not rely on the behaviour of monetary aggregates, which is 
difficult to model when inflation declines to a low level and a rapid remonetization takes 
place. However, inflation targeting requires a thorough knowledge of the monetary 
transmission mechanism, which remains weak because of structural changes and a short 
history of monetary policy under the floating exchange rate system. Was inflation 
targeting successful given the limited knowledge about the monetary transmission 
mechanism? How can our understanding of the transmission mechanism be improved?
The first paper3 on inflation in advanced transitional economies attempts to 
deepen our understanding of the transmission mechanism and to assess the 
implementation of inflation targeting in these countries. The paper focuses on the 
experience of the Czech Republic and Poland. These economies again had diverse initial 
conditions and so followed different policies. Imbalances inherited from the planning 
system were lower in the Czech Republic, and the country quickly achieved exemplary 
macroeconomic stability and low inflation under the fixed exchange rate. However,
3 Earlier version of the paper was issued as CASE (Centre for Social and Economic 
Research) Studies and Analyses 246.
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structural weaknesses, combined with the inflexibility of the exchange rate system, led to 
a currency crisis, followed by depression and a pickup in inflation. The inflation targeting 
system introduced soon after was associated with a faster than expected decline in 
inflation and a mediocre growth performance. Poland, facing relatively weaker initial 
conditions and higher initial inflation, moved from the fixed exchange rate arrangement 
to the crawling peg with a gradually widening band. The less restrictive exchange rate 
arrangement facilitated a smooth transition to a fully floating system, but limited progress 
in disinflation. The subsequent reduction in inflation from a moderate to low levels, 
conducted within the inflation targeting framework, brought about an economic 
slowdown.
The paper utilizes modem Bayesian methods, not previously applied to 
transitional countries data, to estimate the model of the transmission mechanism. The 
applied VAR model utilizes information from both the fixed and the floating exchange 
rate periods, increasing the number of degrees of freedom in the model, while keeping the 
crucial distinction between the two policy regimes. While the previous studies applied 
similar VAR specifications, they did not properly account for the policy change. This 
distinction enables me to estimate monetary transmission mechanisms under different 
regimes more precisely. It also allows for counterfactual simulations, replacing the policy 
reaction function estimated under the inflation targeting framework with the reaction 
function from the controlled exchange rate period. These simulations make possible an 
assessment of the inflation targeting performance against the previous regimes.
The results show that the exchange rate has played a significant role in the 
transmission mechanism, suggesting that the behaviour of this variable should be 
carefully watched even under an inflation targeting regime. Strict control over the 
exchange rate would be costly and difficult to sustain as shown by the simulations for the 
Czech Republic. But adjusting interest rates to smooth exchange rate paths could be 
beneficial, as suggested by simulations for Poland, which show higher volatility for both 
the exchange rate and inflation driven by changes in the interest rate under the inflation 
targeting regime.
The results also point to a significant impact of monetary policy on the real sector. 
The expected reduction in the cost of disinflation, due to a faster adjustment of 
expectations than under conventional policies, convinced policymakers to adopt the
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inflation targeting framework in transition economies. However, the strong relation 
between the real sector and monetary developments, and the sharp slowdown in economic 
activity associated with inflation reduction in Poland, show that the full benefits of the 
inflation targeting framework did not materialize.
The last paper in the thesis analyses the credibility of the targets, which is the 
main factor affecting the costs of disinflation under the inflation targeting framework. 
The concept of credibility, which is particularly relevant in die inflation targeting 
framework, is the marginal credibility, defined as policymakers’ ability to influence 
public expectations by the announcement of a target. The paper attempts to identify to 
what extent inflationary expectations in Poland were guided by such announcements and 
whether the marginal credibility of announcements increased after the introduction of the 
inflation targeting framework.
The paper applies an original Bayesian methodology, efficiently blending 
information from public announcements, a survey of inflationary expectations and actual 
data in order to assess the marginal credibility. Agents in the model are assumed to use 
past data and announcements to form their expectations. A higher weight attached to the 
announcement corresponds to higher marginal credibility.
The results show that the marginal credibility of the targets increased after the 
introduction of inflation targeting, but dropped quickly after the target was missed. The 
virtuous circle of a high marginal credibility influencing expectations, facilitating the 
achievement of the target, and further boosting credibility was broken. This virtuous 
circle could help circumnavigate the problems related to the limited understanding of the 
transmission mechanism. Without this shortcut, central bankers in advanced transition 
economies must face a painful process of a slow learning about the behaviour of their 
economies.
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2 Cen t r a l  B a n k  In d epen d en c e  in  Tr a n sitio n  E co n o m ies4
2.1 Introduction
Monetary expansion driven by political factors is potentially one of the main 
causes of high and persistent inflation at the initial stage of transition from plan to 
market.5 Severe fiscal imbalances and narrow financial markets inevitably lead to 
monetaiy deficit financing. Institutional devices, such as an independent central bank, can 
impose necessary financial discipline on policy makers and restrict them from short­
sighted monetary expansion. Economic theory and empirical evidence give strong support 
for delegating monetary policy to independent central bankers. Although the newly 
established central banks (CB) were generally provided with a considerable degree of 
statutory independence, the legal framework varies considerably from country to country 
and over time. In particular, weak constraints on the amount of credit granted to the 
government significantly reduce central banks' ability to conduct independent monetary 
policy. Moreover, the law protection does not always shield central bank from political 
pressure. The legal provisions may be ineffective because observance of the law, the main 
public good in developed society, has been destroyed under the communist rule. The new 
institutions "transported in the suitcases of Western advisors into largely insolvent and 
administratively weak states" (Semler (1994)) may not be able to withstand the political 
pressure of transition period. Macroeconomic imbalances, credit-hungry governments and 
underdeveloped financial system produce an environment in which the CB independence 
is thoroughly tested.
The aim of this paper is to examine legal independence of central banks and its 
influence on inflation in East European countries and former Soviet republics. Adjusting 
the methodology proposed by Grilli et al. (1991), the paper constructs the indices of 
political and economic independence. It also analyzes changes in the laws and proposes 
some explanations for recent upgrades of the central bank independence. Finally, the 
paper tests for the relationship between central bank independence and inflation in
4 Published in Economics of Transition (Maliszewski, 2000)
5 Next chapters investigate the relationship between monetary expansion and inflation for 
selected transition economies.
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transition economies. The paper provides a sensitivity analysis to earlier empirical results, 
in particular to the findings reported in Cukierman et al (2002), by using a different 
measure of independence, extending the analysis by accounting for recent changes in the 
laws, further exploring the time dimension of the CBI-inflation relationship, and 
controlling for additional explanatory variables in the econometric analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. First, possible motives for monetary expansion, 
its influence on inflation and the role of central bank in reducing inflationary bias are 
presented. Next section analyses various aspects of independence in transition countries. 
Previous empirical works are also discussed here. Next, indices of political and economic 
independence are presented. Section 2.6 analyses changes in the laws and section 2.7 tests 
the relation between independence and inflation. Last section concludes.
2.2 C entral bank  independence: theory and em pirical evidence
There is a general consensus among economists that delegating monetary 
authority to the central bank that is highly averse to inflation may reduce "inflationary 
bias", i.e. persistent and higher than socially optimal price growth. The bias arises from 
government incentives for monetary expansion, classified by Cukierman (1992) into four 
categories, covering employment, revenue, balance of payment and financial stability 
motives.
The employment motive is based on the widely accepted "expectations 
augmented" Phillips curve, i.e. a positive relationship between deviations of 
unemployment from its equilibrium level and unanticipated shocks to inflation. The 
relation was given numerous theoretical explanations; some of them establish an 
exploitable trade-off between inflation and unemployment.6 Inflation depreciates the real 
value of money and allows the government to collect seigniorage revenue (Barro, 1983). 
It also cuts down the value of interest bearing debt fixed in nominal terms, reducing real 
expenditures on interest and repayment of principal (Barro and Gordon, 1983). The 
nominalistic features of tax and transfer systems provide further considerable gains from
6 The relation may be derived either from the Lucas (1973) “surprise” supply function or 
from the overlapping contracts models developed in Fischer (1977), Phelps and Taylor 
(1977) and Taylor (1979)
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inflation to the government (Persson et al., 1996). The government is tempted to use the 
inflationary financing if other taxes are difficult to collect or politically expensive to 
impose, and when it faces constraints on borrowing from private agents.
The concern about the balance of payment may lead to higher inflation through 
the effects of nominal devaluations (Cukierman, 1992), which, in the presence of nominal 
contracts, reduce real wages and increase output. Hence, more resources are available for 
export or for import substitution and the current account position temporarily improves.
Finally, the stability of the financial system may also be inconsistent with the low 
inflation objective (Cukierman (1990), (1992)). The banking system is vulnerable to 
surprise increases in interest rate since in the short run it affects the costs of (mostly short­
term) borrowing more quickly than the revenues from (mostly long-term) loans. If the 
central bank cares about the profits of the banking sector, it may avoid raising interest rate 
when it is needed for suppressing inflationary pressure.
The motives for monetary expansion lead to a dynamic inconsistency problem, 
which arises when optimal policy before the private agents' contracts are set is different 
from optimal policy afterwards. For instance, when policy makers are ready to trade off 
more employment for higher inflation, they have incentive to inflate after the contracts 
have been set. Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that, if expectations are rational, the 
resulting equilibrium is sub-optimal: unemployment is unchanged while inflation is 
higher. This result, popularized by Barro and Gordon (1983), can be extended to other 
motives for monetary expansion by adding additional elements to the government loss 
function.
Rogoff (1985) showed that the time inconsistency problem can be mitigated by 
delegating monetary policy to the central banker who attaches relatively greater weight 
than the policy makers to inflation vs. output stabilization. As a result, the conservative 
and independent central bank delivers lower mean and variance of inflation than the 
government would produce.7 The successful anti-inflationary policy of the German and 
Swiss central banks provides empirical support for this idea.
7 However, since the bank is more concerned about inflation, its responses to supply 
shocks are not optimal for output stabilization. Several extensions of the Rogoff (1985) 
model have been proposed, alleviating this trade off between flexibility and credibility of
(continued)
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Formal tests of this theory require some judgment about unobservable central 
bank independence. Researchers usually concentrate on legal aspects of independence, 
assuming that the formal arrangements provide a reasonable proxy for the actual 
autonomy. The legal CB independence in industrial countries was analyzed by Bade and 
Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988), (1989), Grilli et al (1991), Alesina and Summers (1990) 
and Ejffinger and Schaling (1993). Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al (1992) extend 
the analysis to less developed economies and present the behavioural indices of CBI—the 
average turnover of the governor and the index based on the questionnaire sent to the CB 
staff. Most authors find an inverse relationship between their measures of independence 
and the average inflation, although only behavioural characteristics turn out to be 
significant in explaining inflation for less developed countries. Cukierman (1996) surveys 
theoretical and empirical literature on central bank independence.
2.3 Econom ic theory and transition reality
The employment motive for monetary expansion—a standard theoretical determinant of 
inflationary bias—seems to have only limited influence in the transition environment. 
High or very high inflation rates reduce the length of nominal contracts and bring various 
mechanisms of indexation, reducing potential gains from inflationary surprises. 
Moreover, a negative relationship between high inflation and economic growth, found in 
cross-country studies by Barro (1995) and Bruno and Easterly (1995), seems to be present 
in transition data. Fischer et al. (1996) claim that positive growth in post-communist 
economies resumes within two years of inflation falling below 50 percent. Ghosh (1997) 
estimates that per capita GDP growth rate above 2 percent is unlikely to occur as long as 
inflation stays above the 10 percent threshold. Finally, although Berg et al. (1999) do not 
find any robust negative relationship between inflation level and growth, they confirm 
that an increase in inflation deters output growth in the private sector. Their econometric 
evidence, however, suggests that increasing inflation had a stimulating effect on the 
public sector. The last result probably reflects the effects of slow restructuring in the
monetary policy. For relevant results see Flood et al (1988), Lohmann (1992) and Walsh 
(1995)
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subsidized public sector, which resulted in the smaller initial output losses but was often 
supported by inflationary means.
The revenue motive is undoubtedly the most important source of money creation 
in the countries under investigation. Inefficient welfare state, loss-making state-owned 
enterprises and tax base erosion produced substantial pressure on the budgets. Narrow 
domestic financial markets and limited access to foreign financing inevitably lead to the 
monetary deficit financing, at least at the initial stage of the systemic transformation.
Maintaining stability of the financial system, strongly related to quasi-fiscal 
operations of the government, also played a role in fuelling inflation. Banking systems in 
transition economies inherited considerable amount of non-performing loans. The bad 
debts were concentrated in state-owned banks and the government exerted pressure on 
these institutions to provide further loans to the insolvent state sector enterprises. 
Moreover, financial regulations were usually lax and newly developed private financial 
institutions were fragile and unstable. Central banks, legally responsible for financial 
stability, were forced to bail out insolvent banks in order to avoid financial crisis and to 
provide quasi fiscal subsidies to the public sector. Higher inflation was the imminent 
price for the rescue operations.
Similarly, a concern about the balance of payment deficit had considerable 
inflationary consequences. Transition countries quickly opened up their economies, 
running large deficits financed by borrowing from international institutions and, when 
they regained confidence, at financial markets. High deficits, combined with low level of 
international reserves and fragility of domestic financial systems make them highly 
vulnerable to balance of payments crises. Although the roots of the problem are 
elsewhere, a political pressure on competitive devaluation remains strong.
The pressures on central banks in transition environment make an appropriate 
legal framework potentially more important than in developed countries, but specific 
features of transition countries may distort the influence of legal provisions on inflation 
performance (Cukierman, 1996). The initial stage of economic transformation was 
characterized by severe macroeconomic imbalances. Price liberalization and devaluation 
of the currency, combined with initial monetary overhang, produced substantial shocks to 
inflation. Strong incentives for inflationary financing of the fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits 
fuelled inflationary expectations. Containing inflationary pressure in this environment
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was a formidable task for monetary policy. The evidence from post World War II 
monetary reforms, resembling the situation after the collapse of communism most 
closely, proves that even drastic measures might not be sufficient to hold inflationary 
pressure at bay in the presence of excess liquidity and entrenched inflationary 
expectations. Moreover, the norm of general adherence to the law has been destroyed 
under the communist rule (Triska, 1994). In the presence of strong political pressure and 
the above-mentioned shocks, there was a temptation to bend the law. In this case, the 
legal provisions may be insufficient to protect CBI, but the degree of legal independence 
is still an important indicator of the policy makers’ willingness to ’’tie their hands" and 
construct institutional framework capable to provide price stability.
2.4 Empirical research on CBI in transition economies
Early attempts to explore the question of CBI in post-communist started from 
descriptive studies by Hinton-Braaten (1994), Hochreiter (1994) and Hochreiter and 
Riesinger (1995). The same approach was followed by Sundararajan et al. (1997), who 
discuss central banking reforms in former Soviet Union and Radzynger and Riesinger 
(1997), who present an extensive review of central bank legal independence in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
The first index of legal independence for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovak Republic was built by Siklos (1994). The index is based on the Cukierman et al 
(1992) methodology, but introduces some additional elements specific to transition 
economies, such as a choice of exchange rate system, enterprise arrears, maturity of the 
financial system, foreign debt burden, absence of the deposit insurance system, structure 
of the CB board and the degree of monetary overhang. Most of the additional elements 
account for the effects of initial conditions on the CB policy, introducing behavioural 
elements to the legal index, but unfortunately blurring a distinction between the level of 
independence and the motives for monetary expansion. The new CB laws of Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland were also investigated by Eijffmger and Van Keulen 
(1995), who present several indices of political independence for a broader group of 
eleven countries.
Loungani and Sheets (1997) examine central bank independence in twelve post­
communist countries. They derive two indices of CBI: the first covers goal, economic and
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political independence and the second assesses similarity between the analyzed law and 
the Bundesbank statute. In the regression analysis, a strong negative correlation between 
the measures of independence and inflation emerges, even after controlling for fiscal 
performance and the overall reform progress.
Lybek (1999) focuses on CBI in the former Soviet Union economies, building a 
new index that incorporates standard elements present in the previous studies, but also 
covers accountability of the bank and takes into account the IMF guidelines provided to 
transition countries. The index consists of 21 graded characteristics. The empirical results 
reveal negative correlation between this measure and the average 1995-1997 inflation in 
the group of 15 former Soviet republics analyzed in the paper.
Finally, Cukierman et al. (2002) (CMN) present the most comprehensive study on 
CBI in transition economies to date. The authors construct CB independence index based 
on Cukierman et al. (1992) methodology for 26 post-communist economies, accounting 
for some recent changes in the laws. The first sixteen components of the index are the 
same as in Cukierman et al. (1992) and are grouped in four categories: position of the 
chief executive officer, policy formulation, central bank objectives and limitations on 
lending. All variables are given numerical values from 0 to 1 and are initially aggregated 
into eight legal variables (five concerning limitations on lending) and finally into 
unweighted (LVAU) and weighted (LVAW) indices. The next four variables are from 
Neyapti (2001) and cover financial independence of the CB (in setting its budget and 
salaries), CB supervisory authority and provision of emergency credit to private banks. 
The main finding of the Cukierman et al. (2002) study is that CBI is negatively related to 
inflation only at the sufficiently high and sustained level of economic liberalization. Thus, 
the CBI cannot protect from inflationary consequences of the powerful inflationary 
shocks experienced at the early stage of transformation.
2.5 The index of CBI and comparison with previous studies
An assessment of legal provisions for CBI has twofold purpose. The CBI is a 
proxy for actual independence and—by relating it to the inflation performance—one can 
empirically test the theoretical predictions in a group of transition countries. Furthermore, 
the question of great practical importance is how the institutional settings affect monetary 
policy and inflation in post-communist economies.
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The sample covers twenty countries and includes all Central European countries 
except Bosnia and Yugoslavia (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR 
Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and ten out of 
fifteen former Soviet republics (Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). The choice was dictated by data 
availability, but the group covers almost all post-communist economies except post- 
Soviet Central Asian countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) 
and Mongolia. Only the laws enacted after the introduction of the two-tier banking 
systems are considered: the legal position of the central bank in the system of mono-bank 
system central planning is irrelevant for this study.
Main characteristics of the CB legislation are coded into indices similar to those 
proposed by Grilli et al (1991) (GMT). In GMT the CBI is divided into two components: 
political and economic independence. The political independence is defined by three 
elements: the relationship between the government and the bank in formulation of the 
monetary policy, the procedure for appointing the board and the formal goal of the bank 
with respect to monetary policy. The elements are evaluated using eight criteria: 
appointment procedure for high officials of the bank (the governor and the board), length 
of their term in office, participation of the government representative in the board, 
government approval of monetary policy, legal provision strengthening the bank's 
position against the government in case of conflict and statutory obligations to maintain 
price stability. Economic independence is affected by legal constraint on the central 
bank's lending to the government and the location of banking supervision. The bank is 
assumed to be more economically independent if the direct credit facility is of limited 
amount, not automatic, temporary and at the market rate. In addition more independent 
bank sets the discount rate, does not participate in the primary market for public debt and 
is not engaged in the commercial banks' supervision.
While most of these criteria are self-explanatory, die location of die banking 
supervision requires more attention. Cukierman (1996) argues that placing the banking 
supervision under CB authority makes the bank more vulnerable to political pressure. In 
the presence of bank failures there is a high risk that bad debts will be monetized and 
placing the supervision outside CB makes the costs of rescue operations more transparent. 
On the other hand, the personnel needed for supervision and conducting monetary policy
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is complementary and the central bank may use precise information on the banking 
system to improve its monetary policy. The use of this criterion is thus ambiguous, but— 
as discussed above—in the transition environment the banking system is often used as a 
channel for quasi-fiscal activities and placing banking supervision in the CB may reduce 
its independence.
The interpretation of two other GMT criteria requires further explanation. The 
government approval of monetary policy is interpreted as a prior approval of the 
monetaiy policy guidelines by the government or the parliament. The legal provision 
strengthening the bank's position against the government in case of conflict is interpreted 
as any provision explicitly stating independence of the CB from the executive.
There are two differences between the original GMT index and die methodology 
applied here. Firstly, it is assumed that the bank is more politically independent if the 
provisions for governor’s dismissal, as stated in the law, are non-political only (e.g. loss of 
ability to perform his duties or sentence for criminal act). Consequently, the new variable 
is added to the political index. Secondly, in the index of economic independence, the 
government borrowing from CB is assumed to be less harmful if all direct credit is 
securitized. As noticed by Cottarelli (1993), securitization provides the bank with a stock 
of government papers, increasing flexibility of monetary policy.
Figure 2-1 presents GMT indices of political and economic independence based 
on the latest available CB laws. The laws were changing and the year attached to each 
country is the date of the latest enactment or amendment. The components of all indices, 
also those derived from older laws, are listed in Table 2-7 in Appendix 2.9. Other tables 
in the appendix give more detailed information on die most recent laws in the sample.
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Table 2-1 Aggregate indices of political (PI), economic (El) and overall (OI) independence.
PI El OI (PI + El)
Bulgaria 97 
Lithuania 96
8
8
8
7
7
8
7
8 
6 
8 
6 
9 
7 
5 
5 
7 
5
3
4 
3
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
5
7
5
6
3
4 
6 
6 
4 
6 
7 
3 
2
15
15
15
14
14
14
13
13
13
13
12
12
Kyrgyz Republic 97
Poland 97 
Armenia 96
Macedonia 96
Georgia 96 
Moldova 95 
Estonia 93
Czech Republic 92
Albania 96 
Latvia 92 
Croatia 92 
Russia 95
Slovak Republic 92
Slovenia 91 
Belarus 92 
Hungary 97 
Romania 91 
Ukraine 91
10
7
5
Source: National legislations
In all countries the laws contain at least basic provisions for CBI, and the average level of 
independence is high. For instance, six countries in the group have higher legal 
independence than the Bundesbank with its 13 points in the original GMT index and one 
additional point for non-political provisions for governor’s dismissal. Next section 
discusses changes to the laws in more detail, but it is immediately clear that the countries 
on the top of the list have the laws enacted or amended recently and that the older laws 
give less independence to the banks. Political independence is high in Latvia, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, the Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova and the lowest 
in Hungary and Ukraine Economic independence is high in countries that adopted 
currency board arrangements: in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia. But it is equally high, 
according to the El index, in Armenia, Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic and Poland, where 
the laws have been recently upgraded. In Latvia, Romania and Ukraine it is the lowest. It 
seems that the political consensus on imposing the limits on the government borrowing 
from the bank—the main element of economic independence—is more difficult to attain 
than the political independence. The new laws only recently improved CB economic 
independence in the group. The measure of an overall independence is obtained by 
summing two indices. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Kyrgyz Republic receive the highest score 
in this ranking, closely followed by Poland, Armenia and Macedonia. Romania and 
Ukraine have the least independent central banks in the sample.
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Several arguments are presented above for and against placing banking 
supervision in the central bank structure. In the sample under investigation only two 
countries (Hungary and the Slovak Republic) have their banking supervision outside 
central banks. Thus, the supervision seems to be perceived as a traditional role of the 
central bank. It is interesting to note that in the conflict between the governor of the 
National Bank of Poland and the Ministry of Finance in 1994 the governor strongly 
opposed delegating the banking supervision to an external body, expressing her concerns 
about the impact of such a step on independence of the bank (although this opposition 
may reveal reluctance to accept a restriction on administrative power of the governor 
rather than a true concern about CB independence).
It is useful to compare the constructed GMT index with existing CBI measures for 
the same group of countries. The indices cover broadly the same aspects of legal 
independence, although do not exactly overlap (e.g., CMN index does not cover a 
position of the CB board). The GMT index is not as precise as the methodology in CMN 
but this is not a serious limitation. Constructing a coarser index requires relatively less 
information and, since the laws of central bank differ in their degree of detail, may reduce 
arbitrariness in assessing the independence. Moreover, the more detailed index (with sub­
characteristics for each variable) must be supported by a weighting system and a 
subjective judgment is involved in choosing the characterization of variables and weights 
in the aggregation.
Table 2-2 presents rankings of the CBI according to three indices: GMT built for 
the purpose of this paper, CMN and Lybek (1999). Since the Lybek's study covers only 
FSU countries, the FSU and the Central European banks are compared separately. In the 
FSU group the new law on the Bank of Kyrgyzstan is given the highest rank both by the 
GMT and by the Lybek index. Georgia, Lithuania, Armenia, Estonia and Moldova also 
score high in two indices, and the same group of countries appears on the top of the CMN 
index together with Belarus. The law on the Ukrainian National Bank and the old laws of 
Armenia and Moldova give the lowest independence to the respective central banks. Note 
that the law on the National Bank of Georgia in the Lybek’s index is different from the 
law in the GMT index: in my interpretation the amendment of May 1996 reduced bank's 
ability to formulate policy independently and consequently its position according to the 
GMT index is lower. In the Lybek’s index the bank scores high even after the
amendments. The Czech National Bank is the most independent among banks in Central 
Europe (before recent amendments to laws in other countries) according to both GMT 
and CMN indices. The Bulgarian National Bank is ranked second in the GMT index, 
while the National Bank of Hungary is placed second according to the CMN index. The 
banks of the Slovak Republic and Slovenia are on the next two positions and the National 
Bank of Romania is the least independent according to both indices.
The comparison reveals some similarities in the independence ranking, at least in 
the evaluation of the laws that grant the highest and the lowest CBI. Differences in 
construction make the exact comparison between them difficult, but a rough comparison 
between the measures reveal that the differences in ranking come mainly from the choice 
of variables and the adopted weighting system, rather than from substantial differences in 
the interpretation of the law. Correlation of the GMT index with two other measures, 
measured by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, is high for the group of the Former 
Soviet Union countries, and relatively lower for Central European countries. The latter 
result comes mainly from different evaluation of the independence granted to central 
banks in Hungary and Croatia: a weak position of the bank’s board reduces CBI in 
Hungary and the strong board’s position boosts independence in Croatia according to the 
GMT index. The CMN index does not cover the position of the board.
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Table 2-2 CBI ranking: Comparison of indices
Former Soviet Union Central Europe
GMT Lybek (1999) CMN GMT CMN
Kyrgyz Rep. 97 Kyrgyz Rep. 97 Lithuania 96 Czech Rep. 92 Czech Rep. 92
Lithuania 96 Georgia 96 Estonia 93 Bulgaria 91 Hungary 91
Armenia 96 Estonia 93 Armenia 96 Slovak Rep. 92 Slovak Rep. 92
Georgia 95 Moldova 95 Georgia 95 Slovenia 91 Slovenia 91
Estonia 93 Lithuania 96 Belarus 92 Croatia 92 Bulgaria 91
Moldova 95 Armenia 96 Moldova 95 Poland 92 Albania 92
Georgia 96 Latvia 92 Kyrgyz Rep. 92 Hungary 91 Poland 92
Latvia 92 Russia 95 Latvia 92 Albania 92 Croatia 92
Russia 95 Belarus 92 Russia 95 Romania 91 Romania 91
Belarus 92 Ukraine 91 Moldova 91
Moldova 91 Armenia 93
Kyrgyz Rep. 92 Lithuania 91
Armenia 93
Lithuania 91
Ukraine 91
Spearman’s rank correlation with GMT:
1 0.7636 0.8566 1 0.4583
Source: National legislations, Cukierman et al. (1998), Lybek (1999)
2.6 Changes in central bank laws
This section considers a reverse causality from past inflation to CBI, as well as some 
other factors shaping central bank position in the economy. In most of transition 
countries, central bank laws have been recently changed and lessons can be drawn from 
these episodes. In the midst of inflationary crisis, strengthening CB independence may 
boost confidence in the stabilization policy and contribute to its success. If this line of 
reasoning is correct, changes in CB laws reflect policy makers’ pre-commitment to a low 
inflation regime and should complement stabilization attempts. Cukierman (1996), 
however, argues that CB independence functions well as a preventive, but not as a 
remedial devise. He presents a historical example of the Reichsbank during hyperinflation 
in mid-1922, where independence from the government—augmented by increasing the 
fraction of non-government members in the board—resulted in a different distribution of 
seigniorage revenues (partly channelled to the private sector by discounting commercial 
papers), but not in lower inflation. Even after the changes, however, the corporate credit 
from the Reichsbank constituted not more than a third of total discounted bills and money 
creation was still largely determined by the government borrowing requirements. 
Strengthening position of the bank after the establishment of the Rentenbank put a halt on
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the inflationaiy deficit financing and stabilized the economy. Other hyperinflations in the 
20’s in Austria, Hungary and Poland were stopped after similar measures (Sargent, 1986).
How the historical episodes match the recent experience of transition countries? 
Table 2-3 presents maximum inflation rates experienced in transition economies, dates of 
stabilization attempts8, dates of IMF standby agreements, introduction of national 
currencies by the FSU countries and changes in the central bank laws.
Five Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia) stabilized their economies at the start of reform process. The mixture of good 
policies and favourable initial conditions9 contributed to their relative successes. In this 
group, the CB laws were amended in Hungary and Poland, the two countries experiencing 
relatively high and persistent inflation. The CB independence is also one of the 
preconditions for joining the EMU, and, since the two countries are on the fast track to 
join the EU, they upgraded their laws to meet the Maastricht criteria.
In Albania, the new law on central bank was introduced as a part of the 1992 
stabilization package, just few months before the program backed by the IMF started 
(IMF technical assistance seemed to contribute to the enactment of the new law).
Two former Yugoslav Republics: Croatia and FYR Macedonia were involved in 
military conflicts and experienced higher inflation than other Central European 
economies. Croatia achieved macroeconomic stabilization without institutional changes 
and, at least initially, without IMF backing. The law granting independence to the 
National Bank of Macedonia was legislated in the year when inflation was the highest and 
the CB position was further upgraded two years after the initial program.
8 The paper follows Fischer et al (1996) in defining the dates of stabilization, with 
exception of Bulgaria and Romania, where the dates are for the most recent stabilization 
programs.
For extensive study on the effects of initial conditions on macroeconomic performance 
in transition, see De Melo et al (1997).
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Table 2-3 Inflation, timing of stabilization, and changes in central bank laws.
Highest
inflation
1990-1998
(year)
Stabilisation
program
IMF standby 
agreements
National currency 
adopted
(sole legal tender)
New CB laws 
and major 
amendments 
(U) - CBI 
upgraded, 
(D) - CBI 
reduced
Albania 237 (’92) Aug 92 Aug 92 Apr 92, Feb 96 
(U)
Armenia 10896
(’93)
Dec 94 Jun 95 Nov 93 (Nov 93) Aug 92, Apr 
93, Jun 96 (U)
Belarus 1996 (’93) Nov 94 Sep 95 May 92 (May 94) Dec 90, Dec 92 
(U)
Bulgaria 578 (’97) Jul 97 Mar 91, Apr 92, 
Apr 94, Jul 96, 
Apr 97
Jun 91, Apr 96 
(D),
Jun 97 (U)
Croatia 1149 (’93) Oct 93 Oct 94 ’92
Czech Rep. 52 ('91) Jan 91 Mar 93 Dec 92
Estonia 954 (’92) Jim 92 Sep 92, Oct 93 Jun 92 (Jun 92) Mar 90, May 
93 (U)
FYR
Macedonia
1935 (’92) Jan 94 May 95 Apr 92, Apr 96
(U)
Georgia 7488 (’93) Sep 94 Jun 95 Apr 93 (Aug 93) Aug 91, Jun 95 
(U), May 96 
(D)
Hungary 33 (’90) Mar 90 Mar 90, Sep 93 Oct 91, Jan 
1997 (U)
Kyrgyz
Rep.
1363 (’93) May 93 Jan 94 May 93 (May 93) Jun 91, Dec 92, 
Apr 94 (U), Jul 
97 (U)
Latvia 959 (’92) Jim 92 Sep 92, Dec 93 May 92 (Jul 92) Mar 90, May 
92 (U)
Lithuania 1161 (’92) Jun 92 Oct 92, Oct 93 May 92 (Oct 92) Feb 90, Mar 96
(U)
Moldova 2198 (’92) Sep 93 Dec 93, Mar 95 Jun 92 (Jul 93) Jun 91, Jul 
1995 (U)
Poland 249 (’90) Jan 90 Feb 90, Mar 93, 
Aug 94
Jan 89, Feb 92 
(U),
Aug 97(U)
Romania 296 (’93) Feb 97 Apr 91, May 92, 
May 94, Apr 97
Mar 91
Russia 2506 (’92) Apr 95 Aug 92, Apr 95 Jul 93 (Jul 93) Dec 90, Apr 95 
(U)
Slovak Rep. 58 (’91) Jan 91 Jul 94 Dec 92 (D)
Slovenia 247 (’91) Feb 92 Jun 91
Ukraine 10155
(’93)
Nov 94 Apr 95, May 96, 
Aug 97
Nov 92 (Nov 92) Mar 91
Source: National legislations, Fisher et al. (1996), Havrylyshyn (2000), EBRD (1997), EBRD (1999).
There were recurrent inflationary episodes and several stabilization attempts in Bulgaria 
and Romania. The first country was on the verge of hyperinflation in late 1996 and
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quickly deteriorating macroeconomic situation called for radical policy actions. The 
Bulgarian government successfully introduced the currency board system in mid 1997. 
The implementation of the new system was monitored by the IMF. Romania introduced 
changes to the CB law in 1998, as a part of the new government reform program. The 
new law restricted government borrowing from the bank by setting market interest rate on 
advances to the budget. The IMF standby agreement was signed less than a year before 
this amendment.
The CB independence in the FSU was initially restricted by the existence of the 
ruble area. The central banks participating in the monetary arrangement competed for 
seigniorage and tried to stimulate growth in their jurisdictions. As a result, the growth of 
credit was uncontrolled and inflation spilled over the rouble zone (see Balino et al., 
1997). The Baltic countries introduced their national currencies first and left the monetary 
union, launching stabilization programs under IMF conditionality. In Latvia the new CB 
law was enacted one month before the program started. Estonia introduced the currency 
board system in less than one year from the start of the stabilization program and the new 
IMF standby agreement was arranged soon after. Inflation in Lithuania stayed close to the 
level experienced by the Baltic neighbours, but the currency board was introduced three 
years after reducing inflation to two-digit level. Other countries of the FSU subsequently 
introduced the national currencies. Moldova, one of the first countries to follow Baltics, 
managed to reduce inflation quickly after the implementation of the IMF program. The 
CB law was upgraded only two years later, and again the timing of enactment coincided 
with the new IMF standby agreement. The Kyrgyz Republic also successfully stabilized 
the economy after leaving the ruble area. The IMF standby agreement was signed few 
months after the stabilization program had been launched, and changes in the law 
strengthening CB independence followed. Drastic eradication of hyperinflation occurred 
in Armenia and Georgia, two countries involved in the military conflicts. Six months after 
its start, the Armenian program was backed by the IMF agreement and the new central 
bank law was enacted one year later. In Georgia, the sequence of events was similar, but 
CB independence was upgraded simultaneously with the IMF agreement. In Belarus, 
Russia and Ukraine stabilization started later. Russia introduced its program 
simultaneously with signing the IMF standby agreement and upgrading CBI. Belarus and 
Ukraine concluded their agreements with the IMF few months after launching the
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programs. CBI in Belarus was relatively high after introduction of the national currency. 
Ukraine did not upgrade CB independence after stabilization.
In four cases (Bulgaria, Georgia, Latvia and Russia) changes to the laws were 
introduced simultaneously with stabilization plans or, in case of Latvia, soon before it 
started. The CBI was used as an instrument to improve credibility of the new policy. 
Although the role of external conditionality and expertise might have been significant, the 
changes in the laws required strong domestic political consensus on the new policy. In six 
other countries the amendments were passed within a year from the IMF stabilization 
package. Since institutional changes were introduced only with lags, the external 
conditionality had probably a greater role in establishing the initial confidence in policy 
changes. Subsequent amendments to the law sanctioned the restrictions imposed by the 
IMF conditionality and the anti-inflationary consensus was established when the benefits 
from lower inflation became evident. In the first stage of stabilization the IMF played a 
"scapegoat" function: policy makers blamed external conditionality for the unpopular 
decisions they had to implement.10
In all cases discussed above changes in the CB law were motivated by policy 
makers’ increasing aversion to inflation and their attempts to establish anti-inflationary 
credibility. Fiscal policy, however, was the main factor behind the inflationary episodes 
and the consistency of fiscal and monetary adjustments determined the success of 
stabilization. Constraints on government borrowing from financial markets require more 
painful fiscal adjustments and the narrower these markets are, the less willingly policy 
makers restrict their ability to borrow from the central bank (Cukierman, 1996). The 
scope for the non-monetary budget deficit financing, however, does not seem to affect 
decisions regarding the CBI.11 When fiscal adjustments were not sufficient, the deficit 
was financed by external borrowing and by crowding out credits to the private sector. The 
CBI was thoroughly tested when the government hits the borrowing limit. The Russian
10 See James (1998) for a discussion on the changing role of IMF conditionality.
11 The correlation between CB independence established by the most recent law and 
measures of banking reform and securities markets from the 1997 EBRD transition report 
is close to zero.
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crisis clearly illustrates this problem12, although in this case policy makers bypassed the 
“unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” by defaulting on the debt.
2.7 Central bank independence and inflation performance
Historical episodes of stopping hyperinflations tend to suggest that the CB independence 
may be a powerful device for achieving price stability. Empirical cross-country studies 
show a negative correlation between the independence and inflation level for various 
groups of countries. The sample of transition economies is unique in a sense that it 
provides both cross-section and time series data on the CBI and inflation rates. To assess 
how well the CBI performs its anti-inflationary task, the paper tests for die relationship 
between the independence and inflation focusing on both characteristics of the data.
Figure 2-1 plots average inflation in the period starting next year after enactment 
of the CB law against CB independence measured by GMT index. Following CMN, 
inflation is characterized by the depreciation in the real value of money 7 t/(l+ 7 t), where n 
is inflation rate. Data on end-year inflation is obtained from 1997 EBRD Transition 
Report and 1999 EBRD Transition Update. Countries on the graph are divided into two 
groups according to their progress in transition to market economy. The progress is 
measured by the cumulative liberalisation indicator (CLI) taken from De Melo et al. 
(1996) (for 1989-1994) and updated by using indicators from EBRD Transition Reports 
(for 1995-1998).13 Following CMN, the threshold between fast and slow reformers is set 
to 2.
12 The Central Bank of Russian Federation evaded legal provisions prohibiting credit to 
the government by redeeming maturing treasury bills from the market. Foreign currency 
credits were provided through lending via the Vneshekonombank.
13 De Melo et al. liberalisation index is the weighted average (with weights of 0.3, 0.3., 
and 0.4 respectively) of indices of liberalisation in internal markets (I), external markets 
(E) and private sector entry (P). The first two correspond respectively to the price 
liberalisation indicator and the trade and foreign exchange system indicator of the EBRD. 
The private sector entry index is the average of the small-scale and large-scale 
privatisation indicators and the banking system reform indicator. The EBRD indicators 
are rescaled to the 0-1 range and De Melo et al. index is updated by adding the changes in 
the EBRD index to the 1994 value.
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Figure 2-1 Inflation (depreciation in the real value of money) and independence (OI).
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AL-Albania, AR-Armenia, BE-Belarus, BU-Bulgaria, CR-Croatia, CZ-Czech Rep., ES-Estonia, MA- 
FYR Macedonia, GE-Georgia, HU-Hungary, KY-Kyrgyzstan, LA-Latvia, LI-Lithuania, MO- 
Moldova, PL-Poland, RM-Romania, RU-Russia, SK-Slovak Rep., SV-Slovenia, UK-Ukraine
Source: Table 2-1, EBRD (1997) and EBRD (1999)
The inverse relation between central bank independence and inflation seems to be present 
in the sample. Belarus (1990 and 1992 laws), Bulgaria (1991), Moldova (1991) and 
Russia (1990) are the most prominent outliers. The laws in Belarus, Moldova and Russia 
were enacted when the countries only began the process of price liberalisation and when 
the rouble zone arrangement restricted their monetary independence. Deviations from the 
negative CBI-inflation relationship reflect a degree of initial monetary overhang and the 
lack of restrictions on credit creation in the rouble zone. Moreover, the strong position of 
the president in the Belarusian political system may reduce the actual independence of the 
bank, even if the legal independence is relatively high. For this reason Belarus remains an 
outlier even after the first law had been amended in 1992. Bulgaria encountered a fiscal
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crisis and a systemic banking crisis in 1996/1997 and the position on the graph reflects a 
near-hyperinflation experienced in this period.
The relationship between independence and inflation is statistically tested in the 
first set of equations reported in Table 2-4, where inflation in the post-enactment period is 
regressed on GMT measures of political independence, economic independence and the 
sum of the two. Since countries under investigation vary in the degree of macroeconomic 
imbalances inherited from past and the progress of market reforms and the CBI may be a 
proxy for a general soundness of policy, it has become a standard to include an overall 
indicator of transition progress in the regression testing the relation between the CBI and 
inflation.
Table 2-4 Relationship between average depreciation in the real value of money (n/(l+n)) in the post- 
enactment period and CBI
Dependent variable: 7i/(l+7t)
Regressors:
Political independence, lagged (PIt.i)
Economic Independence, lagged (EIt_i)
Overall Independence, lagged ( Oit_i = PI,_i + EI,_i) -0.0174*
-0.0207*
(0.0118)
-0.0119
(0.0140)
0.0040
Overall Independence when CLI > 2 
Cumulative Liberalization Index (CLI)
(0.0082)
-0.0839** -0.0859**
(0.0066)
-0.0264**
(0.0065)
-0.0460**
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0147)
CONSTANT 0.8010** 0.8006** 0.6602**
(0.0539) (0.0540) (0.0628)
R-squared: 0.737 0.739 0.840
Adjusted R-squared: 0.718 0.71 0.822
Number of observations: 31 31 31
Notes:
Numbers in parenthesis are significance levels.
** and * denotes significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively
The relationship between CB independence on inflation is statistically significant. The 
results in die first column indicate that the effect of the combined index of overall 
independence (sum of the political and economic independence) on inflation is negative 
and significantly different from zero. The second column shows that the coefficient of 
political independence is close to the coefficient of overall independence and significant, 
while the coefficient of economic independence is still negative, but lower in absolute 
value and not significant. These findings are consistent with Loungani and Sheets (1997),
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who also find more significant influence of political independence in their sample. One 
possible explanation for this result is that more politically independent central banks 
manage to sterilise government’s borrowing even if they are not strong enough to enforce 
full adherence to the law and keep credit to the government within the legal limits. CMN 
find some evidence of a moderating effect of limitations on lending on inflation in their 
study. This result, however, is obtained without conditioning on the cumulative 
liberalisation index. In the sample under investigation, the regression of inflation on two 
measures of independence alone (not reported) gives die coefficient of economic 
independence that is highly significant and higher in absolute value than the coefficient of 
political independence. This result suggests that more advanced transition countries tend 
to have stricter limitations on lending and that the coefficient of economic independence 
may be biased if the CLI is not included in the model.
The last column repeats the experiment reported by CMN, who consider different 
impact of independence on inflation at different stages of transition. They found a 
significant and negative relationship between these two only at the high level of 
economic transformation. This conclusion is tested here in a similar way: a new variable, 
which is equal to OIt-i at the high level of transition (measured by the CLI) and is zero 
otherwise, is added to the regression. The threshold, which is chosen by maximising R- 
squared, is equal to 2 and is the same as in CMN. The new variable is negative, 
significant at 1 percent significance level and higher in absolute value than the 
independence index alone in the previous regression. The coefficient of the overall 
independence measure becomes positive and loses its significance (the positive relation 
between independence and inflation at low level of liberalisation is driven by four 
outliers, as is evident from Figure 2-1). The result is similar to that obtained by 
Cukierman et al., although, contrary to results presented here, they do not discover any 
significant relationship between inflation and independence without the new variable.
Equations in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 explore the time series dimension of the 
sample, using annual data instead of aggregating them to the pre- and post-enactment 
averages. The panel estimation has numerous advantages: it gives more degrees of 
freedom, properly takes into account different number of observations for different 
countries and laws, and allows for conditioning on other potentially significant variables. 
In particular, a step dummy that is one in the year of signing the IMF standby agreement
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and after, and zero otherwise, is added to regressors. This variable accounts for the effect 
of the external conditionality on policy performance and is constructed from the dates of 
IMF agreements in Havrylyshyn et al. (2000). To test for the significance of government 
deficit financing, the general government budget deficit is also added to regressions (the 
series is constructed from the data in 1997 EBRD Transition Report and 1999 EBRD 
Transition Update). Finally, a step dummy for countries participating in the rouble zone is 
added: the dummy is one before a country adopts its own currency and zero afterwards. 
For non-FSU countries the dummy is always zero. Dates of adopting national currencies, 
reported in table 3, are from Lybek (1999).
Since results from the panel data are sensitive to adopted estimation methods, for 
each equation the tables report coefficients obtained from regressions with fixed and 
random effects, including only individual effects and both individual and time effects. 
The significance of individual and time effects is tested by F-tests on corresponding 
dummy variables and by Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests. The null 
hypotheses in both tests are that individual and time effects do not exist. The correlation 
between regressors and unobserved effects is tested by Hausman’s (1978) test. In 
presence of such correlation, random effects method gives inconsistent and biased 
estimates, while the estimates from fixed effects method are still consistent and unbiased, 
and thus preferred. Otherwise, the random effects estimator is more efficient. The fixed 
effects method eliminates variation between countries, so that estimates are based on 
variation over time only. The random effects method takes into account both sources of 
variation in the data.
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Table 2-5 Relationship between annual depreciation in the real value of money (tc/(1+tc)) in post- 
enactment period and CBI.
Dependent variable: tc/(1+tc)
Maximum estimation period: 1990 - 1998 
Specification: yit = a  + uit
Uit = Mi + Yit (individual effects only)
Uit = Mi +^t + vit (time & individual effects) 
Mi ~ HD(0,cO, ~  HD(0,ctx), Vh ~ HD(0,ctv)
Individual effects only Time & individual 
effects
Individual effects only Time & individual 
effects
Regressors: Fixed 
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
OIt.t -0.0171 -0.016422 -0.0306* -0.0298* 0.0189 0.0191 -0.0021 0.0071
(0.0150) (0.0128) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0110) (0.0159) (0.0138)
CLI -0.0853** -0.0881** 0.1624** 0.0152 -0.0452** -0.0491** 0.0812 -0.0283
(0.0142) (0.0133) (0.061) (0.0392) (0.0142) (0.0129) (0.0633) (0.0268)
OIt.i when CLI > 2 -0.0343** -0.0360** -0.0232** -0.0299**
(0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0072) (0.0063)
CONSTANT 0.7964** 0.5966* 0.5920** 0.5814**
(0.1272) -0.2317 (0.0966) (0.1611)
R-squared: 0.613 0.595 0.716 0.176 0.710 0.677 0.744 0.433
Adjusted R-sq 0.532 0.588 0.63 0.162 0.646 0.668 0.664 0.419
Durbin-Watson: 1.052 1.3 1.313 1.347
Number o f obs: 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Hausman’s 0.4035 (0.817) 9.995 (0.007) 2.256 (0.521) 3.698 (0.296)
Chi-squared statistic
LM (HO: c^= 0) 0.876 (0.349) 1.104(0.293)
LM (HO: a x= 0) 2.288 (0.130) 0.349 (0.555)
LM (HO: a„= aj,= 0) 3.164(0.206) 1.453 (0.484)
F-statistic for equality of dummy variables:
time dummies: F(7,93) = 4.78 (0.00) F(7,92)= 1.769 (0.103)
group dummies: F(19,93) = 2.606 (0.00) F(19,92) = 1.685 (0.053)
Notes:
OIt-i - Overall Independence, lagged one period 
CLI - Cumulative Liberalisation Index
** and * denotes significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. Numbers in parenthesis under coefficients 
are standard errors . Numbers in parenthesis reported with the tests are marginal significance levels. 
Variance components for random effects model with individual and time effects are estimated as suggested 
by Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989). Variance components for random effects model with individual effects 
only is estimated as suggested by Swamy and Arora (1972) (see Baltagi (1995) p. 153).
14 In order to account for possible autocorrelation in the error term, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for (artificially balanced) panel data model 
with fixed effects are estimated as suggested by Arellano (1987). These standard errors 
were close to standard errors estimated under classical assumptions and thus the latter are 
reported for the (unbalanced) panel data model presented in the paper.
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Table 2-6 Relationship between annual depreciation in the real value of money (rc/(l-Hc)) in post 
enactment period and CBI.
Dependent variable: 7i/(l+7t)
Maximum estimation period: 1990 - 1998 
Specification: yit = a  +Xit’J3 + uit
uit = p i  + Yit (individual effects only)
uit = Pi +^t + Vjt (time & individual effects)
P i ~  HD(0,au), Xt ~ IID(0,ctO, vit ~ HD(0,av)
Individual effects only Time & individual 
effects
Individual effects only Time & individual 
effects
Regressors: Fixed 
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
Fixed
effects
Random
effects
O o © o © -0.0102 -0.0179 -0.015479 0.0100 0.0109 0.0036 0.0080
(0.0116) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0120) (0.0100) (0.0138) (0.0095)
CLI -0.0455** -0.0494** 0.034376 -0.0466* -0.0282* -0.0322** -0.0225 -0.0462*
(0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0564) (0.0197) (0.0122) (0.0112) (0.0575) (0.0198)
OIt-i when CLI > 2 -0.0203** -0.0225** -0.0185** -0.0220**
(0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0053)
DEFm -0.0108** -0.0099** -0.0093** -0.0091** -0.0090** -0.0076** -0.0082** -0.0060**
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0023)
IMF,.! -0.2060** -0.1904** -0.1769** -0.1791** -0.1780** -0.1519** -0.1747** -0.1352**
(0.0603) (0.0541) (0.0630) (0.0556) (0.0569) (0.0479) (0.0605) (0.0469)
RUBEL 0.3036** 0.3125** 0.2542** 0.2960** 0.2424** 0.2467** 0.2368** 0.2572**
(0.0768) (0.0741) (0.0916) (0.0838) (0.0737) (0.0701) (0.0882) (0.0834)
CONSTANT 0.6624** 0.7071** 0.5614** 0.6485**
(0.1168) (0.1383) (0.1024) (0.1092)
R-squared: 0.782 0.759 0.799 0.584 0.811 0.781 0.816 0.741
Adjusted R-sq 0.728 0.749 0.729 0.566 0.761 0.769 0.750 0.728
Durbin-Watson: 1.551 1.55 1.612 1.592
Number of obs: 122 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Hausman’s Chi- 4.831 (0.437) 5.360 (0.374) 7.627 (0.267) 7.751 (0.257)
squared statistic
LM (HO: ct„= 0) 14.448 (0.000) 11.931 (0.001)
LM (HO: a x= 0) 0.083 (0.773) 1.439 (0.230)
LM (H0: 0 m= ctx= 0) 14.531 (0.001) 13.370 (0.001)
F-statistic for equality of dummy variables (marginal significance level):
time dummies: F(7,90) -  1.074 (0.387) F(7,89) = 0.390 (0.906)
group dummies: F(19,90)= 3.398 (0.00) F(19.89) = 2.810 (0.001)
Notes:
OIm - Overall Independence, lagged one period 
CLI - Cumulative Liberalisation Index
** and * denotes significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. Numbers in parenthesis under coefficients 
are standard errors . Numbers in parenthesis reported with the tests are marginal significance levels. 
Variance components for random effects model with individual and time effects are estimated as suggested 
by Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989). Variance components for random effects model with individual effects 
only is estimated as suggested by Swamy and Arora (1972) (see Baltagi (1995) p. 153).
Table 2-5 repeats the earlier regression between inflation and CBI for the panel. The 
results support negative relationship between independence and inflation, even after 
controlling for the cumulative liberalisation. Coefficients of the overall independence
15 See previous footnote.
-38-
(OI) in the model with individual effects are close to those obtained from the time 
aggregated data. Standard errors of these estimates are, however, larger and the 01 is not 
significantly different from zero. The effect of independence in the advanced stage of 
transformation is highly significant and larger in absolute value than estimated from the 
time aggregated data. The coefficient of the cumulative liberalisation index is negative 
and significant. In models with both individual and time effects (preferred on the basis of 
F statistics for time and individual dummies, although not on the basis of LM tests) the 
coefficient of the independence index is negative, significant and larger in absolute value 
than in earlier regression. A model with both effects, but allowing for a different impact 
of CBI in the advanced transformation stage, strongly supports the conclusion from the 
time aggregated data and indicates that the relationship between CBI and inflation is 
stronger at the higher level of liberalisation.
Regressions in Table 2-6 introduce the rouble zone dummy, IMF conditionality 
and budget deficits. The last two variables are lagged one period to allow for a delay 
between a policy change and inflation and to avoid endogeneity problems, particularly in 
case of the budget deficit. The three new variables are significant and have expected 
signs: inflation drops after introducing IMF programs and after adopting own currency, 
increases with higher in absolute value general government budget deficit. Regressions 
without time effects are now preferred over models with both effects on the basis of F 
statistics for time dummies and LM tests, but all models produce similar results. The 
coefficient of the overall independence is much smaller in absolute value than in models 
estimated from time aggregated data or from the panel with only one conditional variable 
and not statistically significant. The coefficient of independence at the high level of 
liberalisation is smaller in absolute value than in earlier regressions, but is still negative 
and highly significant.
Thus, the panel regressions conditional on additional variables support the 
conclusion that the negative relationship between inflation and independence is present in 
the data, but only at the advanced stage of economic transformation. The significance of 
CBI in models without the additional variables does not arise from the correlation 
between policy adjustments and changes in the law.
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2.8 Conclusions
Almost all transition economies passed through the period of very high inflation. 
Economic theory suggests that an independent central bank can protect an economy from 
excessive monetary expansion, facilitating the stabilisation process and protecting society 
from inflationary bias. However, in a period of severe macroeconomic imbalances, this 
institutional arrangement may not be effective enough to stabilise the economy.
How effective is central bank independence in protecting price stability? The 
results reported in the text indicate that, although the fiscal policy stance and external 
conditionality are important elements of the stabilisation process, changes in the CB laws 
are highly significant in explaining the annual inflation rates over time. The CB 
independence, however, is not a substitute for other elements of stabilisation programs 
and exerts a downward pressure on inflation only at the high level of liberalisation, after 
the initial price liberalisation shock had been contained. Moreover, in most cases analysed 
here the new CB laws were enacted after the stabilisation program had been introduced. 
The two results: statistical significance of the CB independence at the high level of 
liberalisation, as well as the timing of stabilisation attempts and reforms of CB laws, 
suggest that the independence is a powerful device for protecting price stability, but not 
for stabilising the price level.
It still may be true that monetary institutions do not really matter for inflation 
performance, even after the initial stabilisation. The significance of CBI could mean that 
independence is a proxy for inflation aversion in the society and among policy makers. 
Granting legal independence to the central bank is a signal that the anti-inflationary 
consensus has been achieved when the costs of inflation exceed political gains from 
excessive monetary expansion. A lower inflation merely reflects the policy change and 
not the institutional changes.
Obviously, the legal framework is only one element of overall central bank 
independence. In the study by Cottarelli et al. (1998), who analyse a panel of transition 
and industrial countries, the CB independence is evaluated by IMF country economists in 
a questionnaire.16 Cottarelli et al. (1998) find significant effects of CB independence
16 The questionnaire asks IMF desk economists to evaluate CB independence in the scale 
from 1 (independent) to 10 (subordinate).
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evaluated in this way on inflation. Similar conclusions thus follow from a more 
behavioural approach to measuring independence and undermine the critics expressed 
above. Further research, based on other behavioural measures, would be useful to check 
the robustness of the results. Some measures already proposed in the literature could be 
applied here: average turnover of the governor, political vulnerability of the governor 
(fraction of political transitions followed by a replacement of the governor) and an index 
based on a questionnaire sent to the CB staff.
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2.9 Appendix: Construction of indices of Central Bank Independence
Table 2-7 Elements of political (PI) and economic (ED CB independence. OI = EI+PI.
G1 G2 G3 B4 B5 R6 R7 C8 C9 PI D10D11D12D13D14D15 M16 M17 EI OI
Albania 92 * * * + * 5 * * * * * 5 10
Albania 96 * * * * * * 6 * * * * * * 6 12
Armenia 93 * * * * * 5 * * * 3 8
Armenia 96 * * * * * ♦ ♦ 7 * * * * * * * 7 14
Belarus 90 * * * * * 5 * * * * 4 9
Belarus 92 * * * * * 5 * * * * * * 6 11
Bulgaria 91 * * * * * * * 7 * * * * * 5 12
Bulgaria 96 * * * * * * 6 * * * * * 5 11
Bulgaria 97 * * * * * * ♦ 4* 8 * * * * * * * 7 15
Croatia 92 ♦ * * * * * * 7 * * * * 4 11
Czech Rep 92 * * * * * * * * 8 * * * * * 5 13
Estonia 93 * * * * * * 6 * * * * * * * 7 13
Georgia 95 * * * * * ♦ * * 8 * * * * * * 6 14
Georgia 96 * * * * * * * 7 * * * * * * 6 13
Hungary 91 * * * 3 * * * * * * 6 9
Hungary 97 * * * 3 * * * * * * * 7 10
Kyrgyz Rep 92 * * * 3 * * * * * 5 8
Kyrgyz Rep 97 * + * * * * * * 8 * * * * * * * 7 15
Latvia 92 * * * * * * * * * 9 * * * 3 12
Lithuania 91 * ♦ * * * 5 * * 2 7
Lithuania 96 * * * * * * * * 7 15
Macedonia 96 * * * * * * * * 8 * * * * * * 6 14
Moldova 91 * * * * * * * * 8 * * 2 10
Moldova 95 * * * * * * * * 8 * * * * * 5 13
Poland 89 * * * * 4 * * * * 4 8
Poland 92 * * * * * * 6 * * * * 4 10
Poland 97 * * * * * * * 7 * * * * * * * 7 14
Romania 91 * * ♦ * 4 * * * 3 7
Russia 90 * * * ♦ * 5 * * * * * 5 10
Russia 95 * * * * * 5 * * * * * * 6 11
Slovak Rep 92 * * * * * 5 * * * * * * 6 11
Slovenia 91 * * * * * * * 7 * * * * 4 11
Ukraine 91 * * * 3 * * 2 5
Source: National legislation
G1: Governor not appointed by the government
G2: Governor appointed for more than 5 years
G3: Provisions for governor's dismissal non-political only
B4: None of the board appointed by the government
B5: Board appointed for more than 5 years
R6: No mandatory government representative in the board
R7: Government approval of monetary policy is not required
C8: Statutory responsibility to pursue monetary stability
C9: Presence of legal provision supporting bank in conflicts with the government
DIO: Direct credit facility is not automatic
D11: Direct credit facility is at the market interest rate
D12: Direct credit facility is temporary
D13: Direct credit facility is of limited amount
D14: CB does not participate in the primary market
D15: All direct credit is securitized
M l6: Discount rate is set by the central bank
M l7: Supervision of commercial banks is not entrusted to CB (**) or not entrusted to CB alone (*)
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Table 2-8 Central bank governor
Country Governor appointed by Term (years) Reappointment Provisions for 
dismissal
Albania 96 President (proposal of 
the Central Bank Board)
7 Yes Non-political
Armenia 96 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
7 ? Non-political
Belarus 96 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
6 - -
Bulgaria 97 Parliament 6 Two terms Non-political and action 
or inaction resulting in a 
failure to fulfil any task 
of the Bank
Croatia 92 Parliament 6 - -
Czech Rep. 92 President 6 - Non-political
Estonia 93 President (proposal of 
the Board Chairman)
5 - Non-political
Georgia 96 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
7 Yes Disagreement on a 
current monetary policy 
between the Central 
Bank and the Parliament 
(or President)
Hungary 97 President (proposal of 
the Prime Minister)
6 Yes Non-political
Kyrgystan President (approval of  
the Parliament)
7 Three terms Non-political
Latvia 92 Parliament 6 Yes Non-political
Lithuania 91 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
5 - Non-political
Macedonia 96 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
7 Two terms Non-political
Moldova 95 Parliament 7 - Non-political
Poland 97 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
6 Two terms Non-political
Romania 91 Parliament (proposal of 
the Prime Minister)
8 Yes Unconditional
Russia 95 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
4 - Non-political
Slovak Rep. 92 President on 
Government's proposal
6 Two terms Non-political
Slovenia 91 Parliament (proposal of 
the President)
6 Yes -
Ukraine 91 Parliament 4 - -
Sources: National legislations. For Armenia: Cukierman et al. (1998) and Bank of Armenia WWW page.
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Table 2-9 Central bank board
Country Board appointed by Members Term (years) Reappointment Government 
representative
Albania 96 Parliament: 3 members, President: 1 member, 
Council of Ministers: 2 members, Minister of 
Finance: 1 member, Central Bank Board:
1 member, Governor: 1 member
9 7 Yes No
Armenia 96 Parliament (proposal o f the President): 
V-Govemor,
President: 5 other members
7 7 (V-Govemor),
5 (other members)
No
Belarus 96 Parliament: 1 member, Council of Ministers: 
1 member, Parliament (proposal o f the 
Governor): other members
6 No
Bulgaria 97 Parliament (proposal of the Governor):
3 V-Govemors, President: 3 other members
7 6 - No
Croatia 92 Parliament (proposal of the Governor): Deputy 
Governor and V-Govemors, Parliament: other 
members
9-15 6 (Deputy 
Governor and V- 
Govemors)
No
Czech Rep. 92 President 7 6 - Yes (advisory)
Estonia 93 Parliament (proposal o f the President): 
Chairman, Parliament (proposal o f the 
Chairman): other members
5 Yes 
(Minister of 
Finance)
Georgia 96 Parliament (proposal o f the President) 9 7 Yes No
Hungary 97 President (proposal of the Governor, agreed 
with and presented by the Prime Minister): 
Deputy Governors, President (proposal of the 
Prime Minister consulted with the Governor): 
other members
Max 11 6 (Deputy 
Governors),
3 (other members)
Yes (advisoiy)
Kyrgystan President (proposal of the Governor) 9 7 Three terms No
Latvia 92 Parliament (proposal o f the Governor) 8 6 Yes Minister of
(advisory and 
suspensive 
right)
Lithuania 91 President (proposal of the Governor) 14 9 - No
Macedonia 96 Parliament (proposal o f the Governor): 
Deputy Governor and V-Govemors, 
Parliament: other members
9 7 Two terms 
(Deputy 
Governor), No 
(other members)
No
Moldova 95 Parliament (proposal o f the Governor) 5 7 - Yes (advisory)
Poland 97 President: 3 members, 
Parliament: 6 six members
9 6 No Yes (advisory)
Romania 91 Parliament (proposal o f the Prime Minister) 9 8 Yes No
Russia 95 Parliament (proposal of the Governor after 
consultation with the President)
13 4 - Minister of 
Finance
Minister of 
Economy 
(advisory)
Slovak Rep. 
92
President (proposal of the Government with the 
consent o f the Parliament): 2 V-Govemors 
Government (proposal of the Governor):
2 Executive Directors and 3 other members
8 6 (V-Govemors Two terms 
and Executive 
Directors),
4 (other members)
Yes (advisory)
Slovenia 91 Parliament (proposal of the Govemor):Deputy 
Governor and 3 V-Govemors, Parliament 
(proposal of the President): 6 other members
11 6 No
Ukraine 91 Parliament (proposal of the Governor) 4 No
Sources'. National legislations. For Armenia: Cukierman et al. (1998) and Bank of Armenia WWW page.
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Table 2-10 Monetary policy
Country Relation with 
Government
Relation with Parliament Monetary
stability
objective
Provisions in case of 
disagreement 
Central Bank vs. 
Government
Albania 96 Consultation Bank submits semi-annual policy statements 
(assessment of the monetary policy in the 
proceeding six month and the monetary policy 
that will be followed in the next six months)
Yes No
Belarus 96 Advisory Bank submits quarterly reports and monetary 
policy guidelines for the next year. Parliament 
issues recommendations regarding monetary 
policy guidelines
Yes Yes
Bulgaria 97 Advisory Bank submits annual and semi-annual reports Yes Yes
Croatia 92 - Bank submit reports at least twice a year and 
on demand
Yes Yes
Czech Rep. 92 Advisory Bank submit reports at least twice a year Yes Yes
Estonia 93 Advisory Bank submits annual reports Yes Yes
Georgia 96 Advisory Bank submits annual reports. Parliament Yes Independence from the
issues directives regarding monetary policy 
guidelines.
Government. Board 
dismissal in case of 
disagreement on 
Parliament directives 
regarding monetary 
policy_____________
Hungary 97 Co-operation Bank submits annual reports and monetary 
___________ policy guidelines___________
Yes No
Kyrgystan Co-operation if Bank submits annual reports and semi-annual Yes Yes
price stability not reports on monetary policy developments.
_______________ endangered_______Parliament approves annual reports.__________________________
Latvia 92 Advisory Bank submits annual reports Yes Minister o f Finance has
a right to postpone a 
decition o f the Board for 
ten days. The decision is 
executed if the Board 
does not change it
Lithuania 91 Advisory Bank submits semi-annual reports Yes Yes
Macedonia 96 - Bank submits semi-annual and annual reports Yes No
Moldova 95 Co-operation Bank submits annual reports Yes No
Poland 97 Co-operation Bank submits monetary policy guidelines and 
annual reports
Yes No
Romania 91 - Annual report Yes No
Russia 95 Co-operation Bank submits annual reports and presents 
monetary policy guidelines. Parliament issues 
statements regarding reports and monetary 
policy guidelines of the Bank.
Yes Yes
Slovak Rep. 92 Advisory Bank submits semi-annual reports Yes Yes
Slovenia 91 - Bank submit reports at least twice a year Yes No
Ukraine 91 Bank submit annual reports and monetary 
policy guidelines. Parliament approves 
monetary policy guidelines.
No No
Sources'. National legislations.
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Table 2-11 Constraints on central bank credit to the government
Country Instrument Maturity Quantitative Ceiling Interest rate
Albania 96 Direct loans one year 10% (1996), 6% (1997) and 2%(1998) o f the 
budget revenue in the preceding year
Not lower than the 
market rate on treasury 
bills
Securities (P) U 4% of the budget revenue in the preceding year -
Securities (S) U U -
Belarus 92 Direct loans Less than six months 5% of the GDP in the current financial year -
Securities (P) P P -
Securities (S) U U -
Bulgaria 97 Direct loans P - -
Securities (P) P - -
Securities (S) P - -
Croatia 92 Direct loans Repayable not later than the 
end of the budgetary year
5 percent o f the budget Discount rate
Securities (P) U U -
Securities (S) U U -
Czech Rep. 
92
Direct loans Less than three months 5 percent of the budget revenue in the previous 
year
-
Securities (P) U U -
Securities (S) U U -
Estonia 93 Direct loans P P -
Securities (P) P P -
Securities (S) P P -
Georgia 96 Direct loans Less than six months 5 percent (in special circumstances 8 percent if  it is Market rate
consistent with monetary policy of the Bank) o f 
the average budget revenue in die last three 
______________ financial years______________
Securities (P) The above conditions applies to purchases of 
securities but may be relax if  securities are 
purchased for conducting monetary policy on the 
secondary market
Securities (S)
Hungary 97 Direct loans Up to 15 days and 
repayable before the end of 
the budgetary year
2% of the planned budget revenues Basic rate
Securities (P) P P P
Securities (S) U U U
Kyrgystan 97 Direct loans P P -
Securities (P) P P -
Securities (S) u u -
Latvia 92 Direct loans u l/12th of the planned revenue -
Securities (P) u U -
Securities (S) u U -
Lithuania 96 Direct loans p P -
Securities (P) p P -
Securities (S) u U -
Macedonia 96 Direct loans Repayable not later than the 
end of die budgetary year
5 percent of the planned budget Market
Securities (P) U U -
Securities (S) U U -
Sources: National legislations.
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Table 2-11 (contd). Constraints on central bank credit to the government
Country Instrument Maturity Quantitative Ceiling Interest rate
Moldova 95 Direct loans U U Market
Securities (P) P P P
Securities (S) Less than 6 months u -
Poland 97 Direct loans P p -
Securities (P) P p -
Securities (S) U u -
Romania 91 Direct loans U 10 percent of the planned budget and twice the 
sum of the capital and reserve fund of the Bank
-
Securities (P) u U U
Securities (S) u U U
Russia 95 Direct loans - Prohibited, unless stated otherwise in the budget 
law
-
Securities (P) - -
Securities (S) u U -
Slovak Rep. 
92
Direct loans Less than three months Prohibited 5 percent of the budget revenues in the 
previous year None
u
Securities (P) P P -
Securities (S) Less than one year U -
Slovenia 91 Direct loans Repayable not later than the 
end of the budgetary year
5 percent of the budget and 20 percent of die 
planned budget deficit
u
Securities (P) U U -
Securities (S) U U -
Ukraine 91 Direct loans U Subject to decision of the Parliament -
Securities (P) U U -
Securities (S) U U -
Sources: National legislations.
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3 M o n ey , Infla tio n  and  O u tpu t  in  R om ania , 1992-200017
3.1 Introduction
The end of central planning in Europe—whether it came as a result of slow decay or of 
rapid collapse—was frequently accompanied by bursts of high inflation. Though the 
causes of that inflation have been and remain a subject of debate, statistical tests of 
alternative hypotheses have not been frequent.18 One of the central questions is the extent 
to which these early periods of high inflation were caused by excess monetary creation 
versus other factors. This paper addresses that question in the case of Romania, a weakly 
reformed, high inflation, transition economy.
High inflation can not persist unless it is caused or validated by excessive money 
creation. The objective of this paper is to provide an empirical estimate of the relationship 
between inflation and money creation in Romania, and to test statistically the extent to 
which money creation is cause or effect.
Romania is an interesting case in its own right, but also because liberalization in 
this country was delayed and drawn out, and the dynamics of high inflation can be 
observed over a period of several years. This paper specifies and estimates a demand 
function for real money in Romania. This is done with monthly data from January 1992, 
the earliest date for which all of the necessary series are available, to December 2000, 
when the rate of inflation first durably declined below 35% per year at an annual rate. 
Augmented ADF tests suggest strongly that the principal variables are integrated of order 
one. In this context, the search for a real money demand function is a search for a co- 
integrating, equilibrium relationship; and an important question is whether, and to what 
degree, the observed high inflation is influenced by divergence between actual money 
supply and equilibrium money demand.
The estimation of equilibrium real money demand functions has been one of the 
central focuses of the empirical literature on applied co-integration analysis. Ever since 
the path breaking studies of Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Juselius (1992),
17 This chapter is based on the joint paper with Nina Budina, Georges de Menil and 
Geomina Turlea, forthcoming in Journal of International Money and Finance.
18 One of the obstacles to statistical inference is the short duration of the initial burst of 
high inflation in most transition countries.
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cointegrating real money demand equations have been identified and estimated in many 
different countries and contexts. Lutkepohl and Wolters (1998) edit the proceedings of a 
workshop motivated by the run-up to European Monetary Union, in which co-integration 
estimates of money demand are presented for the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, 
Germany, Spain, Greece and Switzerland.19 Ericsson et al. (1998) discuss the structural 
analysis of co-integrating relationships in their introduction to a series of studies in which 
this method is applied to money demand in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Turkey, 
Brazil and Australia.20
Though the general principles of money demand analysis apply to all non- 
centrally planned economies, European transition economies present certain characteristic 
traits, which call for a distinctive approach. These are: high inflation; large amounts of 
directed, non-market credits; periods when the exchange rate is significantly over-valued; 
and pervasive price controls. The paper argues that these call for modeling money 
demand with an extended version of the Cagan (1956) specification.
Single equation co-integration methods have been used to estimate long-run, 
Cagan money demand functions for transition economies by Aarle and Budina (1995). 
Measures of the difference between money supply and such money demand functions 
have been used as part of an error correction mechanism to explain inflation in Russia by 
Choudry (1998)21 This paper can be viewed as an extension to another incompletely 
reformed economy of the approach of Choudry.22
19 See Hendiy and Mizon (1998), Ripatti (1998), Eitrheim (1998), Schamagl (1998), 
Lutkepohl and Wolters(1998), Vega (1998), Ericsson (1998), Ericsson and Sharma 
(1998), Peytrignet and Stahel (1998), and Juselius (1998).
20 The studies, in a special section of the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, are 
Harbo et al. (1998), Juselius (1998), Metin (1998), Durevall (1998) and de Brouwer and 
Ericsson (1998). See also, earlier work by Hendry and Doomik (1994).
21 See also the study of inflation in Ukraine by Banaian et al. (1998).
22 The special characteristics of the Cagan money demand function in Romania have been 
studied by Dobrescu (1994). Co-integration techniques are used to estimate a complete 
model of the monetary mechanism in Pelinescu and Scutaru (2000).
-49-
The rejection the weak exogeneity of inflation and the finding that excess money 
supply affects the course of inflation confirms Choudry’s result. The specification and 
conclusions differ from those reached in a related analysis in IMF (2001).
Section 3.2 reviews the context of transition in Romania and presents the data. 
Section 3.3 discusses the distinguishing characteristics of money demand and inflation in 
European transition countries. Section 3.4 tests for the stationarity of the variables 
studied. Section 3.5 uses the Johansen (1998) technique to identify and estimate a co- 
integrating relationship and test for weak exogeneity. Section 3.6 estimates the implied 
error correction models and uses them to compute out-of-sample forecasts. The economic 
implications of these results are interpreted in Section 3.7.
3.2 Romania: A Decade of Delayed Liberalization and High Inflation
233.2.1 Political transformations
Under Ceausescu, Romania experienced one of the most draconian and repressive 
regimes in the Communist Europe. After he was overthrown in December 1989, power 
remained in the hands of the successor to the Communist Party, which eventually became 
the PDSR (Partidul Democrat Social Roman).
The PDSR introduced partial political and economic reforms, but resisted full 
liberalization. On at least two occasions, steps toward liberalization were either thwarted, 
or offset by increased distortions elsewhere. The unification of exchange rates in 
November 1991 was accompanied by a large devaluation, but the authorities stopped 
short of either adopting external convertibility, or freeing domestic prices. The exchange 
rate remained controlled, and was soon again overvalued. It remained overvalued until 
early 1997.
In June 1993, the share of consumer prices subject to controls was reduced from 
over 50% to about 40%, and, in October of the same year, real interest rates on credits 
from the state-owned banking system (which had been as low as -230%) were increased 
to positive levels. By the spring of the following year, massive directed credits to state 
owned enterprises and political affiliates had resumed. Between 1994 and 1996, the
23 The political economy of Romania’s first ten years of transition is discussed in De 
Menil (2003).
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economy grew, but the distortions resulting from subsidized and uneconomical credits, 
the overvalued exchange rate, and price controls accumulated. Between 1991 and 1996, 
the IMF had signed, and then interrupted three Stand-By agreements, for lack of 
compliance with commitments to convertibility and price liberalization.24
In elections in November and December 1996, opposition forces led by a coalition 
of historical parties won a majority of the National Assembly, and defeated the incumbent 
president. The new Government began its term with a comprehensive program of 
liberalization and stabilization. In February and March 1997, with the support of the IMF, 
it devalued the exchange rate, guaranteed its convertibility, and eliminated remaining 
price controls on all but 10% of consumer goods.25 Energy and public utility prices were 
raised to international levels. The burst of inflation, which immediately resulted, was to 
be contained by strict budgetary and monetary policies. Implicit subsidies were 
eliminated, and the explicit, consolidated, cash budget deficit was limited to 5%. 
Subsidized, directed credits were stopped, but political pressures delayed the closure of 
major state banks, which had been rendered insolvent by their previous bad loans. For 
two years, these banks were bailed out by special credits from the central bank, which 
eventually found their way into increased money supply. Inflation remained high. Output 
fell as a result of domestic uncertainty and adverse external shocks.
Four years later, in the elections of November and December 2000, the PDSR -  
renamed the PSD (Partidul Social Democrat) -  won back the majority of the legislature 
and the presidency. Though it temporarily halted privatization and social security reform, 
it maintained most of the other major reforms enacted between 1997 and 2000.
24 Notwithstanding the above, trade was substantially liberalized, notably after the 
signature of an Association Agreement with the EU in February 1993, and exports and 
imports were reoriented towards the West. Also, small and medium sized enterprises were 
privatized, and 10 foreign banks (6 of them branches) were licensed between 1990 and 
1996.
25 The IMF supported the new Government’s program with a Standby Credit, and the 
World Bank with Sectoral Adjustment Loans. The IMF loan was interrupted when a 
major Government reshuffle was accompanied by delays in the program in 1998.
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3.2.2 Economic Evolution
Figures 1 and 2 describe the evolution of inflation, output and money during the period of 
this study. Prices are measured by the consumer price index -  P; output by the real 
industrial production index -  Y26; and money by domestic M2 -  M17. The data are 
monthly, seasonally adjusted, and they span January 1992 through December 2000. We 
eliminate common nominal trends, by focusing in the usual manner on the rate of change 
of prices (Ap), the natural logarithm of real industrial production (y), and the natural 
logarithm of real money balances (m-p), where lower case letters represent the logarithms 
of upper case letters.
26 The paper uses real industrial production: the broadest activity variable available on a 
monthly basis. The velocity of M  relative to the nominal value of reported industrial 
production will also be affected by the evolution of the share of informal to total output. 
Since informal output is not directly measurable, the effect of changes in its share is 
captured in the coefficients of the other factors influencing reported velocity. This 
approach is also taken by Dobrescu (1994,1998).
27 In the studies of money demand in Romania cited in the previous footnote, Dobrescu 
advocates focusing on total M2, inclusive of foreign currency deposits, to which he adds 
estimates of economy-wide net arrears, and estimates of the value in Lei of foreign 
currency held outside the banking system. Foreign currency is excluded, both because 
domestic money is a less costly medium of exchange (as opposed to a store of value) in a 
less than hyperinflationary context, and because no direct measurements are available for 
foreign currency in circulation. Arrears are treated as a form of credit, rather than an 
alternative medium of exchange. In the estimates reported below, inflation and other 
explanatory variables capture the effect on Af-velocity of variations in the intensity of the 
use of both foreign currency and arrears.
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Figure 3-1 Romania: Trends in Velocity of Domestic Broad Money and Inflation
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Figure 3-2 Romania: Trends in Real Money Balances and Output
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Figure 3-1 shows inflation starting at a high level. The first observations of Ap in January 
and February 1992 are 18% and 12%. These come after a year of similarly high inflation. 
The average monthly rate during 1991 (not shown in the Figure) was 10%; the more 
customary January 1991 to January 1992 measure was 236%. The average monthly rate 
remains high in 1992 (9%) and 1993 (11%). 1993 was marked by an episode of partial 
liberalization in May 1993, when consumer prices rose 27%. The average monthly rate 
declines in 1994 (4%) and 1995 (2%), but starts to rise again after July 1996. 
Liberalization at the beginning of 1997 leads to a renewed bout of high inflation, 13% in 
January 1997, 17% in February, and 27% in March. The monthly rate then declines 
slowly. It averages 2% in 1999 and 4% in 2000. At no point in the period do price 
increases reach the level of hyperinflation (defined as 50% per month), but they are, 
throughout the period, well above the norm in Western Europe or the United States, and 
remain, at the end of the period, the highest in the region.
In January 1992, Romania was in the middle of its first transition recession, and 
industrial production was still declining. (Figure 3-2). However, output stabilizes in 1993, 
and grows steadily in 1994, 1995 and 1996. Between December 1993 and December 
1996, the average annual rate of growth of industrial production is 13%. The OECD has 
described this as a period of real growth with weak structural change.28 The second 
transition recession, beginning in early 1997, leads to a renewed decline of industrial 
production. Output stabilizes at the end of 1999, and is growing slowly during the last 
year of our period.
The wide swings which characterize the movement of real money balances 
between 1992 and 2000 (Figure 3-2) are suggestive of a positive relationship with real 
output and negative one with inflation. Between January 1992 and January 1994, real 
domestic M2 declines 69%. Between January 1994 and November 1996, it rises 139%. 
During the major liberalization episode of 1997, real M2 falls 41% in four months, and 
remains low for most of the rest of the period. Figure 1 presents the underlying 
relationship, central to this study, between velocity ( m -  p - y )  and inflation.
28 See OECD (1998) and OECD (2002).
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Figure 3-3 represents two additional variables, whose movements are important 
characteristics of the inflation process in Romania: the monthly rate of change of the real 
leu/dollar exchange rate (A(e-p-p*)), and the monthly rate of change of administered 
prices (A padm).29
Figure 3-3 Romania: Growth in Administrative Prices and Real Exchange Rate Changes
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Before 1997, the Leu was not freely convertible, except for brief intervals. Between 
episodes of devaluation, the authorities adjusted the official nominal exchange rate in a 
manner which resulted in a moderately rising trend of its real value.30 In January and 
February 1997, the Leu was allowed to float, and it depreciated sharply. At the end of 
February, the currency became convertible on current account, but not on capital account.
29 A (e-p-p*) is the monthly rate of change of the official Leu/dollar exchange rate, minus 
the difference between the monthly rate of change of the US CPI and the Romanian CPI.
30 Data on the black market premium suggest that the Leu was overvalued throughout this 
period. See de Menil (2003).
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The National Bank of Romania intervened regularly, using reserves to smooth its 
movements. In the spring of 1999, when a combination of a peak in foreign debt service 
and delays in the renegotiations of an IMF Stand-By Agreement generated the 
expectation of a high probability of external default, the Bank again let the real value of 
the Leu slide. Otherwise, the period after February 1997 was characterised by a moderate 
appreciation of the real rate of exchange with the US dollar. Statistically the dynamics of 
real appreciation/depreciation appear similar before and after the 1997 liberalization.
The persistence of price controls over large segments of consumer goods implied 
that the economy was subjected to shocks at irregular intervals, when the authorities 
raised the prices still subject to administration.31 Figure 3-3 depicts the impact effect of 
these increases. The two largest shocks coincided with the liberalizations of May 1993 
and February and March 1997. In those months, prices still under control rose 
respectively 57%, 24% and 44%. In the Figure, as in estimations, the increases in 
administered prices are weighted by the remaining share of controlled prices in the 
consumer price index. Since this share declined at each liberalization, the peaks of the 
weighted impact number in the Figure also decline. The construction of the administered 
price index, /*“*", and its weight, are described in appendix 3.9.
Figure 3-1 through Figure 3-3 do not include any interest rate measures. Until 
1997, many of the largest state banks, which dominated the Romanian banking sector, 
were heavily engaged in extending directed credits at subsidized rates. The official 
measure of average deposit rates implies negative real rates through all of 1993, most of 
1995, and all of 1996. After the liberalisation of 1997, these real interest rates fluctuate 
around zero. At the same time, the Treasury Bill market, which was almost non-existent 
before 1997, remained essentially the narrow preserve of these same banks after 1997. 
Given the limited and political nature of financial alternatives to holding money, interest 
rates are not included in estimates of the demand for money.
o  1
Practitioners in these economies often go so far as to argue that administrative price 
increases completely determine the overall course of inflation, while they are working 
their way through the economy. Estimates below will support the view that they alter the 
short-run dynamics of what is, in the long run, fundamentally a monetary phenomenon.
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3.3 Modelling Money Demand in Transition
High rates of inflation and poorly developed financial markets have characterized 
European transition countries in their early years. Romania lived with both for longer than 
most. Under both conditions, the rate of inflation is a better measure of the opportunity 
cost of holding money than available interest rates. This points to the following extended 
Cagan (1956) form for the choice of a model of money demand:
™,-P, = A +  fiiiPt ~Pt-i) + h y t (5-1)
As before, lower case letters are the natural logs of upper case letters. The second term is 
the expected inflation rate. We follow Aarle and Budina (1995 ), Banaian et al.(1998), 
Choudiy (1998) and others in basing our analysis of money demand in transition on this 
simple form.
Choudry (1998) adds the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate to (5.1) 
in the case of Russia. If the rate of change of the Leu/USD rate had diverged in an 
irregular manner from the domestic inflation rate for significant periods of time, adding 
e-e_y to (5.1) (where e is the logarithm of that exchange rate) would be beneficial. 
However, as pointed out above, in Romania, controls before 1997 and the managed float 
after 1997 resulted in relative constancy (with the exceptions mentioned) of the real 
exchange rate. Therefore, e -  e_x does not have sufficiently independent variation to be 
an additional determinant of the long-run real demand for money. The transitory 
influence of variations in the real exchange rate is tested below.
One of the paradoxes of money demand and the inflation process in less than fully 
liberalized transition economies is that neither the prevalence of price controls nor their 
removal appears fundamentally to distort the form of the demand for money. High rates
'X'j
of inflation have been observed even when countries had pervasive price controls. It 
will be shown below that Romania is not an exception to this paradox.
32 In Ukraine in 1993, for instance, extensive controls did not stop price increases from 
reaching hyperinflationary levels. See de Menil(1996). Some of the controls were 
administered rates of profit margin, and others—in absolute level form—were rapidly 
adjusted, increasingly frequently, by the bureaucracy.
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The liberalization of February and March 1997 merits particular attention. Did the 
freeing of most remaining controlled prices, the passage from an overvalued to a mostly 
market determined exchange rate, and the termination of years of massive directed 
credits, constitute such important structural changes that they led to a regime change in 
the monetary mechanism and the inflationary process? Tests for a structural break in 
long-run money demand, and in price dynamics are presented below. The answer is that, 
though our equations include short-run responses to these shocks, there does not seem to 
be evidence of a structural break.
3.4 Choice of Variables and Tests for Stationarity
Stochastic character of the seasonality in the series is tested using two different methods: 
the Dickey, Hasza, Fuller (1984) method modified by Osbom (1988) and the method 
developed by Franses (1991) as an extension of Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo 
(1990) test for monthly data. Both tests reject in all cases the null hypothesis of stochastic 
seasonality. The rejection of non-stationary, stochastic seasonality justifies our 
maintained, simplifying assumption that seasonality is deterministic. Seasonally adjusted 
data are used for all variables except .33
Table 3-4 in Appendix 3.10 presents augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
tests for all the variables. Following the strategy proposed by Dickey and Pantula (1987),
33 In order to remove the deterministic seasonality present in our series we used the X-12- 
ARIMA program of Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Ericsson, 
Hendry, and Tran (1994) show that the linear seasonal filter approximating earlier version 
of the Census procedure (X-ll) may affect inferences about cointegration and alter 
dynamics and exogeneity status of variables in the model. Siklos, Ghysels and Granger 
(1995) show that the X -ll procedure exhibits strong non-linear characteristics, and that 
these characteristics may lead to incorrect inference about the number of cointegrating 
vectors in series simulated from linear models. However, empirical series may exhibit 
certain non-linear features and the impact of X -ll adjustment on more complicated 
process has not yet been fully researched. If the periodic component of data-generating- 
process exhibit non-linear characteristics, and if seasonality is treated as a noise 
contaminating the true relationship between the series, application of the X -ll procedure 
may perform better than using seasonally unadjusted data. This is likely the case for 
transition data, where seasonal patterns are likely to be more complicated and volatile 
than in developed economies.
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the sequence of tests starts from the null hypothesis of two unit roots in the series. The lag 
structure in ADF equations is determined by sequential reduction starting from 6 lags, 
based on F-statistics, Schwarz information criterion and tests for remaining 
autocorrelation in the residuals. The tests are conducted with constant and trend for the 
null hypothesis of a single unit root, and with constant only for testing the hypothesis of 
two unit roots. The estimation period runs from January 1992 to December 2000. The 
tests suggest that the log of real money (m-p), inflation Ap and the log of real industrial 
production y  are all integrated of order one. The rate of change of the real exchange rate 
A(e-p+p*) appears to be stationary. The evidence is borderline for the rate of change of 
administered prices Ap™*", which is assumed to be stationary.
To check robustness of the model, the cointegrating and error correction relations 
are also estimated for a shorter sample period (June 1993 to November 1996), beginning 
after the first and ending before the second liberalization shock. The ADF tests for the 
shorter sample period are reported in Table 3-5. They provide additional support for the 
inferences based on Table 3-4. In the shorter sample period, there is strong rejection of a 
unit root for the rate of change of administered prices.
3.5 Johansen’s tests for cointegration and weak exogeneity
We begin our analysis of the dynamics of money, price and output with the formulation 
of an unrestricted VAR system with three endogenous variables: (m-p), Ap and y. The 
multivariate approach is more efficient than single equation modelling if there is a failure 
of weak exogeneity34 or if variables under investigation form more than one cointegrating 
relation. Since both of these conditions may be present in our data, we apply the Johansen 
(1988) procedure based on the system estimation to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors and to test for weak exogeneity.
The analysis starts from the unrestricted VAR system (UVAR) of the following
form:
34 In the cointegration framework the variable is weakly exogenous if it is not influenced 
by deviations from the long-run relationships. The concept of weak exogeneity is 
discussed in Engle et al. (1983). Weak exogeneity in the cointegration framework is 
discussed in Ericsson et al. (1998).
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k
xt = Y l AjXt-j +  7 A  (5.2)
j= i
where xt contains all endogenous variables {m-p, Ap, y) and Dt contains exogenous 
variables. Finally, £t is a vector of normally distributed error terms. The system can also 
be presented in the equivalent VECM (vector error correction) form:
k- 1
A x t =  £ n ;A a^  +  n ^ - 1  +  7  A  +  e t (5.3)
j =i
where II =  A, — I) and 11^  =  o^rJ = 1,2,...(k-1). The II matrix can
be decomposed to ap', where a  represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium and p 
the long-run coefficients. The rank of the II matrix, which is equivalent to the number of 
cointegrating vectors, is tested by the Johansen (1988) procedure.
The first step in empirical UVAR modelling is to set the appropriate lag structure 
and select the set of exogenous variables on which we are conditioning the system.
After experimenting with different sets of exogenous variables, the preferred set 
includes a constant term, an impulse dummy for January 1997 (more flexible exchange 
rate regime), an impulse dummy for March 1997 (price liberalisation), the current second 
difference of the log of the administered price index scaled by the weight of administered 
prices in CPI, and lags of the first difference of the real Leu/dollar exchange rate. The two 
1997 dummy variables reflect general characteristics of the liberalization of that winter, 
not captured by the other two exogenous variables. The same specification is also run 
with, in addition, a time trend.35 36
35 The results were similar to those described below, except that the estimated semi­
elasticity of inflation in the long-run demand was more than half again higher. With the 
trend present, acceptance of the weak exogeneity of output, and rejection of the weak 
exogeneity of inflation and real money were even clearer than they are below. The results 
without the trend produce more economically reasonable estimated value of the semi­
elasticity of inflation.
36 Two of the variables which were included in our original set of exogenous variables, 
but were not retained because they were not significant were Aw and A(w -  p ) , where w 
is the average wage rate in industry.
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Both the rate of change of administered prices and the rate of change the real 
exchange rate are treated as measures of exogenous, supply shocks, expected to have an 
impact effect on the overall price level, and therefore on the supply of real money.
The analysis starts with six lags of the endogenous variables, the two dummies 
mentioned above, the current, scaled, second difference of the log of administered prices, 
and six lags of the first difference of the real exchange rate. After sequential reduction, 
UVAR with four lags of each endogenous variable, four lags of the first difference of the 
real exchange rate, the two dummies and our measure of administered prices is chosen for 
further analysis37, and the Johansen’s (1988) trace (Xtrace) and maximum eigenvalue (Xmax) 
tests are used to determine the rank of II matrix. Asymptotic critical values for these tests 
are given in Johansen (1988) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992). Reimers (1992) proposed 
small sample correction by replacing T by T-nk in both tests, and results from this test are 
also reported. It is important to note that the critical values of these tests are only 
indicative if we condition on exogenous variables other than constant and seasonal 
dummies. Therefore, in order to draw more decisive conclusions on the number of 
cointegrating vectors, test results from the specification without exogenous variables in 
the system are also reported.38
37 The final lag structure is determined by VAR order selection criteria SC (Schwarz’s 
information criterion) and AIC (Akaike’s information criterion), together with F-statistics 
associated with sequential reduction. The results on specification search are available on 
request.
38 Harbo et al. (1998) and MacKinnon et al. (1999) account fully for the inclusion of 
exogenous variables. The strength of results indicates that they are robust to adjustments 
in the critical values.
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Table 3-1 Romania: Cointegration statistics
Model 1: UVAR with four lags Jan 1992 -  Dec 2000, conditional model
Rank Xmax
Xmax using 
T-nk
9 5 % Xtrace
Xtrace U s in g  
T- nk
9 5 %
0 2 8 .6 8 * * 2 5 .4 9 * 2 2 . 0 4 4 .3 3 * * 3 9 .4 * 3 4 .9
1 1 1 .4 7 1 0 .1 9 1 5 .7 1 5 .6 5 1 3 .9 1 2 0 . 0
2 4 .1 8 3 .7 2 9 .2 4 .1 8 3 .7 2 9 .2
Model 2: UVAR with four lags Jan 1992 -  Dec 2000, no exogenous variables
Rank Xmax
Xmax using 
T - n k
9 5 % Xtrace
Xtrace U s in g  
T-nk
9 5 %
0 3 0 .5 7 * * 2 7 .1 8 * * 2 2 . 0 4 4  4 * * 3 9 .4 6 * * 3 4 .9
1 9 .8 0 8 .1 7 1 5 .7 1 3 .8 2 1 2 .2 9 2 0 . 0
2 4 .0 2 3 .5 8 9 .2 4 .0 2 3 .5 8 9 .2
Model 3: UVAR with four lags Jun 1993 -  Nov 1996, conditional model
Rank Xmax
Xmax using 
T - n k
9 5 % Xtrace
Xtrace using
T-nk
9 5 %
0 2 5 .9 5 * 1 8 .5 4 2 2 . 0 4 1 .7 6 * * 2 9 .8 3 3 4 .9
1 9 .2 5 6 .6 1 1 5 .7 1 5 .8 1 1 1 .2 9 2 0 . 0
2 6 .5 6 4 .6 9 9 .2 6 .5 6 4 .6 9 9 .2
Notes’.
** denotes rejection at 1% critical value 
* denotes rejection at 5% critical value
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Table 3-2 Romania: Tests for restrictions in the conditional model
Weak exogeneity tests (cointegrating rank = 1 imposed)
Variable Jan 1992 -  Dec 2000 Jun 1993 -  Nov 1996
LDMR %2(1) = 17.061 [0.0000] ** %2{2) = 16.662 [0.0000] **
ALCPI x2(l) = 6.6331 [0.0100] ** *2(2) = 6.5678 [0.0104] *
LIIP X2(l) = 1.2261 [0.2682] *2(2) = 0.39088 [0.5318]
Long-run coefficients ($’ with weak exogeneity of LIIP imposed (standard errors in 
parentheses)
LDMR ALCPI LIIP Constant
Jan 1992 -  Dec 2000
1.000 13.696 -2.225 8.865
Jun 1993-N ov 1996
(3.555) (0.779) (3.418)
1.000 16.069 -1.587 5.818
- (4.076) (0.803) (3.746)
Adjustment coefficients a  with weak exogeneity of LIIP imposed (standard errors in 
parentheses)
Jan 1992 -  Dec 2000 Jun 1993 -  Nov 1996
LDMR -0.05427 (0.0106) -0.1274 (0.0279)
ALCPI 0.01522 (0.0053) 0.04797 (0.0194)
LIIP
Notes:
** denotes rejection at 1% critical value 
* denotes rejection at 5% critical value
The results in Table 3-1 suggest that there is only one linear combination of the variables, 
which is stationary. After imposing this restriction and normalising the parameter of the 
log of real money to unity, the cointegrating vector is recognisable as an augmented 
Cagan (1956) money demand function.
39 Unitary elasticity of real money demand to output is not imposed, both because there 
are institutional reasons to expect velocity to increase, other things being equal, during
(continued)
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Tests for the weak exogeneity of industrial production, inflation and real money in 
the conditional system, and estimates of the coefficients with imposed restrictions are 
reported in Table 3-2. Since the hypotheses being tested are linear in 1(0) variables40, the 
test statistic used is the likelihood ratio test with limiting %2 distribution and a number of 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent restrictions to be tested.
Weak exogeneity of industrial production can not be rejected in any configuration. 
Economically, this implies that there is no long-run feedback from excess real money to 
industrial production. Interpretation of this result is proposed in section 3.7. In contrast, 
weak exogeneity of both real money and the rate of inflation are decisively rejected at the 
1% level. This rejection constitutes the underlying rationale for the estimation of error- 
correction mechanisms for the short-run dynamics of real money and inflation.
The identified equilibrium money demand function (using conditional UVAR 
with imposed weak exogeneity of production) has the following form (with standard 
errors under estimated coefficients):
m - p =  - 8.865 - 13.696 p +  2.225 y
(5.4)
(3.418) (3.555) (0.779)
The robustness of these results is checked by repeating the tests on a shorter 
sample, which excludes the two major price liberalization episodes of 1993 and 1997. In 
the longer period tests, it could be argued that the estimated sensitivity of inflation to 
excess real money is mainly a reflection of spurts of pent-up inflation released at the time 
of liberalization. The results for the shorter sample period, reported in Table 3-1 and 
Table 3-2, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the full-sample period results 41
the period, and because the only available monthly measure of output is industrial 
production, and not GDP.
40 xtis 1(1) but Axt and (3'xt are 1(0) because there is cointegration between elements of xt.
41 The trace and maximum eigenvalue pass die Johansen (1988) test for one cointegrating 
vector, but not the Reimers (1992) test, because of the shortness of the sample.
Nevertheless, conditional on there being one cointegrating vector, weak exogeneity of 
inflation and real money are rejected, and weak exogeneity of output is not. The 
cointegrating vector is recognizable as a Cagan money demand, with coefficients similar 
to those obtained for the longer sample.
-64-
The short sample period results thus support the conclusion that excess supply of real 
money is a recurrent determinant of inflation, whose influence is not limited to episodes 
of liberalization.
3.6 Error correction model
In die next step of the analysis the unrestricted UVAR system is mapped to a vector 
error correction system by restricting the II matrix, as suggested by cointegration 
analysis, and by reducing the number of the short run parameters to be estimated. 
Defining ECMt as a deviation from the long run money demand equation, we can map 
the whole system from 1(1) to 1(0) as follows:
k- 1
Axt = Z ) UjAxt- 1 +  otECMt_ 1 +  7  Dt +  et (5.5)
j=i
The analysis of the vector error correction representation starts with estimation of the 
system of two equations with three lags of each dependent variable, the ECM term, and 
exogenous variables retained from the UVAR representation. The system is reduced by 
imposing zero restrictions on short run parameters with significance level lower than 10 
percent as indicated by t-statistics. Since the hypothesis of weak exogeneity of industrial 
production was not rejected and parameter reduction reveals that this variable is not 
Granger-caused by real money and inflation, industrial production is strongly exogenous 
with respect to the remaining two endogenous variables. Consequently, the production 
equation is not analyzed. Estimates of the error correction model conditional on this 
variable are reported in Table 3-3. Validity of the last stage of reduction is tested and 
accepted by calculating the likelihood ratio of the model reported in the table versus an 
error correction model similarly conditioned on exogenous production, but including the 
subsequently dropped variables.42
42 The test is x 2(24)=18.123(0.797]. The final model cannot be tested versus the original
cointegrated UVAR reported in Table 3-1, because industrial production is treated as 
endogenous in Table 3-1 and exogenous in Table 3-3. However, that simplification was 
itself previously validated by the test for the exogeneity of production, reported above.
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Diagnostic tests for ninth order serial correlation, ninth order conditional 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality did not reveal any problems with the specification 
of the model.43 44
The constancy of the system is checked through recursive estimation. Recursive 
residuals45 and recursive Chow tests46 for the complete system show reasonable 
constancy of all equations (Figure 3-4). They notably do not suggest the presence of a 
structural break at the beginning of 1997.
43 The tests were run in PcFiml econometric package. See Doomik and Hansen (1993) for 
a description of the tests.
44 Against the charge that, given the shortness of our sample, these estimates constitute 
data mining, one may cite Hoover and Perez (1999), and subsequent discussion in 
Campos and Ericsson (1999) and Hendry (2000, Chapter 20).
45 1-step ahead residuals and their confidence intervals, for estimation ending 
successively in December 1995 (the first end date chosen by the procedure) through 
December 2000.
46 1-step Chow tests scaled by their critical values at 1% level are shown in the left 
diagram. N-decreasing Chow tests for stability between t and December 2000 are shown 
in the right diagram.
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Table 3-3 Romania: Error correction model: FIML estimates
Estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) :______________________
ALDMR = -0.0462 ECM-! - 0.3628 ALDMR_i + 0.2893 ALDMR_3 - 0.5309 AALCPI-! 
(0.0084) (0.0910) (0.0764) (0.1623)
-0.6172 AALCPI - 2  - 0.3975 ©AALADM + dummies 
(0.1540) (0.0935)
AALCPI = 0.0139 ECM-! + 0.2748 ALDMR_i -0.1021 ALDMR_2 - 0.2361 AALCPI-i 
(0.0037) (0.0470) (0.0367) (0.0825)
+ 0.0700 ALIIP_3 + 0.0855 AREXR_i + 0.0358 AREXR_2 
(0.0395) (0.0292) (0.0134)
+ 0.2850 ©AALADM + dummies 
(0.0493)
Sample: Jan 1992 -  Dec 2000 
Diagnostic statistics:
Individual equations:
ALDMR:
Normality X2(2) = 1.4963 [0.4732]
ARCH 9 F (9,36) = 1.2847 [0.2611]
AR 1-9 F (9,45) = 1.7569 [0.0902]
AALCPI:
Normality x2 (2) = 2.2736 [0.3208]
ARCH 9 F (9, 36) = 0.56493 [0.8210]
AR 1-9 F (9,45) = 2.3453 [0.0213]*
System:
Vector AR 1-9 F(36,160) = 0.99663 [0.4831] 
Vector normality X (4) = 2.2683 [0.6866]
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Figure 3-4 Romania: Recursive Residuals and Chow Statistics for the Conditional ECM Model
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3.7 Economic interpretation
The tests reported in Table 3-2 do not reject weak exogeneity of output, but reject weak 
exogeneity of both real money and inflation. In economic terms, in equilibrium, both the 
price level and real money are determined by the interaction of the supply and demand for 
money, whereas output is not. One possible interpretation is that output is supply 
determined.47 This interpretation is not inconsistent with the emphasis on restructuring 
and reallocation in some analyses of the macroeconomics of transition. (See Blanchard 
(1997) and the literature cited there).
The result that the dynamics of inflation depend on the supply and demand for 
money is one of the principal findings of this study. Month-to-month movements in the 
rate of inflation are satisfactorily explained by an error correction mechanism in which 
the disequilibrium difference between supply and demand of money plays a significant 
role. Changes in administered prices and changes in the real exchange rate have transitory 
effects on the monthly movements of inflation.
47 Popa (1998) presents evidence against the existence in Romania of a Phillips-like trade­
off (working through demand channels) between inflation and output.
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The results differ in emphasis from those reported in IMF (2001). The authors of 
that study focus on the levels of p,y,e,m  and a measure of unit labour costs.48 They take 
all five variables to be I(l)49, find evidence for at least one cointegrating vector, and 
report that, in their preferred specification, nominal money does not appear significantly 
in the long-term, cointegrating relationship. Focusing on the relationship between 
p,e, and unit labour cost, they find a stable cointegrating relationship between the levels 
of those three variables, which they interpret as a price equation. They conclude that “unit 
labour costs, and to a lesser extent the exchange rate (...) are the leading proximate 
determinants of inflation,” and that “the role of money and credit growth, (though) also 
important, (has been) harder to demonstrate empirically.”50 This paper finds strong 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship between real money, inflation and industrial 
production, and provides an estimate of a stable inflation equation in which excess money 
plays a significant role. The presented analysis suggests that focusing on the levels of 
nominal values is misleading, and the evidence strongly suggests that those variables are 
1(2). The resulting misspecification is responsible for the implausible rejection of a long- 
run cointegrating relationship, which can be interpreted as a money demand equation in 
the IMF study.51
Findings presented here agree, on the other hand, with the results for Russia in 
Choudry (1998). The rejection in these studies of the weak exogeneity of inflation in 
Russia and Romania contrasts with the acceptance of that weak exogeneity in many 
cointegration studies of money demand and inflation in developed, market economies. 
In the workshop on “Money Demand in Europe” cited in the introduction, weak 
exogeneity of prices was rejected in only one case, that of Switzerland.52 In other cases,
48 The period spanned by their data is January 1991 through March 2000.
49 The authors acknowledge that many of the tests reported in their Appendix I could be 
interpreted as supporting a conclusion that the variables are 1(2).
50 IMF (2001), pp. 2 and 3.
51 Table All. 3 of the study reports several estimates of cointegrating relationships in 
which monetary variables are highly significant. See models 4a, 5a and 6a.
52 See Petriguet and Stahel (1998).
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the proximate causes of inflation were implicitly or explicitly seen to be cost-push or 
excess demand variables. Additional country studies are needed to ascertain whether or 
not the direct influence of excess money supply on inflation found here is a characteristic 
of high inflation, transition economies.
The fact that real money is endogenous implies that nominal money is itself 
endogenous. In principle, the endogeneity of real money could reflect exclusively die 
endogeneity of the price level. But, in that case, the A(m-p) equation would be a simple 
transformation of the AAp equation (Table 4). It can be readily shown that this is not the 
case. Interpretation of the endogeneity of real money is beyond the scope of this paper. If 
M2 were directly controlled by the authorities, one could argue that its endogeneity 
suggests that monetary policy was partially accommodating.
3.8 Conclusions
This paper uses cointegration techniques to examine the equilibrium relations between 
real money, output and inflation in Romania, between 1992 and 2000. The three variables 
are found to be linked by a cointegrating relation that can be interpreted as an expanded 
Cagan (1956) money demand function. Output is shown to be strongly exogenous. But 
the dynamics of inflation and real money are satisfactorily described by error correction 
mechanisms, which include significant short-run effects of monetary disequilibria. The 
coefficients of those dynamic equations are stable, and do not show signs of structural 
break during the liberalization of 1997. The results imply that inflation was largely a 
monetary phenomenon, in Romania between 1992 and 2000.
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3.9 Appendix: Construction of the administered price index
The administered price index is constructed from disaggregated data on consumer prices 
and their weights in the CPI, provided by the Romanian Statistical Office and published 
in the Price Statistical Bulletin. The list of administered prices was taken from the 
succession of laws and ordinances, provided by the National Bank of Romania. Since we 
do not have information about the weights used in constructing the 1993 CPI index, the 
figure for 1993 is based on regulations in 1993 and product weights in 1994.
The estimated share of the average consumer basket subject to controls evolved as 
follows:
Period Share of Consumer Prices Controlled
1992.01 -1993.04 0.52
1993.05-1996.12 0.33
1997.01-1997.02 0.37
1997.03-1998.08 0.15
1998.09-1998.12 0.10
1999.01-1999.12 0.12
2000.01-2000.12 0.15
Reductions in the share mainly result from the freeing of previously controlled items. 
Some of the variability reflects changes in the weights of controlled items in the basket. 
The shares are higher than officially reported by the Romanian authorities prior to 1997, 
but close to the estimates reported in IMF (2001).
-71-
3.10 Appendix: Unit Root Tests
Table 3-4 Romania: ADF unit root tests on the SA data—long sample: 1.1992 -12.2000
Variable Two roots One root
Constant and trend Constant
Lag Test
statistic
Lag Test
statistic
Lag Test
statistic
LDMR 4 -3.6694** 4 -2.6317 4 -2.8203
ALCPI 4 -6.8111** 4 -2.8751 4 -2.5050
LIIP 4 -4.9507** 4 -1.5757 4 -1.5772
ALADM 4 -9.3518** 4 -3.5692* 4 -2.5974
ALREXR 4 -8.7797** 4 -6.7454** 4 -6.7563**
N otes:
** denotes rejection at 1% critical value 
* denotes rejection at 5%  critical value
Table 3-5 Romania; ADF unit root tests on the SA data—short sample: 4.1993 -11.1996
Variable Two roots One root
Constant and trend Constant
Lag Test
statistic
Lag Test
statistic
Lag Test
statistic
LDMR 1 -3.7527** 4 -2.5485 4 -1.0021
ALCPI 3 -5.0742** 4 -1.0994 4 -3.0908*
LIIP 4 -3.6099** 4 -3.2600 4 0.11889
ALADM 4 -12.690** 4 -5.7587** 4 -8.1583**
ALREXR 4 -4.6040** 4 -3.9457* 4 -4.2036**
N otes:
** denotes rejection at 1% critical value 
* denotes rejection at 5% critical value
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4 M o d e l l i n g  I n f l a t i o n  in  G e o r g ia 53
4.1 Introduction
Georgia has achieved an impressive success in stabilizing its economy after a 
hyperinflationary episode in 1993-1994. Inflation dropped from 15607 percent in 1994 to 
163 percent in 1995 and reached a single-digit level in 1997. Devaluation of the Lari after 
the Russian financial crises raised the price level but did not have any lasting effect on 
inflation. In the same time National Bank of Georgia has faced difficulties in conducting 
its monetary policy: the economy has been highly dollarized, monetization has been low, 
and the money demand has fluctuated widely. This paper attempts to throw some light on 
the behaviour of inflation in Georgia and construct an inflation model suitable for policy 
formulation and evaluation. It tests for the presence of economically interpretable long- 
run relationships between prices, money and exchange rate, estimates a short-run inflation 
equation, and tests for its robustness and stability.
The model points to a dominant role of exchange rate in the behaviour of inflation 
and shows a low persistence of inflation in Georgia. Both factors contributed to the 
observed behavior of inflation after the Russian crises: after the depreciation, inflation 
increased sharply but quickly subdued, when the authorities managed to maintain the 
exchange rate at a higher, but stable level.
The model does not attempt to explain the behaviour of inflation during the 
hyperinflation and stabilization periods. For an analytical and empirical analysis of these 
episodes, the reader is referred to Wang (1999). Jimy and Jarocinski (1998) discuss and 
model the behaviour of money demand in Georgia following the stabilization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes developments 
in monetary and exchange rate policy in the post-stabilization period. Section 4.3 lays 
down theoretical background for the model, describes statistical properties of the data and 
presents estimates of the long- and short-run models. The last section offers policy 
conclusions.
53 Published as IMF Working Paper WP/03/212. Invited resubmission to Applied 
Economics.
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4.2 Macroeconomic Developments in Georgia
Georgia experienced one of the highest inflation rates among the former Soviet Union 
countries after the creation of a national currency—the coupon—in April 1993. A 
stabilization program in mid-1994 brought an end to hyperinflation, and introduction in 
October 1995 of a new currency (the lari) replacing the coupon boosted demand for 
money. Since then, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) has conducted a prudent 
monetary policy, focusing on maintaining price stability. The lari was pegged de facto to 
the U.S. dollar between October 1995 and December 1998 and price stability helped to 
remonetize the economy somewhat, although monetization has remained low and 
dollarization high ( Table 4-1).
To keep the exchange rate stable, the NBG intervened in the foreign exchange 
market, sterilizing the liquidity impact of direct central bank credit to the government. 
Other monetary policy instruments included interventions in the inter-bank credit 
auctions. At the end of 1996 -  in an attempt to lower interest rates -  the NBG started 
providing liquidity to the banking sector through the auctions, but die strategy had an 
adverse effect on NBG foreign reserves targets and was abandoned in the second half of 
1997.
In the final months of 1998, die onset of the Russian crisis and widespread public 
concern regarding domestic budgetary problems led to a sharp decline in the demand for 
lari (broad money declined by 25 percent in nominal terms from August to November) 
and growing pressure on the pegged exchange rate. To defend the lari, the NBG 
intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market (Figure 4-1), increased banks’ reserve 
requirements, withdrew liquidity through interbank auctions, and suspended automatic 
intra-month budget financing. The attempt was unsuccessful, and after running foreign 
reserves down to the equivalent of 3 weeks of imports, the NBG allowed the lari to float 
on December 7, 1998. The lari/dollar exchange rate immediately dropped by 20 percent 
and monthly inflation soared to 12 percent (Figure 4-2).
After the depreciation, the NBG further tightened monetary policy by limiting 
credit to the government, but the continued weakness of the fiscal position forced an 
increase in direct financing in the last months of 1999 and in the first half of 2000. This 
once again exerted downward pressure on the currency. As the fiscal position improved in 
the second part of 2000, the NBG was able to restrain the growth in net domestic assets.
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Moreover, it controlled reserve money growth sufficiently to offset a rebuilding of 
foreign reserves at the end of the year, which was permitted by favourable balance of 
payments developments. When the exchange rate began to appreciate at the end of 2002, 
the NBG intervened by stepping up foreign exchange purchases. Aside from these 
episodes, the exchange rate has remained largely stable, inflation low, and monetization 
has been increasing throughout the post-crisis period. The crisis, however, has raised 
dollarization of the economy (which increased from 73 percent at the end of 1998 to 86 
percent at the end of 199954), indicating that policy credibility has remained low.
54 Measured as a ratio of foreign to total deposits.
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Table 4-1 Georgia: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 1995-2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(Annual percent change)
Real sector
GDP volume 2.6 10.5 10.6 2.9 3.0 1.9 4.7 5.6
Consumer prices
Period average 162.7 39.4 7.0 3.6 19.1 4.0 4.7 5.6
End-of-period 57.4 13.7 7.2 10.7 10.9 4.6 3.4 5.4
(Percent of GDP)
Government finances
Revenue and grants 10.6 14.1 14.4 15.6 15.4 15.2 16.3 15.8
Of which: revenue 7.7 12.2 14.1 14.7 14.6 14.9 15.6 15.6
Expenditure and net lending 18.7 21.5 21.2 21.8 22.1 19.2 18.3 17.8
Balance (commitments) -8.1 -7.4 -6.8 -6.1 -6.7 ^.0 -2.0 -2.0
Balance (cash) -7.0 -7.2 -6.1 -4.9 -5.0 -2.6 -1.6 -1.9
(Percent change, end-of-period)
Broad money 1/
Including foreign currency deposits 135.2 41.9 45.5 -1.2 20.7 39.0 18.5 17.9
Excluding foreign currency deposits 319.7 38.2 35.4 -11.5 9.6 33.5 5.7 14.5
(Millions of USD)
External Sector
Exports (goods) 362.6 417.0 493.5 478.3 477.0 527.7 473.0 468.6
Imports (goods) -700.1 -767.9 -1,052.4 -1,163.7 -1,013.0 -937.0 -934.8 -944.1
Trade balance -337.4 -350.9 -558.9 -685.4 -536.0 -409.2 -461.8 -475.6
Current account (including transfers) -404.8 -415.4 -364.1 -370.3 -217.5 -175.6 -179.2 -202.5
Official reserves, end-of-period
(In millions of U.S. dollars) 156.7 158.0 173.3 118.4 132.4 109.4 161.1 197.7
(In months of imports) 2.7 2.5 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.8
(Lari/USD)
Exchange rate
Period average 1.29 1.26 1.30 1.39 2.02 1.98 2.07 2.20
End-of-period 1.23 1.27 1.30 1.79 1.96 1.98 2.06 2.09
Sources: Georgian authorities; and IMF estimates.
1/ Valued at end-of-period actual exchange rates.
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Figure 4-1 Georgia: Lari/USD exchange rate and NBG interventions at the TICEX market
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Figure 4-2 Georgia: Inflation and percentage changes in Lari/USD exchange rate.
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4.3 Model Specification
This section provides theoretical underpinnings for the long-term (co-integrating) 
relationship estimated in the empirical part of the paper. Long-term price level (P) 
behaviour is assumed to be governed by the balance between aggregate demand (YD) and 
supply (Ys) of domestic goods and services. The aggregate demand for domestic goods 
and services is a function of real money supply (M/P) and the real exchange rate (E/P). In 
log-linear form (denoted by lower-case letters), the aggregate demand is written as:
yD =  - p) +  Oi2(e - p) (6.1)
The aggregate supply is exogenously given and in equilibrium is equal to aggregate 
demand and real income (Y):
y =  ys =  yD (6.2)
It is assumed that the domestic goods market is always in equilibrium and therefore 
equation (6.2) always holds.
Flow demand for foreign exchange (current account deficit) is assumed to be a 
function of real exchange rate and real income. Real income is fixed at the level of 
aggregate supply, the available foreign financing is exogenously given, and the real 
exchange rate tends to equilibrate the foreign currency market. Money demand is 
assumed to be a function of real income. Similarly, since real income—the only variable 
entering the real money demand function—is exogenous, real money balances tend to 
equilibrate the money market. Since the domestic goods market is, by assumption, in 
equilibrium, equilibrium in the foreign currency market implies equilibrium in the money 
market (and vice versa) by application of the Walras law.
If the markets are in equilibrium, the simple model determines two real variables 
(m-p and e-p), leaving one degree of freedom for determination of nominal variables (m, 
e and p). Fixing one of the nominal variables determines the other two, providing a 
nominal anchor for the system. Empirically, if the markets are on average in equilibrium, 
it is likely that two unique long-run co-integrating vectors emerge between non-stationary 
nominal variables in equation (6.1) (treating y as exogenous). The two co-integrating 
vectors describe equilibria in any two of the three markets and the equilibrium in the
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omitted market is described by a linear combination of the two unique co-integrating 
vectors, again by the application of the Walras law.
It is also possible that the money and foreign exchange markets are persistently 
out of equilibrium (adjustments towards equilibrium may be very slow or non-linear) and 
that the goods market—by assumption—quickly adjusts to equilibrium. Empirically, even 
though the equilibrium in the foreign exchange and money markets is ultimately restored, 
the persistence of the disequilibrium can preclude finding two co-integrating vectors 
among the series in a short sample. Only the vector corresponding to the equilibrium in 
the goods market—described by equation (6.1)—can be discovered in this case.55 The 
model is misspecified by omitting one of the co-integrating vectors, but it can still 
provide a good approximation to the data generating process.
From a policy perspective, fixing one of the nominal variables no longer provides 
a nominal anchor for the system. Fixing any two still determines a third one by equation 
1, although it is possible that the variables are persistently fixed at the level inconsistent 
with a long-run equilibrium. It follows that, though monetary and exchange rate policies 
need to be ultimately consistent, for a prolonged time the two can be conducted 
independently to set the price level.
The persistent pressure on exchange rate before the Russian crisis— discussed in 
section 4.2 above—may be an example of disequilibrium of this type in one of the 
markets. The disequilibrium in the foreign exchange market in this period would imply 
that the money market was also out of equilibrium. The shift in real money holdings 
during the crisis gives some support to this hypothesis.
If only goods market adjusts to equilibrium quickly enough in the sample, 
substituting (6.2) into (6.1) and solving for p gives the price level:
p = a , / ( a x +  a2) m -I- a2/(  ax 4- a2) e - l / (  ax +  a2) y (6.3)
Equation (6.3), similar to the price equation developed by Bruno (1993), describes an 
observable relationship between prices, exchange rate, money and real income, suitable
55 Another implication is that, even if it is possible to successfully find one co-integrating 
vector corresponding to equation (6.1), a stable money demand function cannot be 
estimated from the data.
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for estimation and testing in the co-integration framework even if money and foreign 
exchange markets are persistently out of equilibrium. The equation exhibits a neo­
classical dichotomy: ys is fixed and equi-proportional changes in nominal variables leave 
the two real variables (m-p and e-p) unaltered. Testing for the neo-classical dichotomy is 
equivalent to testing that coefficients of money and exchange rate sum up to one.
The equilibrium real money demand discussed above is a function of real income 
only. A standard money demand formulation for high-inflation economies incorporates 
expected inflation (E(p-p_i)) or expected exchange rate depreciation (E(e-e.i)) into the 
function. If inflation or exchange rate depreciation series contain a unit root, and if one is 
interested in estimating a co-integrating relationship describing money demand or 
behaviour of prices, it is necessary to incorporate these variables into the long-run 
equation (see Budina et al., 2002 or Choudhry, 1998). Visual inspection suggests that 
time series properties of prices and exchange rate in Georgia changed after eradication of 
hyperinflation and introduction of the Lari. Tests for stationarity of the series—discussed 
below—suggest that after 1996 inflation and exchange rate depreciation became 
integrated of order zero, while real money balances remained integrated of order one. 
This result leaves only the real income as a potential argument in the co-integrating 
relationship describing the real money demand.
Short-run dynamics of prices and other endogenous variables in the system is 
modelled as an error-correction mechanism. The exact form of the short run relationship 
(lag structure) is determined by application of the general-to-specific methodology as 
discussed below.
4.4 Sources, Transformations and Statistical Properties of the Data
The model is estimated on monthly data for the post-stabilization period (January 1996- 
February 2003). Domestic CPI and GDP (a measure of income) are available from the 
Georgian State Department of Statistics (SDS). The available quarterly GDP series has 
been interpolated under the assumption that a monthly series follows a unit root process.56 
The exchange rate is measured by average lari/U.S. dollar exchange rate, and money is
56 The code for the Kalman filter interpolation - written in Ox (Doomik 1999) with the 
SSFPack package (Koopman et al. 1999) - is available on request.
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measured by M2, both available from the NBG. 57 Fruit and vegetable prices are obtained 
from disaggregated CPI data and are divided by the total CPI to obtain relative values. 
Average oil prices are from the IMF’s WEO database. All series are in logs and are 
seasonally adjusted using a version of the X-12 procedure. 58
Statistical tests confirm that time series properties of the inflation series has 
changed after macroeconomic stabilization and introduction of the Lari. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test conducted on the Jan 1991 -  Dec 1995 sample cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The result is reversed when the test is performed on 
the post-stabilization sample Jan 1996 -  Feb 2003, when logs of CPI, M2, and the 
lari/U.S. dollar exchange rate are all integrated of order one (Table 4-8 in the appendix) . 59  
Modelling the regime change is beyond the scope of the paper and the model estimation 
period starts in January 1996, a few months after introduction of the lari to insulate 
estimates from the pre-lari regime
4.5 Testing and Estimation of Co-integrating Vectors
The Johansen (1988) procedure is used to test for the number of co-integrating vectors, 
estimate their coefficients and test for weak exogeneity of the variables. The weak 
exogeneity of system variables has important econometric consequences and a clear
57 Estimation of the model using M3 instead of M2 yields very similar results.
58 As implemented in GiveWin. Ericsson, Hendry, and Tran (1994) show that the linear 
seasonal filter approximating earlier version of the Census procedure (X-ll) may affect 
inferences about co-integration and alter dynamics and exogeneity status of variables in 
the model. Siklos, Ghysels and Granger (1995) show that the X -ll procedure exhibits 
strong non-linear characteristics, and that these characteristics may lead to incorrect 
inference about the number of co-integrating vectors in series simulated from linear 
models. However, the exchange rate dynamics in Georgia exhibits a pronounced seasonal 
component in the post-1998-depreciation period, which does not exist in the pre-crisis 
period. Accounting for this effect in a model with seasonally unadjusted data would be 
difficult. Seasonally adjusting the exchange rate series for the post-crisis period only (and 
other variables for the whole period) is a more straightforward strategy, which is applied 
in the paper. More generally, empirical series may exhibit certain non-linear features and 
the impact of adjustment procedures on more complicated process has not yet been fully 
researched.
59 The log of real GDP is interpolated under the assumption that the series follows a unit 
root process.
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economic interpretation. From the econometric standpoint, it justifies conditioning on 
weakly exogenous variables, allowing for simplification of the system. Economically, 
weak exogeneity implies that there is no feedback from deviations from long-run 
equilibria to certain variables.
The procedure starts by selecting a set of endogenous and exogenous variables 
and choosing an appropriate lag structure for the endogenous variables. Prices, the 
exchange rate and money are modelled as endogenous variables. Real GDP is determined 
outside the system and restricted to enter only the co-integration space. Allowing output 
to enter the system endogenously and adding some proxies for potential output—such as 
deterministic trend—would allow for testing the assumptions of output exogeneity and 
continuous equilibrium in the goods market. The alternative approach is not followed 
given the small sample size, already a large number of parameters, and difficulties with 
modelling the supply side of the economy in the midst of structural changes. Two other 
exogenous variables are added to the list of variables affecting the short run dynamics of 
inflation: percentage changes in relative prices of fruits and vegetables, and percentage 
changes in oil prices. The two variables proxy for supply shocks stemming from 
agriculture sector and from input prices. The variables are assumed to be exogenous and 
only their current values enter the short-run equation. In addition, two dummy variables 
are used: for December 1998, the month of a de facto regime change when lari started 
floating against the dollar, and for September 1998, the first month after the Russian 
crises. The VAR is estimated with 6  lags of each endogenous variable, which is a 
compromise between an attempt to correctly capture potentially rich dynamics of monthly 
data and to preserve degrees of freedom.60
60 Sequential testing starting from the highest order of six allows for reduction of the lag 
length to four. Given high uncertainty surrounding the correct lag length I opt for the 
over-parameterized model. Monte Carlo studies in Gonzalo (1994) show that efficiency 
loss from choosing a too long lag structure is small, while a too short lag structure has a 
severe impact on maximum likelihood estimates. Estimates of co-integrating vector 
obtained from the four-lag model are almost identical to those obtained from the six-lag 
specification.
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Results of the tests suggest that there is only one co-integrating vector between 
prices, money, the exchange rate and output (Table 4-2) . 61 After normalizing the 
parameter of the log of price level to unity, a hypothesis that coefficients of money and 
exchange rate sum up to one (homogeneity restriction) is tested, together with exogeneity 
restrictions (Table 4-3). The homogeneity restriction, the weak exogeneity of die 
exchange rate, and the weak exogeneity of money are not rejected at 5 percent 
significance level. The weak exogeneity of prices is strongly rejected. Testing joint 
hypotheses leads to the same conclusions about the homogeneity and exogeneity status of 
the variables. Exogeneity of the exchange rate implies that prices—rather than exchange 
rate—adjust to bring about changes in the real exchange rate necessary to restore 
equilibrium in the goods market. This hypothesis is reasonable a priori, given that the 
nominal exchange rate was heavily managed, even in the post-Russian-crisis period. 
Similarly, weak exogeneity of money means that prices adjust to generate changes in real 
money balances necessary to restore equilibrium in the goods market.
The equation with imposed restrictions of homogeneity and weak exogeneity of 
money and exchange rate (Table 4-4) is chosen for further analysis. The exchange rate 
coefficient is higher than that of money, but they are both close to one-half. Real income 
coefficient is negative, as predicted by equation (6.3). Less restricted estimates are also 
recognizable as the price equation (6.3), with positive coefficients of money and 
exchange rate and a negative coefficient of output. Recursive estimates of parameters, 
plotted on Figure 4-3, show that coefficients are stable over time. Figure 4-4 plots the co- 
integrating vector and components of the long-run relationship. The largest deviation 
from equilibrium appears after the post-Russian-crisis devaluation. Since prices did not 
fully adjust to the new exchange rate level, the disequilibrium was exhorting an upward 
pressure on inflation in this period.
Since the weak exogeneity of the exchange rate and money is not rejected, it is 
valid to condition on these two variables in a single-equation inflation model. The 
behaviour of money in Georgia between 1996 and 2002 was volatile, with a break in
61 Estimating the model with a trend added to the co-integrating space does not change 
the number of co-integrating vectors, but results in very high standard errors of the trend 
and real output coefficients.
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remonetization coinciding with the Russian crisis. The crisis has also led to a change in 
the exchange rate regime. Given the breaks, the behaviour of money and the exchange 
rate is difficult to model. Conditioning on these two variables is therefore a convenient 
strategy in modelling the dynamics of inflation, which is of primary interest. In order to 
check for the robustness of this specification, the model is also estimated by instrumental 
variables method, using past changes in money and exchange rate as instruments.
Table 4-2 Georgia: Tests for the number of cointegrating vectors between p, m, e and y.
Rank A-max A-max A^race A<trace
using using
T- nk T- nk
0 39.25 [0.003]** 28.38 [0.003]** 30.53 [0.041]* 22.07 [0.035]*
1 10.87 [0.223] 9.09 [0.285] 8.46 [0.425] 7.07 [0.489]
2 1.78 [0.182] 1.78 [0.182] 1.38 [0.239] 1.38 [0.239]
Notes: Variables are defined in the text. The ADF test for co-integration has the null hypothesis that 
residuals from reported equations contain unit roots against an alternative of a stationary root. The number 
of lags in the test was chosen based on F-tests for a joint significance of lags and Akaike information 
criterion, starting from 6 lags for each equation. Test equations are estimated with a constant and seasonals 
for the PPP relationship and seasonals only for the money demand residuals. * and ** denote significance at 
the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. All results reported in the paper are obtained from PcGive 
econometric package (Hendry and Doomik 2001).
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Table 4-3 Georgia: Tests for weak exogeneity and restrictions on long-run coefficients. 
Homogeneity restriction:
(sum o f coefficients o f money and exchange rate in the cointegrating vector = 1 )
%2 (1) = 2.8404 [0.0919]
W eak exogeneity tests: 1/
a. No other restrictions imposed
-  USD 
Ct mt Pt
Pt %2 (2) = 17.868 [0.0001]** X2(2)= 19.670 [0.0001]** X 2(l)=  17.606 [0.0000]**
mt x2(2 )=  3.1609 [0.2059] 
etUSD x 2 ( l)=  0.2559 [0.6130]
X 2(l)=  3.0294 [0.0818]
b. With homogeneity restriction imposed
USDet mt Pt
Pt %2(3)= 19.273 [0.0002]** X2(3)= 24.458 [0.0000]** X2(2)= 22.616 [0.0000]**
mt x2(3 )=  6.8798 [0.0758] X2(2)= 6.7213 [0.0347]*
etUSD x2 (2)= 4.3538 [0.1134]
1/ Numbers along diagonal are test statistics for a simple hypothesis that a variable in a given column (or, 
likewise, in a row) is weakly exogenous. Numbers outside diagonal are test statistics for a joint hypothesis 
that variables in a given column and a row are weakly exogenous.
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Table 4-4 Georgia: Coefficients of cointegrating vectors fl and adjustment coefficients a.
Restriction
A B C  
Number of cointegrating vectors = 1
Sum of coefficients of money and exchange rate =1
P:
Pt
mt
USD c t
yt
a:
Pt
mt
USDe t
1 . 0 0 0 0
(0.0000)
-0.2530
(0.0457)
-0.5213
(0.0314)
0.4418
(0.1478)
-0.1561
(0.0394)
0.3271
(0.2015)
-0.0451
(0.0888)
1 . 0 0 0 0  
( 0.0000)
-0.4309
(0.0650)
-0.5691
(0 .0000)
1.2833
(0.1101)
-0.0706
(0.0190)
0.1741
(0.0951)
-0.0487
(0.0418)
Weak exogeneity of money 
and exchange rate
1.0000
(0.0000)
-0.3759
(0.0736)
-0.6241
(0.0000)
1.2659
(0.1247)
-0.0744
(0.0171)
*-1
Notes: The system has a form Axt ■ + ccfi'xt_x + yDt + £t , where xt is a vector of
y'=i
endogenous variables and Dt is a vector of exogenous variables. The rank of the a(3’ matrix determines the 
number of cointegrating vectors. The matrix can be decomposed to the matrix of adjustment coefficients a 
and the matrix of long-run coefficients p. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure 4-3 Georgia: Recursive Estimates of Long-Run Coefficients of the Price Equation
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Figure 4-4 Georgia: Cointegrating Vector and Components o f the Long-Run Relations.
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4.6 Error-Correction Model for Inflation
The “general-to-specific” methodology is followed in searching for the final form of the 
short-run dynamic inflation equation. The specification search begins from estimation of 
a relatively unrestricted model. The unrestricted inflation equation includes five lags of
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inflation; five lagged and current values of changes in the log of money and in the log of 
the exchange rate; the lagged error-correction term from the long-run price equation; 
changes in oil prices and in relative prices of fruits and vegetables; and the dummy 
variables discussed above. The search is guided by information criteria and the imposed 
restrictions are tested against unrestricted alternatives. 62
Restrictions imposed on the general specification leading to the final equation 
reported in Table 4-5 cannot be statistically rejected and improve information criteria. 
Figure 4-5 shows actual and fitted values, together with residuals. The equation shows 
that inflation is strongly affected by exchange rate changes and that the pass-through is 
fast. Changes in money also have a significant impact on inflation, but this effect takes 
longer to work its way through the economy than exchange rate changes. The adjustment 
of prices is also affected by the error-correction term, which is highly significant but low. 
This suggests that the price level slowly adjusts to its long-run equilibrium, which is a 
function of the levels of money, exchange rate and output. Supply shocks originating in 
agriculture have a high and significant short-term impact on inflation. Changes in oil 
import prices have a smaller, but also significant impact.
The final inflation equation easily passes all specification tests (Table 4-6). One- 
step ahead residuals are within a 2  standard deviations band, indicating that the estimated 
parameters are stable (Figure 4-6). One-step ahead and break-point Chow tests do not 
reject stability of the parameters at 1 percent level (Figure 4-6). Since the behaviour of 
inflation is visibly different in the period immediately preceding the exchange rate 
devaluation of December 1998 than in the rest of the sample, the model is re-estimated on 
the shorter sample from June 1999 to February 2003 as a further check for stability of the 
coefficients (column B in Table 4-7). The results are remarkably close to the full sample 
estimates. 63
The assumption that conditioning on contemporaneous changes in exchange rate 
and money is valid is checked by estimating the equation by the instrumental variables
62 F-tests have been used to test the restrictions. Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn and the 
Final Prediction Error criteria have been used forjudging adequacy of the reductions.
63 Standard errors of some coefficients are higher, but this is not surprising, given that the 
new estimates are based on a shorter and therefore less informative sample.
(IV) method. The results of IV estimation, using lagged changes of exchange rate and 
lagged moving average of money changes as instruments, are reported in column C of 
Table 4-7. The estimates are close to the OLS results, although coefficient of the moving 
average of changes in money is lower than the OLS counterpart.
Table 4-5 Georgia: Parsimonious error-correction equations for inflation and money demand.
Apt = 0.4450 + 0.0952 AeUSDt + 0.0961 VS (A mt + Amt-i + Amt.2) - 0.0534 ECMt-i 
(0.1037) (0.0274) (0.0253) (0.0125)
+ 0.1325 A(ptf00d-pt) + 0.0285 Aptoil + 0.0862 D1298
(0.0225) (0.0076) (0.0081)
R2 = 0.8582 Sample: 1996.6 -  2003.2
Equation standard error: 0.0055 Number of observations: 81
DW = 2.19
N otes: A indicates first difference. D0998 is one for September 1998, zero otherwise, and D1298 is one for 
December 1998, zero otherwise. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 4-6 Georgia: Diagnostic statistics for the single-equation inflation model.
AR 1-5 test: F(5,69) = 1.4581 [0.2149]
ARCH 1-5 test: F(5,64) = 0.2341 [0.9461]
Normality test: %2 (2) = 1.4100 [0.4941]
heterotest: F(ll,62) = 0.8282 [0.6127]
hetero-X test: F(21,52) = 0.5846 [0.9108]
RESET test: F(l,73) = 0.8634 [0.3558]
Notes: AR 1-n tests for autocorrelation up to nth lag, performed through an auxiliary regression of residuals 
on original variables and lagged residuals. Normality test has a null hypothesis that distribution of residuals 
has skewness and kurtosis corresponding to the normal distribution. ARCH 1-n tests for autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity up to nth lag in the residuals through auxiliary regression of squared residuals 
on a constant and lagged squared residuals. See Hendry and Doomik (2001) for a description of the tests. 
Probabilities are reported in parentheses and * and ** denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
level, respectively.
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Table 4-7 Georgia: Robustness check for the single-equation inflation model.
Dependent variable: Apt 
A B C
Estimation method: OLS OLS IV
Sample: 96.6 -  03.02 99.6-03.02 96.6-03.02
Constant 0.4450 0.4332 0.4806
(0.1037) (0.1729) (0.1076)
AeUSD, 0.0952 0.1064 0.0712
(0.0274) (0.0552) (0.0407)
Vi (Amt+Amt-i+Amt-2) 0.0961 0.1311 0.0646
(0.0253) (0.0622) (0.0360)
ECMm -0.0534 -0.0520 -0.0577
(0.0125) (0.0208) (0.0130)
A(ptfood-pt) 0.1325 0.1277 0.1326
(0.0225) (0.0293) (0.0231)
Aptoil 0.0285 0.0320 0.0270
(0.0076) (0.0095) (0.0079)
D1298 0.0862 0.0910
(0.0081) (0.0104)
N otes: Standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure 4-5 Georgia: Ap actual values, fitted values and residuals from the error-correction model.
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Figure 4-6 Georgia: Ap recursive residuals, 1-step ahead Chow tests and break-point Chow tests.
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4.7 Conclusions
The econometric results show that it is feasible to estimate robust price and inflation 
equations for Georgia. The long-run price equation expresses prices as a function of 
money, the exchange rate, and real income, and may be interpreted as portraying
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equilibrium in the goods market. Short-run dynamics of inflation are strongly affected by 
current exchange rate changes, money growth, and changes in relative prices of foodstuffs 
and in prices of oil. The estimated long- and short-run relationships are stable, and may 
be useful as a tool for policy formulation and evaluation. Estimation of a separate money 
demand equation turns out to be more difficult, pointing to a longer and more 
complicated adjustment mechanism governing the behaviour of real money balances.
The results suggest that the NBG faces serious challenges when conducting 
monetary policy. Public memory of hyperinflation is still fresh, and any external or 
internal shock quickly exerts strong pressure on the exchange rate. Because the stock of 
foreign exchange reserves remains small, the NBG has no scope for leaning against 
downward pressure on the Lari, especially when budget financing needs complicate 
monetary tightening. Yet even when faced with these challenges, the NBG has enjoyed 
substantial success in keeping inflation low and relatively stable. Looking ahead, further 
accumulation of foreign reserves and development of indirect monetary control 
instruments, such as a deeper treasury bill market, would increase the capacity of the 
NBG to respond to shocks.
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4.8 Appendix: Tests for Stationarity 
Table 4-8 Georgia: Unit Root Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 1996.1 -  2003.2
P
M
JJSD
P
M
~USD
Lag
Level
Test statistic
Seasonally adjusted series
-2.951
-3.180
-1.628
Unadjusted series
-2.732
-3.181
-1.750
First Difference 
Lag Test statistic
-3.873**
-6.250**
-5.172**
-4.344**
-6.596**
-4.854**
Notes: The null hypothesis is that a series contains a unit root against a stationary alternative. For each 
variable the augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic and the number of lags used in the test are reported. The 
number of lags was chosen based on F-tests for a joint significance of lags and Akaike information 
criterion, starting from 6 lags for each equation. Equations for levels of unadjusted series are estimated with 
a constant, seasonals and a linear trend. Equations for levels of seasonally adjusted series are estimated with 
a constant and a linear trend. Since first differences do not appear to be trended, the trend is not included in 
estimated equations for first differences of the series. Inclusion of trend into these equations does not 
change the results. * and ** denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
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5 M o n eta ry  P o lic y  in  A d v an c ed  Tra nsitio n  E co n o m ies
5.1 Introduction
Choosing exchange rate and monetary regimes for transition economies has been a 
difficult task. Exchange rate anchors proved popular at the beginning of reforms, as fixing 
the exchange rate was relatively easy to implement and effective in taming inflationary 
expectations in the midst of structural changes. These anchors became difficult to sustain 
by advanced reformers, gradually more integrated with the world economy and subject to 
booms and bursts in financial flows, complicating monetary management, especially 
when combined with inflexible fiscal policy responses. The advanced transition 
economies started looking for alternative monetary regimes. Unstable relationship 
between the growth of money supply and inflation in the past let to a disillusion with 
monetary targeting (Horvath and Jonas, 1998). A “just-do-it” approach without specifying 
a nominal anchor lacked credibility, especially in countries which abandoned the peg in a 
crisis situation. A hard peg regime would eliminate monetary policy from the set of 
policy tools. Given the drawbacks of alternative regimes, some countries embraced the 
growingly popular inflation targeting. 64
This paper evaluates the experience of two advanced transition economies, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, which at the end of the decade conducted their monetary policies 
in the framework of direct inflation targeting with a floating exchange rate. 65 The two 
countries—facing many of the above mentioned difficulties—exemplify the experience of 
advanced transition economies that recently introduced inflation targeting. They also 
represent different strategies for introducing the new framework, with a much faster 
implementation in the Czech Republic after the currency crisis, and a more gradual 
approach taken by Poland.
Performance under inflation targeting is compared with a counterfactual scenario 
of the past, more restrictive exchange rate regime. While the fixed exchange rate lessened
64 See Jonas and Mishkin (2003) for a fuller discussion of alternative monetary regimes 
for transition economies.
65 Another advanced transition country, Hungary, introduced inflation targeting only in 
2001, moving to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement much slower the Czech 
Republic and Poland.
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control over domestic monetary conditions, the exchange rate channel may still be a 
powerful tool to control inflation, and exchange rate stabilization may play a role even 
under the inflation targeting regime. Incentives to use the relatively well-documented 
exchange rate channel may be particularly strong in transition economies, where the 
relationship between monetary policy instruments and inflation remains highly uncertain 
(Christoffersen et al, 2001, and Gottschalk and Moore, 2001). On the other hand, 
limiting exchange rate fluctuations may lead to confusion about the final goal of 
monetary policy. For instance, exchange rate smoothing may be compelling for emerging 
markets, where—due to typically high degree of dollarization—exchange rate movements 
may have adverse effects on the financial sector balance sheet (Mishkin, 2004).66 There is 
a consensus in the literature that inflation targeting central banks should not pursue 
exchange rate stabilization for its own sake, but only as a tool to achieve a given inflation 
target. However, theoretical recommendations how far the central bank should go in 
stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations vary.
Early theoretical literature indicates that exchange rate smoothing may be an 
important element of the inflation targeting strategy. Svensson (1998) considers 
alternative targeting rules for a small open economy: strict inflation targeting (where 
central bank minimizes only inflation variability) and flexible inflation targeting (where 
output gap variability and interest rate smoothing are added to the loss function), both 
applied to domestic and CPI inflation. 67 He shows that the flexible CPI inflation targeting 
reduces the volatility of output to the low level achieved under the domestic inflation 
targeting, and stabilizes real interest and exchange rates more than other regimes. 68
66 Large and abrupt depreciations may increase the burden of dollar-denominated debt, 
produce a massive deterioration of balance sheets, and increase the risks of a financial 
crisis as discussed in Mishkin (1996).
67 While the model used by Svensson (1998) is not fully micro-founded, it contains a 
realistic lag structure resembling policy models commonly used in central banks for 
policy analysis.
ZO
In simulations, domestic inflation targeting is successful in stabilizing domestic 
inflation and—particularly in case of the flexible targeting—output gap. However, it 
generates high volatility in real exchange rate and the CPI inflation, driven by interest rate 
changes to produce desired adjustments in aggregate demand. The strict CPI inflation 
allows for a near-perfect stabilization of the CPI inflation, but exacerbates real exchange
(continued)
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Svensson (1998) concludes that the flexible CPI inflation targeting regime, which 
requires a certain degree of exchange rate smoothing, “appears as an attractive alternative 
(...) in a situation with weight on stabilization to both inflation and real variables”.
Evaluation of alternative policy rules in fully micro-founded models and using 
consumers’ welfare as a criterion produces less clear-cut results, but supports exchange 
rate smoothing in some specifications.69 Gah and Monacelli (2002) and Clarida et al
(2001) confirms that the CPI inflation targeting implies a smoother exchange rate than 
domestic inflation targeting, but find that the latter dominates the former from a welfare
7ftviewpoint. The exchange rate smoothness, combined with price stickiness, slows the 
response of the real exchange rate to productivity shocks, leading to inefficient allocation 
of resources. The result is challenged in models assuming imperfect exchange rate pass­
through. 71 Smets and Wouters (2002) show that minimizing distortions from staggered 
price setting in the imported goods sector—consistent with welfare maximization—gives 
an explicit reason for the stabilization of the nominal exchange rate in response to certain 
shocks.
The counterfactual simulations empirically investigate potential costs and benefits 
of limiting exchange rate fluctuations. Using the past regime as a benchmark has certain 
advantages over comparing the current implementation of inflation targeting with 
hypothetical optimal policies. Firstly, devising an optimal policy requires a fully 
structural model immune to unknown policy changes. While the method applied in this 
paper is not exempt from the Lucas critique, the stability of equations describing die 
behaviour of the private sector across the two actual regimes can be tested. Secondly, the 
comparison with the past exchange rate regime is relevant in the context of adopting the
rate volatility and introduces high output volatility, as it requires an aggressive use of the 
direct exchange rate channel to cancel the effect of domestic inflation on the CPI 
inflation.
69 Only a snapshot of the rich literature is discussed here. See Lane (2001) for a survey.
70 Several extensions of the model confirm this finding: Benogno and Benigno (2001)
(two countries); Benigno (2001) (incomplete financial markets); and Senay and 
Sutherland (2005) (endogenous changes in price flexibility).
71 See Choudhri and Hakura (2001), Yetman and Devereux (2003) and Gagnon and Ihrig 
(2004) for empirical evidence of imperfect pass-through.
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Euro, as the process of accession to the Eurozone will require a period of limiting 
exchange rate fluctuations under the ERMII system, similar to past exchange rate bands 
(although less adjustable).
The paper contributes to the literature on monetary transmission mechanisms in 
the two economies by explicitly modelling the change in the monetary policy regime. The 
applied methodology is a version of the structural VAR proposed by Sims and Zha
(2002), allowing for changes in some parameters of the model across regimes. The 
changes are restricted to parameters of the policy reaction functions, but more general 
specifications allowing for changes in all coefficients of the model are also tested. The 
preferred specification captures well policy changes and it is parsimonious enough to 
produce reasonable results in small samples under investigation. Identification of shocks 
follows the scheme proposed by Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) 
for open economy models, but extends their frameworks by exploiting the effects of 
fluctuations in emerging bond markets on capital flows to transition economies. Most of 
estimating structural VAR for transition economies applies a simple recursive 
identification scheme (e.g. Christoffersen et al., 2001, and Gottschalk and Moore, 2001, 
Wrobel 2001). A notable exception is Dibogloo and Kutan (2000), who estimate 
structural VARs for Poland and Hungary with long-run identification restrictions. 
Changes in the exchange rate regime are not addressed in any of the existing papers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes 
monetary and exchange rate policies in Poland and the Czech Republic, focusing on the 
timing of the regime change and the implementation of inflation targeting. Section 5.3 
discusses identification and section 5.4 describes estimation strategy and results. Section 
5.5 shows counterfactual policy simulations and interprets the results. Section six checks 
the robustness of results. A description of data sources and technical details of the 
estimation strategy are relegated to appendices.
5.2 Monetary and exchange rate policy in Poland and the Czech Republic
5.2.1 The Czech Republic
In Czechoslovakia, a macroeconomic disequilibrium inherited from the Soviet- 
style system was less severe than in Poland and price liberalization produced a smaller 
effect on inflation. The koruna was initially pegged to the basket of five currencies and
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since 1993 to the basket of DM and USD. Inflation was falling, approaching a single digit 
level by 1994.
Since 1994, the fixed exchange rate regime—combined with liberalization of die 
foreign exchange market, improved rating of the Czech Republic and the privatization 
process -  led to a massive capital inflow, a pressure on real appreciation and a growing 
current account deficit. In 1997, the growing external disequilibrium changed market 
sentiments towards koruna. A speculative attack, triggered by the Asian crisis, led to 
abandoning the peg in May 1997. The CNB adopted measures to avoid a sharp drop in 
the domestic currency value. The koruna was well inside the band when exit from the 
previous exchange rate regime was announced, leaving some scope for depreciation even 
within the previous, narrow band. The CNB maintained a tight liquidity control after the 
devaluation, driving up money market rates and preventing excessive depreciation. 
Pressure on koruna eased after June 1997 and the central bank was gradually reducing the 
rates, closely monitoring developments on the foreign exchange market. Real interest 
rates converged to the pre-crisis level in August 1997, completing the process of interest 
landing after die hike triggered by the crisis (Smidkova et al. 1999).
Figure 5-1 (upper panel) plots daily percentage deviations of the pre-crisis 
exchange rate basket from central parity.
Inflation targeting, a new regime in the Czech monetary policy, was introduced at 
the beginning of 1998. The CNB initially targeted net inflation rate (excluding changes in 
administrative prices and direct taxes). Economic slowdown, brought about by the 
currency crisis and the tight monetary policy in its aftermath, exerted downward pressure 
on inflation. The 1998 target was missed by a large margin: the net inflation was 1.7 
percent against the 6  ± 2 per cent target range. In mid-1998 the CNB started reducing 
interest rates and, in a series of cuts, the rate was lowered from 15 percent at the 
beginning of 1998 to 5.25 percent in November 1999. Policy relaxation did not prevent 
the net inflation rate to drop below the 4.5 ± 0.5 percent target in 1999. Interest rates 
remained stable in 2000, and were falling at a slower rate in 2001, reaching 4.75 percent 
at the end of the year. Low interest rates induced portfolio outflows, but capital inflows 
related to foreign direct investments put a pressure on koruna appreciation and in 2 0 0 0  
the currency appreciated in nominal terms. The net inflation in 2000 was again below the 
target (4.5 ± 1 percent), and fluctuated in the lower range of the target band (3 ± 1
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percent) in 2001. In 2001, the CNB announced the target band for headline inflation, 
declining from 3-5 percent in January 2002 to 2-4 percent in December 2005. Despite 
record-low interest rates (falling to 2 percent in August 2003) and interventions in the 
foreign exchange market, further appreciation of koruna kept monetary conditions tight 
and hampered implementation of the inflation targeting framework. The rate of inflation 
was 2  percentage points below the target in 2 0 0 2 , and 1.5 percentage points lower in 
2003. Inflation returned to the centre of the CNB’s target band in 2004, fuelled by the 
past policy relaxation, and increases in food, oil prices, and indirect taxes after the EU 
accession.
5.2.2 Poland
Poland experienced a period of near-hyperinflation after price liberalization in 
1989-90. As a part of the stabilization package, the zloty was temporarily fixed against 
the dollar. The inflation was quickly reduced, but remained at a two-digit level and 
exchange rate appreciated in real terms. In 1991 the exchange rate was devalued, the 
dollar was replaced by a basket of five currencies, and subsequently a crawling peg 
system replaced the peg. In the 1991-94 post-stabilization period, despite large fiscal 
deficit financing, real interest rates of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) remained at a 
positive level and inflation was declining in line with the crawling peg.
In 1995 a capital inflow to the country -  driven by increasing credibility of 
economic reforms and privatization process -  became a source of excessive monetary 
expansion. In order to increase the risk faced by portfolio investors and tame the inflow, 
the crawling peg system was replaced by a ± 7  percent band in May 1995. The zloty 
appreciated after introduction of the new system, but the new regime did not bring any 
significant increase in volatility since exchange rate was persistently close to the strong 
bound of the zone (Figure 5-1 plots daily percentage deviations of the basket from central 
parity after introduction of the target zone). The capital inflow slowed down only after 
interest rate cuts and revaluation of the parity at the end of 1995. The volatility was still 
limited, with the NBP keeping percentage deviations of the exchange rate basket from 
parity within an implicit ±2.5 percent zone.
In January 1998, a newly established Monetary Policy Council (MPC) adopted 
inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy. The MPC considered a break from the
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previous exchange rate policy as a necessary step in implementation of the inflation 
targeting framework (NBP, 1998). In February 1998 the exchange rate band was widened 
to ± 1 0  per cent and the exchange rate was allowed to move more freely within the zone. 
In October 1998 the target zone was widened to ±12.5 per cent, in March 1999 it was 
further widened to ±15 per cent, and in April 2000 zloty started floating.
At the end of 1996 and in 1997 NBP interest rates were increasing after a rapid 
growth in domestic credit in 1996, but throughout 1998 the reference rate was reduced 
from 24 percent in February to 15.5 percent in December. The sharp reduction was a 
response to economic slowdown, a decline in the 1 2 -month inflation from 13 percent in 
1997 to 8.4 in 1998, and large portfolio capital inflows. Central bank interest rates 
remained at a stable level for the first half of 1999 but higher inflation—overshooting the 
6.6-7.8 percent target for 1999—prompted monetary authorities to reverse the cuts 
starting from the second half of 1999. In 2000 interest rates were further increased but the 
inflation rate remained above the 5.4-6. 8  percent target for this year. A period of interest 
rate cuts started only from the beginning of 2 0 0 1 , when inflation was declining and 
economic activity plunged into recession. Despite the policy relaxation (the reference rate 
dropped by 8.5 percentage points in 2001 and by nearly 5 additional points in 2002), the 
end-year inflation was below the 7 ± 1 target in 2001 and dropped to 0.8 percent in 2002, 
well below the 5 ± 1 target72. The policy relaxation pushed inflation towards the lower 
band of the target range (3 ± 1) at the end of 2003. A modest policy tightening started in 
2004, when inflation oscillated above the upper band of the range (2.5 ± 1) at the end of 
the year.
72 In June 2002, the MPC reduced the 2002 target to 3 ± 1.
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Figure 5-1 Percentage deviations from central parities for the Czech Republic and Poland.
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Remark : Central parities and baskets in the floating exchange rate period are the same as last parities and 
baskets in the target zone period.
A -  Czech crisis (devaluation)
B Asian crisis (stock exchange crash in Hong-Kong)
C -  Russian crisis (devaluation)
D -  Brazilian crisis (devaluation)
E -  Argentine crisis (devaluation)
5.3 Specification and identification of the model
The empirical model adopted in this study is a version of a small, open-economy 
structural vector autoregression (SVAR). Similar models have been successfully 
estimated for Canada by Cushman and Zha (1997) and for other OECD countries by Kim 
and Roubini (1995). Due to data limitations (short time series), the size of the model is 
kept at the minimum and consequently the adopted identification scheme is simpler than 
in the other studies. The basic model is described by the following system of 
simultaneous equations:
y 'A  =  x 'tA + +  £*,* =  i - r  (7.i)
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where yt = [ Yt, Pt, It, Et, St\  It* ] is a n x 1 vector of endogenous variables (Yt is output, Pt 
denotes prices, It is short-term interest rate, Et is exchange rate, St* is spread on emerging 
market debt, and It* is interest rate in industrialized countries), Xt is a m x 1 vector of 
lagged endogenous variables and exogenous variables specified below, and et is a n x 1 
vector of structural disturbances with the following distribution:
et\yt~ N(0,1) (7.2)
Five variables in the yt vector can be grouped into two blocks: output and prices form a 
’’real sector” block, and short-term interest rate, exchange rate, and measures of return on 
foreign assets (the spread and the interest rate) form a ’’financial sector” block. 
Identification of shocks in the system described by equations (7.1) and (7.2) requires 
imposing a sufficient number of restrictions on the Ao matrix. Table 5-1 presents the 
imposed restrictions.
Table 5-1 Restrictions on coefficients of the A0 matrix.
Real sector bloc Financial sector bloc
Policy Information Emerging Foreign
reaction equation market interest rate
function spread
p ao a5
Y ai a.2 ae
I a3 a7
E a4 a8
S* a 9 a ior -a 7 an
The first column of the table lists endogenous variables. The top rows divide the table 
into two blocs and—when economically interpretable—into behavioral equations defined 
by columns with non-empty cells.
Identification of shocks in the real sector block is achieved by assuming that 
financial sector variables affect real sector variables only with a lag. This restriction 
makes the Ao matrix bloc triangular. The real sector bloc itself is assumed to be 
triangular, which is normalization. Shocks and equations in the real sector bloc are not
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given any economic interpretation, and their normalization does not affect identification 
of shocks in the financial sector bloc (Zha, 1996).
Identification of shocks in the financial sector is achieved by assuming that a 
time-lag in data dissemination does not allow real sector variables to contemporaneously 
enter the policy reaction function, and that returns on foreign assets are exogenous and do 
not contemporaneously affect variables in the policy reaction function. The information 
equation includes all variables, but coefficients of domestic and foreign interest rate are 
restricted to have the same absolute value with opposite signs, giving this equation an 
interpretation of the uncovered interest parity condition. Restrictions identifying the 
financial sector bloc do not depend on any particular policy regime, and can be used 
under both pegged and floating exchange rate arrangements.
The policy reaction equation may be interpreted as a function describing the 
behaviour of an implicit monetary condition index—a linear combination of short term 
interest rate and exchange rate—by lagged endogenous and exogenous variables. This 
interpretation originates from Gerlach and Smets (1996) and Smets (1996), who show 
that it is optimal for monetary authorities targeting the monetary condition index not to 
react to foreign financial markets’ shocks. Contemporaneous coefficients in the monetary 
policy reaction function can be normalized to sum up to one, and interpreted as weights in 
the monetary condition index. A successful identification should give a higher weight to 
exchange rate in the target zone regime, and a higher weight to interest rate in the floating 
regime.
The presence of the emerging market debt spread in the foreign sector block is 
innovative. The traditionally used interest rate in industrialized countries may not fully 
capture shocks affecting transitional economies. Advanced transition economies are 
regarded as emerging markets and—as depicted on figure 1 —capital flows to these 
countries are driven by developments in other emerging markets to much larger extent 
than by changes in developed economies’ interest rates (Habib, 2002). Changes in 
emerging market debt spread are likely to be exogenous with respect to the behaviour of
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other variables in the model, given a relatively small size of the Czech Republic and 
Poland in international capital markets. 73
The change in the monetary policy strategy—a switch to inflation targeting— 
makes the fixed-coefficient VAR model potentially unsuitable for the analysis of the 
whole sample. To account for policy changes, the model allows for a limited time- 
variation in coefficients, following the methodology proposed by Sims and Zha (2002) 
and similar to Del Negro and Obiols-Homs (2001). In the specification with time-varying 
coefficients, equation (7.1) is replaced by:
y \ \ ( s t) = xtA+(st) +  et1t = 1...T (7.3)
where st is a state of the economy, which is assumed to be observable.
If all elements of matrices Ao and A+ vary across states, the number of parameters 
in the system described by equation (7.3) can be very large, making it unsuitable for short 
transition series. In what follows, time-variation in the system is restricted to parameters 
of the policy reaction function, both in the Ao and in the A+ matrix. The number of states 
is set to two, corresponding to the pegged and floating exchange rate regime. Testing this 
specification against a more flexible alternative shows that the policy break was the major 
change in the estimation period.
5.4 Estimation and results
In empirical specification, variables in the financial sector bloc are short term interest 
rates (1 month WIBOR for Poland and 1 month PRIBOR for the Czech Republic), 
exchange rate indices defined as a weighted average of USD and DM rates (domestic 
currency units per foreign currency unit, with a dollar weight of 35 percent for the Czech
73 Since the EMBI+ index used in the study gives a small weight to Polish Eurobonds (3.7 
percent), the assumption that returns on foreign assets measured by the index are 
exogenous with respect to domestic variables may be violated. Even if country’s bonds 
are excluded, other bonds in the index may be affected by developments on domestic 
financial markets. In particular, the exogeneity assumption may be violated in case of the 
Czech Republic during the 1997 crisis. Developments in the Czech Republic and Poland 
do not seem to have any visible effect on the EMBI+ index, but robustness of results to 
this assumption is checked by estimating alternative specifications as discussed below.
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Republic and 50 percent and Poland), spread on the JP Morgan EMBI+ index, and 1 
month LIBOR. These interest rates are best proxies for short term policy rates in the 
sample. The dollar weight in the exchange rate index for the Czech Republic is the 
official basket weight in the March 1996-June 1997 period. For Poland, the weight is an 
approximation, since the official basket included four non-dollar currencies, later replaced 
by the Euro. The spread on the EMBI+ index and LIBOR measure returns on foreign 
assets. Real sector variables are consumer price index and interpolated real GDP.74  
Industrial production and consumer price indices are seasonally adjusted and in logs, 
exchange rate and EMBI+ indices are in logs, and money market rates are not 
transformed. A dummy equal to one in May and June 1997 and zero elsewhere is 
introduced in the information equation for the Czech Republic. Introduction of the 
dummy reflects the assumption that large shocks related to a sudden capital outflow in 
this period are not drawn from the same distribution as other shocks in the model. 
Following Begg (1998), it is assumed that the capital outflow was driven by a confidence 
crisis, which was contemporaneously exogenous to other variables in the model. It 
assumed that the policy reaction to the shock was not different from policy responses to 
other disturbances in international financial markets. A description of variables is given in 
5.7
Estimation period runs from May 1995 (introduction of the target zone) until 
September 2004 for Poland, and from March 1996 (introduction of the target zone) to 
December 2003 for the Czech Republic. The date of policy change is set to January 1998 
for the Czech Republic (corresponding to introduction of the inflation targeting 
framework) and to February 1998 for Poland (corresponding to widening of the target 
zone to ±10 percent by the Monetary Policy Council, after announcing a switch to 
inflation targeting). The discussion above and Figure 5-1 indicate that the dates mark a 
visible change in the exchange rate behaviour, consistent with a switch to a floating 
regime.
74 GDP series are interpolated from quarterly values using related monthly series: index 
of industrial production, retail sale and construction activity for the Czech Republic; and 
the same set of variables augmented by the volume of cargo transport for Poland. State- 
space model used for interpolation is estimated through die Kalman filter as discussed in
5.9
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Co-integration analysis is not conducted. Bayesian methods are used for the 
estimation, in which the inference is not affected by non-stationarity of the data. 
However, as discussed in Sims (1996), estimation of a VAR system conditional on initial 
conditions with flat priors attributes implausible explanatory power to initial conditions. 
This leads to the well-known bias toward stationarity in conventional estimates of such 
models. Sims’ remedy to this problem is to formulate priors that reflect the prior 
implausibility of models dominated by initial conditions, pushing the model towards non- 
stationarity. In this paper, unit root priors are applied to die reduced-form VAR, but other 
priors advocated by Sims (1996) and Sims and Zha (2002) to reduce the reliance on initial 
conditions are not used. According to Sims (1996), the application of these priors should 
not be automatic, but should depend on investigator’s prior knowledge about the 
behaviour of the system. The prolonged effect of powerful price liberalization shocks 
experienced at the beginning of transition gives a strong reason not to downplay the role 
of initial conditions in the system. The estimated model leans therefore toward a 
hypothesis that the gradual disinflation path experienced by transition economies could 
had been expected at the start of the process.
Additional restrictions are imposed on the reduced system and coefficients to 
tighten the inference. The reduced form systems are assumed to be non-explosive. 
Coefficients of exchange rate and interest rate in the monetary policy reaction function 
are restricted to have opposite signs (—a^ /  > 0  ), and the weight attached to exchange
rate in the monetary condition index is restricted to be higher in the target zone regime 
(~ a?  /  aT  < ~ a?  /  a42))* 5.8 discusses in details the Bayesian estimation technique.
The lag length in the VAR is set to six, which is a balance between limiting 
degrees of freedom and allowing for a reach dynamics in the system. All calculations are 
conducted in OX (Doomik, 1999) and programs replicating the results are available on 
request.
5.4.1 Model fit
Table 5-2 presents measures of fit for models with different treatment of structural breaks 
associated with monetary policy regime changes: Schwarz criteria and likelihood 
functions evaluated at the top of posterior density. Four specifications are considered: 
changes in all parameters of the model at the time of structural break; changes in
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parameters of the monetary policy function; changes in contemporaneous coefficients of 
the monetary policy reaction function (weights of exchange and interest rates in the 
MCI); and constant parameters across policy regimes.
Table 5-2 Measures of fit.
log(/(yr 0) • 7r(0)) Schwarz
Czech Republic
All parameters 2222.7 -34.494
Monetary policy 2133.5 -38.084
MCI weights 2130.1 -39.229
Nothing 2047.7 -37.555
Poland
All parameters 2535.0 -33.999
Monetary policy 2471.9 -37.893
MCI weights 2461.2 -38.767
Nothing 2448.1 -38.615
Models allowing for changes in policy parameters are strictly favoured over 
specifications allowing for variation in all model parameters, providing evidence that 
structural equations other than monetary policy reaction function did not change at the 
time of regime change. A model forcing all coefficients to be constant across regimes is 
marginally better than the model allowing for changes in policy parameters for Poland, 
and worse for the Czech Republic.
Models allowing for changes in only contemporaneous coefficients of the policy 
reaction function (MCI weights) come first in the ranking.
Although measures of fit favour models with time-varying contemporaneous 
coefficients in the policy reaction function, the difference is small compared to models 
allowing for changes in all parameters of the function. Further analysis is therefore 
conducted using models with the fully time-varying policy reaction functions, given their 
more straightforward economic interpretation.
5.4.2 Coefficients of the Ao matrix
Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 list modes, and 5th and 95th percentiles of posterior distributions 
of coefficients in Aq matrices for two regimes for the Czech Republic and Poland.
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Table 5-3 Coefficients of the A q matrix for the Czech Republic.
5 percentile Mode 95 percentile
ao
ai
a2
a3(0) 
(0)
0 )
'(D
a4
a3
a4 
as 
ao 
a? 
a8
a9
aio
an
|a3(0 )|/( |a3(0)| + |a4(0 ) |)
153.30
-77.99
274.94
17.25 
-137.52 
261.23 
-18.57
3.13
-46.28
36.19
55.95
-37.45
104.92
441.25 
0.14 
0.94
173.88
-29.82
308.07
26.53
-108.55
298.61
-7.13
28.59
4.56
47.92
63.09
-17.80
115.67
480.49
0.20
0.98
195.05
26.99
344.17
36.69
-83.57
338.78
- 1.12
55.89
50.03
58.37
70.61
0.26
128.59
535.40
0.26
1.00
Table 5-4 Coefficients of the Aq matrix for Poland.
5th percentile Mode 95th percentile
ao 101.85 114.21 127.10
ai -83.20 -26.44 27.56
a2 319.50 356.05 393.68
a3(0) 26.69 72.12 119.87
a4(0) -151.06 -119.86 -90.95
a3(,) 63.75 112.71 142.82
-49.40 -33.84 -20.59
as -25.67 -7.24 6.73
a« -67.45 -16.99 36.85
a? 87.97 112.96 145.03
a8 29.95 47.62 58.73
ag -54.42 -34.50 -9.80
aio 109.96 120.23 132.19
an 468.76 513.82 562.51
|a3(0 )|/( |a3(0)| +|a4(0)|) 0.17 0.38 0.54
|a3( l ) |/ ( |a 3(l)| + |a4 (l) |) 0.57 0.78 0.87
Coefficients of the policy reaction function a3 and aA are consistent with their 
interpretation as contemporaneous coefficients in the monetary policy reaction function. 
After normalization, these coefficients can be interpreted as weights of exchange rate and 
interest rate in the MCI, which are reported in bottom rows of the tables. Both for the 
Czech Republic and Poland, the weight attached to exchange rate in the MCI is much
27
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higher than in the floating exchange rate regime. In both regimes the weights are 
precisely estimated. The difference between two policy regimes appears to be lower for 
Poland than for the Czech Republic.
Coefficients of financial variables in information equations are economically 
interpretable and in most cases precisely estimated. An increase in domestic interest rate 
or a decline in LIBOR appreciate domestic currency, while a higher spread on emerging 
market debt depreciates the currency. Coefficients of other variables in information 
equations are estimated less precisely.
Since the real sector block is not identified, no interpretation is given to 
coefficients in the first two equations of the model.
5.4.3 Dynamic responses to policy shocks in the two regimes
Responses of consumer price index, industrial production, money market rate and 
exchange rate to a monetary policy shock for the Czech Republic and Poland are plotted 
on Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3. Graphs in left and right columns show posterior modes and 
5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution for the first and the second regime 
respectively.
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Figure 5-2 Czech Republic: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in two regimes: 1996.3- 
1997.12 (left column) and 1998.1-2003.12 (right column) with 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5-3 Poland: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in two regimes: 1995.5-1998.2 (left 
column) and 1998.3-2004.9 (right column) with 95% confidence interval.
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In both regimes, a negative monetary policy shock leads to a simultaneous appreciation of 
exchange rate and an increase in interest rate, but the path of response is different,
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reflecting changes in the operation of monetary policy in these periods. In the Czech 
Republic, the monetary policy shock in the first regime has a strong but short effect on 
both the interest rate and the exchange rate. In the floating exchange rate regime, interest 
rate and exchange rate responses are smaller, but more persistent. Responses of output 
and prices have a correct sign in both regimes, but are not precisely estimated. Both 
output and prices react faster in the first regime: output decline starts shortly after the 
shock and continues for a period of 7 months, and prices react fully to a monetary policy 
shock after about a year. Under the floating exchange rate, the maximum output decline 
occurs after 12 months, and prices fully react nearly two years after the shock. In Poland, 
responses of interest rate and exchange rate are both stronger and more persistent in the 
floating exchange rate regime, but the initial reaction to the shock is reversed after about 
15 months. Output responses are estimated more precisely, with output falling to the 
lowest level three quarters after monetary tightening, and prices fully falling a year after 
the tightening. Output and price responses under the floating exchange rate regime are 
stronger than in the first regime, but partly reversed due to policy reversals indicated by 
the behaviour of interest and exchange rates.
5.5 Counterfactual Simulation of the 1998 Policy Change
This section attempts to estimate the effects of the 1998 change in policy framework on 
the behaviour of policy instruments, inflation and output for the Czech Republic and 
Poland. The aim of these simulations is to evaluate the implementation of inflation 
targeting combined with floating exchange rates in the two countries. Following Sims and 
Zha (2002), a counterfactual history is modelled as follows. For each draw from the 
parameters’ density, a sequence of unit variance structural shocks is saved. In the next 
step—starting from December 1997 for the Czech Republic and February 1998 for 
Poland—a one-step to n-step ahead forecasts are created (where n is the last period of the 
simulation), using the saved structural shocks and parameters from the previous policy 
regime. The counterfactual paths for year-on-year changes in output, year-on-year 
changes in CPI, short-term interest rate and exchange rate index are plotted on Figure 5-4 
and Figure 5-5 for the Czech Republic and Poland.
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Figure 5-4 Czech Republic: Counterfactual simulation of 
operating in the floating exchange rate period.
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Figure 5-5 Poland: Counterfactual simulation of a policy rule from the crawling peg regime operating 
in the floating exchange rate period.
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For both countries, the simulated exchange rate path is smoother, but contains a time- 
varying trend implying a real appreciation.75 The estimated first regime restricts exchange 
rate fluctuations, but combines this policy with an adjustable speed of nominal 
depreciation. Throughout the simulation period, the counterfactual interest rate path 
exhibits more high-frequency volatility, responding—instead of exchange rate—to shocks 
originating from international financial markets.
For the Czech Republic, the simulated paths are significantly different from actual 
ones at the beginning of the simulation period. The results suggest that without the policy 
change, there would be a significantly faster relaxation of monetary policy after the crisis,
75 In Poland, the depreciating nominal exchange rate is consistent with real appreciation 
due to relatively higher inflation. Nominal appreciation is necessary in case of the Czech 
Republic, when inflation is lower.
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generating faster output recovery and initially higher inflation. Subsequently, in 2000 
interest rates would need to be increased compared to the baseline in order to counteract 
exchange rate depreciation, reducing output and stabilizing inflation. The baseline paths 
are close to the 95 percent confidence interval for counterfactual simulations in this 
period. The simulated monetary policy appears too tight in the last 18 month of the 
analysis compared to the actual interest rate and exchange rate behaviour, although 
differences between the simulated and actual paths are not significant. The simulated 
policy strongly supports the exchange rate, which may be a reflection of the interest hike 
and its subsequent behaviour during and after the 1997 crisis, covered in the estimation 
period. This strong emphasis on the exchange rate generates a likely sub-optimal 
behaviour of interest rate at the end of the simulation.
For Poland, the counterfactual policy is not only often significantly different, but 
also seems to perform better than the actual one for most of the simulation period. The 
simulated interest rate path is more gradual. In particular, the policy relaxation in 1999, 
and a subsequent tightening are less pronounced. As a result, exchange rate depreciates 
less in 1999, and the strong appreciation in 2001 is avoided. This leads to smoother 
output and inflation paths.
The model is also estimated using alternative inflation measures. While policy 
targets in both countries are currently set for the headline inflation, the Czech Republic 
targeted net inflation after the introduction of the new framework. In Poland, MPC 
statements underline the role of the net inflation in policy decisions.76 While it is unlikely 
that the policy under the previous monetary regime was fully guided by these measures of 
inflation, the policymakers might, to some extent, have taken into account a temporary 
nature of the shocks now excluded from the net inflation series. Estimating the system 
with the net inflation series allows for this possibility. Impulse responses produced from 
the re-estimated models are similar to the original specification. The interpretation of 
counterfactual simulations—presented on Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7 is also broadly 
similar. The main exception is that the counterfactual path for the Czech inflation is now
7  f \ The net inflation for the Czech Republic excludes changes in administrative prices and 
direct taxes. In Poland, the net inflation excludes prices of food and oil products.
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significantly lower than the actual at the end of the sample due to a strong increase in 
interest rate and exchange rate appreciation.
I: Actual
Figure 5-6 Czech Republic: Counterfactual simulation o f a policy rule from the crawling peg regime 
operating in the floating exchange rate period using net inflation.
Y (y-on-y change): Actual and Counterfactual P (y-on-y change): Actual and Counterfactual
Simulation
95% confidence interval 
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Figure 5-7 Poland: Counterfactual simulation o f a policy 
in the floating exchange rate period using net inflation.
Y (y-on-y change): Actual and Counterfactual
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rule from the crawling peg regime operating
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Simulation
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Additional robustness checks included adding central bank foreign currency reserves as 
an exogenous variable affecting the behaviour of financial variables, adding fiscal 
primary balance to the system, and relaxing priors used in the presented specification. 
The addition of reserves, which proxy for central bank intervention at the exchange rate 
market, does not significantly change the results. Estimating the model either with 
primary balance or with weak priors did not produce economically interpretable results 
due to the large number of parameters in the systems. It is worth to note, however, that 
since variables in the real sector block are affected by fiscal policy, the estimated 
monetary policy indirectly reacts to fiscal variables even in the current specification.
5.6 Conclusions
This paper attempts to shed some light on the effects of monetary policy on output and 
inflation, and evaluate the effects of monetary policy changes in the Czech Republic and
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Poland after the introduction of the inflation targeting framework in 1998. The six- 
variable structural VAR methodology adopted in the study is successful in identifying 
monetary policy shocks and their effects for the Czech and Polish economies. The time- 
varying model is capable of detecting changes in the policy reaction function consistent 
with the introduction of the floating exchange rate system and switching to short-term 
interest rates as the main policy instrument. Counterfactual simulations—in which the 
countries do not switch from target zones to the floating exchange rate system—facilitate 
the evaluation of the policy in the floating exchange rate period.
For both countries, a typical unexpected monetary tightening during the regime 
with restricted exchange rate fluctuations leads to a temporaiy appreciation of the 
exchange rate and a temporary increase in the short term interest rate. In the inflation 
targeting framework, monetary policy tightening is reflected in a persistent increase of 
short-term interest rates, leading to exchange rate appreciation. Responses of prices and 
output are consistent with macroeconomic theory and other VAR studies: both prices and 
output decline after the contractionary monetary policy shock and the response of output 
is faster than the response of prices.
In the Czech Republic, the weight of exchange rate in the monetary conditions 
index for the regime with restricted exchange rate fluctuations is much higher that the 
corresponding weight for Poland. This is likely a reflection of the behaviour of interest 
rate during and after the 1997 crisis, when monetary policy attempted to defend the peg. 
For this reason, the identified monetary policy function for the past regime may be of 
limited use to evaluate the behaviour of macro-variables when exchange rate fluctuations 
are constrained, but there are no unusually large shocks.
In Poland, a contractionary monetary policy shock under the floating exchange 
rate generates stronger interest rate and exchange rate responses than in the corresponding 
period for the Czech Republic. Moreover, the responses of exchange and interest rates to 
the shock are reversed after about 15 months, pointing to cyclicality in setting monetary 
policy instruments. In counterfactual simulations, the exchange rate and interest rate paths 
are smoother than actual, leading to a more stable inflation and output. The smoother 
simulated interest path suggests that reducing monetary policy volatility—which 
apparently increased in the floating exchange rate period—dominates the stronger effect 
of external shocks on interest rate when exchange rate fluctuations are restricted.
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Gains from limiting exchange rate fluctuations in Poland would therefore 
originate mainly from reducing volatility in the monetary policy itself.77 This has 
important implications for the EMU accession. Restricting exchange rate fluctuations in 
this process would reduce the discretion in monetary policy, and therefore its volatility. 
The model, however, cannot answer the question how the fixed and non-adjustable 
exchange rate would affect inflation behaviour in the presence of persistent real 
appreciation.
77 Borghijs and Kuijs (2004) offer a similar conclusion.
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5.7 Appendix: Data sources and transformations
Country Variable Description Source
Czech E (CZKAJSD)035(CZK/DM)° 65 (in logs) CNB
Republic I 1 month PRIBOR CNB
Y Index of industrial production (XI1 
seasonally adjusted, in logs)
CNB
P CPI (XI1 seasonally adjusted, in logs) CNB
Poland E (PLN/USD)°'5(PLN/DM)°5 (in logs) NBP
I 1 month WIBOR Datastream
Y Index of industrial production (XI1 
seasonally adjusted, in logs)
CSO
P CPI (Xll seasonally adjusted, in logs) CSO
Financial
markets
I* JP Morgan EMBI+ (in logs) Datastream
CNB -  Czech National Bank
NBP -  National Bank of Poland
CSO -  Central Statistical Office (Poland)
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5.8 Appendix: Bayesian estimation
The estimation method for the multi-regime model in this paper is adapted from Sims and 
Zha (2002), simplified after assuming that dates of regime changes are known.
Following Sims and Zha, the model (7.1) is rewritten in the following way
=  z;p<‘> + s '4 t)] + e; (7.4)
where
S = 0 (7.5)(m—n)xn
Priors for non-zero coefficients in Ao (for regimes k=l,2) are specified assuming a joint 
Gaussian prior distribution with independent individual elements with mean zero and 
standard deviation set to \  /  St for the i’th raw of Ao®, where Ao is a hyperparameter and
is a standard deviation from an estimated autoregressive process for the i’th variable. 
For D®, a joint Gaussian prior distribution is specified with independent individual 
elements with mean zero and standard deviation of the coefficient on lag 1 of variable j in
each equation given by -^-L, where 1, Ai, Ao are hyperparameters and 6, is a standard
6 f 3
deviation from an estimated autoregressive process for the j ’th variable. This formulation 
of the prior is equivalent to specifying a random walk prior for reduced form VAR 
coefficients. In the baseline specification 1 = 1, Ao = 1, Ai = .2, A3 = 1. In addition, diffuse 
priors are assumed for deterministic and exogenous elements of the system.
Denoting the j ’th column of A^k) by aj*j and the j ’th column of D® by d® for j
= 1,..., n and k = 1, 2, the proposed prior distributions for elements of A® in equation j 
can be written as:
-  N(0,H0j),k =  1,2, j  =  (7.6)
4 k> -  N(0,ff+j),k = 1,2, j  = l,...,n  (7.7)
The model is further rewritten by stacking and d{k) for k = 1; 2 into:
In order to avoid over-parameterization of the model, the coefficients in aj and dj must 
be restricted. In the baseline specification only parameters of policy reaction functions are 
allowed to vary. Following Waggoner and Zha (2001), coefficients in a0 j and d0 j can be
expressed in terms of “free” coefficients by writing the restrictions as:
where Qj is a nk x nk matrix with rank qj and Rj is a mk x mk matrix with rank rj. 
Denoting by Uj a nk x qj matrix such that the columns of Uj form an orthonormal basis for 
the null space of Qj and denoting by Vj a mk x q matrix such that the columns of Vj form 
an orthonormal space for the null space of Rj, aj and dj can be expressed in terms of a qj x 
nk vector bj and a rj x mk vector gj satisfying the following relationships:
Vectors bj and gj contain ’’free” parameters of the model. The original parameters in aj 
and dj can be recovered by linear transformations Uj and Vj.
The prior for coefficients in bj and gj are obtained by combining equations 7.6, 
7.7, 7.8 and 7.10:
Qfioj = o ,Rjdj = 0 , j  = 1 ,...,n (7.9)
aoj = Ujbj ,dj = V3gp j  =  l,...,n (7.10)
(7.11)
(7.12)
where
(7.13)
(7.14)
Introducing notation:
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Up >
y(*) = ,xw =
H'. X%\
,k =  1,2 (7.15)
where Tk is the total number of observations in regime k; and t[k) and are respectively
the first and the last observation from regime k, the likelihood function expressed in terms 
of original parameters is proportional to:
L  oc f j |d e t(4 * ))|7in e x p |- - / r a c e [ 7 w 4 * ) - X (k)(D(k) + S 4 k))][Y(k)4 k) -  X (k\ D (k) + S 4 k))] 
*=i *=i I  2
r i l d e t ^ ’f r i ^ p l - +  & £ >)'P '(X r ) - X « \ d ?  + & £>)]} =
jt=i *=i I 2 J
~ [ a l k] Y {kyY w a™ - 2 { d f  + Sa(QkJ ) ' X w 'Y(k)a (0k]  +
( d f  + S a $ y X w X ik)( d f ' + Sa$)]
The above expression can be simplified by introducing the following notation:
A’ 1 = diag^Y^'Y™ -  2 S 'X (tyY (h) + 5 ,X<i)'X(‘)5 ] t 1} 
Aw = diag^Xw'Ym -  X w 'Xm S]jU}
A ;1 =
(7.16)
(7.17)
where diag {[Xtky X <k)fk=l\  is a matrix with XnJ,X(1’ and X<2)'X(2) on the diagonal. Using 
the newly introduced symbols, the likelihood function is proportional to:
L oc J I |d e t ( ^ fc))|r* n - P
k —1 fc=l
—\an An^n. — 2d' A , nan . +  d' A ,ld 12 L 0,7 0 0,7 7 +0 0,7 1 7 +  7-1 (7.18)
Equation (7.18) can be re-written in terms of free parameters bj and gj implicitly defined 
in equation (7.10):
Combining equation (7.19) with priors from equation (7.11) and (7.12), and completing 
the squares in gj gives the following conditional posterior distribution for gj and the 
marginal density kernel for b:
The posterior density of parameters of die model is estimated by Gibbs sampling, 
combining direct draws from distribution in equation (7.20) with Metropolis-Hastings 
step for drawing from distribution in equation (7.21). The results reported in the paper are 
based on 100.000 draws (with 10.000 initial draws discarded). To ensure that draws 
converge to a target distribution, several runs have been tried with random values of 
initial parameters. All runs converged to the same distribution. In addition, a numerical 
maximization of the marginal density in (7.21) gives the same values of bs as modes of bs 
obtained from the Gibbs algorithm. Other restrictions discussed in the text (slope of the 
monetary policy reaction function and non-explosiveness of the system) are imposed by 
eliminating draws violating the restrictions and replacing them with new draws, and by 
imposing the restrictions in the numerical maximization of (7.21).
iz[g,\ YT,b) =  +  H I)) '1) (7.20)
<b\Yt)
(7.21)
where g, =  ^jL-L+0V  .
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5.9 Appendix: State-space model for GDP interpolation
A generic Gaussian state-space model consists of a transition and a measurement equation 
(Koopman et al. 1998):
«*+! =  dt +  Ttat +  Htet, ax ^N {a ,P ) ,  t = l , . . . , n  (7.22)
yt = ct + Ztat +  Gtet, et ~  NID(0,I) (7.23)
where NID(n, \F) denotes an independent sequence of normally distributed random 
vectors with mean fi and variance matrix ^ , and iV(-, •) is a normally distributed 
variable. The state equation (7.22) describes the behavior of unobservable stochastic 
processes contained in the m x 1 state vector a t . The measurement equation (7.23) links 
the state vector with a n x 1 vector of observables yt and the vector of disturbances et .
In the interpolation model for the Czech Republic, the unobservable monthly GDP 
(a state variable) is related to proxy variables observable at monthly frequency with 
coefficients t2, t3 (indices of industrial production, retail sale and construction activity), 
and an unobservable component, which is assumed to follow a random walk process with 
variance a2. The unobservable monthly state variable is linked to the observable 
quarterly GDP via transition equation. Both the proxy variables and quarterly GDP series 
are seasonally adjusted. In terms of generic matrices above, the model takes the following 
form:
0 0 0 0 0 0 O'
0 0 0 0 0 O'
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
HtG't
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 HtH[
0 0 0 0 , 2 , = ^  t, <3 1 1 l),
— 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 GtH't GXG[
0 0 0 a 2 0 0 0
1^ *2 h 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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'0 0 0 0 0 0 ' Xt
0 0 0 0 0 0 2Xt
0 0 0 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 106 0 0 , a = [x\ x l  xjj 0 0 0 j , dt =
Xt
0
0 0 0 0 106 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 106 0
The model is estimated through the Kalman filter algorithm by maximum likelihood. 
Figure 5-8 plots proxy variables, quarterly GDP series, and interpolated monthly GDP 
series. The structure of the interpolation model for Poland is identical, with the set of 
proxy variables augmented by the volume of cargo transport. Figure 5-9 plots the series.
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Figure 5-8 Czech Republic: Quarterly GDP, proxy monthly series, and interpolated GDP
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Figure 5-9 Poland: Quarterly GDP, proxy monthly series, and interpolated GDP
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Source: Polish Statistical Office and own calculations
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6  C r e d ib il it y  o f  In f l a t io n  T a r g e t s  in  P o l a n d
6.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, a number of countries adopted inflation targeting as a framework 
for conducting their monetary policy. The main features characterizing the new approach 
are 1) public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation; 2) 
institutional commitment to price stability and to achievement of the inflation goal, 
combined with increased accountability of the central bank for attaining these objectives; 
3) increased transparency of the monetary policy; 4) reduced role for intermediate targets 
(Mishkin, 1998). The first three of these elements aim at reducing uncertainty regarding 
monetary policy strategy, hence influencing inflationary expectations. The last element 
increases flexibility of central bank's operations in search for the most efficient way of 
controlling inflation. These two pillars of inflation targeting reinforce each other. Better 
monetary policy enhances credibility of the targets. The higher is the credibility, the 
easier it is for policymakers' to control inflation and to accommodate shocks without 
jeopardizing the price stability objective. The credibility factor is therefore critical for 
successful implementation of the framework.
The concept of credibility, which seems to be particularly relevant in the inflation 
targeting framework, is the marginal credibility, defined by Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986) as policymakers’ ability to influence public expectations by means of policy
no
announcements. This notion of credibility is especially important for countries in the 
process of inflation reduction: the costs of disinflation may be significantly reduced if 
authorities are able to successfully manipulate private sector’s expectations.
This paper empirically investigates credibility of the targets, proposing an 
alternative way of estimating the credibility of policy announcements, closely resembling 
the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) definition. The methodology is applied to the analysis 
of credibility of inflation targets in Poland, contributing to the discussion on merits of 
inflation targeting, particularly in the transition environment. Although inflation targeting 
in Poland attracted some attention, researchers focused mainly on feasibility and
no
More recently, the concept of marginal credibility has been investigated by Walsh
(1999).
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operational aspects of the new regime (Christoffersen et al., 2001, Gottschalk and Moore, 
2001), leaving aside credibility-related issues.
The proposed methodology collects three pieces of information: survey data on 
inflationary expectations, forecasts generated from past observations of inflation and 
other macroeconomic indicators, and central bank’s inflation targets. The aim is to 
statistically assess the relative distance between the targets and survey-based expectations 
on the one hand, and between these expectations and data-based forecasts on the other. 
The closer are expectations to the targets relative to the data-based forecasts, the higher is 
the marginal credibility of the target (the public attaches greater weight to policy 
announcements than to past developments).
The two crucial elements in this methodology is a procedure to generate data- 
based forecasts and a testing procedure for assessing the effect of targets on expectations. 
The paper starts from summarizing inflation dynamics with an unconstrained VAR 
model, which is the data-based forecasting model The central bank’s target is regarded as 
an alternative model (a target model), which is used by the public for forecasting 
inflation. It is assumed that the public constructs their predictions of future inflation from 
a weighted average of forecasts from the data-based model and the target model. The 
estimated weight attached to the target model is interpreted as the marginal credibility of 
policymakers’ announcements.
Intuitively, the paper attempts to identify to what extent inflationary expectations 
are driven by the targets, as opposed to past developments in the data. If parameters of 
central bank’s loss function change over time in an unobservable way, and, as in 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), policy announcements partly reveal these changes, it is 
optimal for private agents to use both the past data and the announcements in forecasting 
inflation. Obviously, successful inflation targeting framework may modify dynamic 
interactions between macroeconomic variables and the data-based VAR model will adapt 
to these changes. In the limiting case of a credible strict inflation targeting with a constant 
low inflation target, the VAR forecast will eventually replicate the target, eliminating the 
difference between the data- and target- based forecasts. However, the adaptation of the 
VAR parameters will not be immediate, mimicking the learning process of economic 
agents after the switch to inflation targeting. In transition economies such as Poland, the 
learning process about the new policy regime may be lengthy due to protracted high
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inflation history and there is a substantial uncertainty surrounding policymakers’ 
commitment to the price stability objective.
The chapter starts from a discussion of the existing empirical literature on the 
credibility of policy announcements. Next section presents a descriptive analysis of 
monetary policy and inflation targeting in Poland, addressing the broader issue of 
inflation targeting in emerging market economies. Section 6.4 gives a more detailed 
description of the proposed methodology. Estimation results follow, and some technical 
details of the estimation strategy are relegated into the appendix.
6.2 Credibility of inflation targets in empirical literature
Empirical work on inflation targeting is already vast but the issue of credibility 
attracted relatively less attention than some operational problems related to the 
implementation of the new framework. The simplest approach to the empirical analysis of 
policy credibility compares inflation forecasts derived from financial instruments 
(Svensson, 1993) or from surveys of inflationary expectations (Johnson, 1998) to official 
targets. This approach, however, does not allow for the analysis of marginal credibility 
defined above, providing instead a measure of average credibility, defined by Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986) as a difference between beliefs and targets.79 In other words, the 
method does not distinguish between a growing trust in policy announcements, and a 
policy shift without any change in the mechanism generating private sector expectations. 
In the latter case, private sector’s expectations may be in line with the government’s 
target even if the public does not take into account the target in formulating their 
expectations, learning instead about the central bank’s policy reaction function from past 
policy developments.
Bemanke et al. (1999) proposed and applied three related methods of analyzing 
the effects of targets on expectations. The first method is based on the comparison of 
sacrifice ratios before and after the adoption of inflation targeting. The lower sacrifice 
ratio is an indicator of economic benefits brought about by inflation targeting due to their 
effects on expectations. Bemanke et al. (1999) regressed the sacrifice ratio—estimated in
79See Faust and Svensson (2001), (2002) for a more recent analysis of average credibility 
in an extension of the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) model.
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a sample of industrialized economies before the introduction of inflation targeting—on 
the initial level of inflation and the speed of disinflation. In the next step, they generated 
forecasts from this regression for the inflation targeting period. They found that the 
sacrifice ratio after the introduction of inflation targeting was not only higher than the 
average sacrifice ratios in previous disinflationary episodes, but also higher that the ratios 
forecasted from the regression. The results give strong evidence against the credibility 
bonus entertained by inflation targeters.
Since the comparison of sacrifice ratios does not take into account possible effects 
of supply shocks on inflation, Bemanke et al. (1999) estimated a Phillips-type inflation 
equation with lagged exchange rate and commodity prices as proxies for supply side 
factors. In the next step, they generated forecasts from the Phillips curve estimated on the 
sample before introduction of inflation targeting and compared these forecasts with the 
actual inflation rates in the inflation targeting period. With a notable exception of the 
United Kingdom, the comparison does not reveal any significant over-prediction of 
inflation by the model, confirming the results from the sacrifice ratio exercise: the 
credibility effects of inflation targeting do not seem to be present in the sample.
The last method applied in Bemanke et al. (1999) measures average credibility of 
the targets and is based on direct, survey-based observations of inflationary expectations. 
The comparison of inflation expectations with the announced targets reveals that 
expectations do not adjust momentarily to the targets: a learning process seems to be 
lengthy even for countries successful in meeting the inflation targets. The behaviour of 
expectations after the initial disinflation, however, seems to show that the targets are able 
to anchor the medium term expectations: after similar developments in inflationary 
expectations in Australia and New Zealand in the disinflation phase, expectations in 
Australia, which introduced inflation targeting later, were more prone to an upward drift 
than in New Zealand. The comparison of inflation targets with survey-based inflationary 
expectations and various tests for stability of the Phillips curve regression before and after 
introduction of inflation targeting have been applied in a number of other studies and 
usually led to similar conclusions.80
80See Hutchison and Walsh (1998) for opposite conclusions for New Zealand.
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The methods applied by Bemanke et al (1999) and widely followed in the 
literature have, however, several drawbacks. The comparison of sacrifice ratios does not 
take into account possible effects of supply shocks on inflation. Testing stability of the 
Phillips curve mixes up the effects of changes in the mechanism governing the formation 
of inflationary expectations with other possible changes in functioning of labour markets 
or non linearities in the model. Finally, the comparison of expectations with the target 
does not provide any insight into the marginal credibility of the target.
Kuttner and Posen (1999) propose another testing procedure for assessing the 
effects of targets on expectations. Noting that the introduction of inflation targeting tends 
to reduce inflation persistence, they test for a change in parameters governing inflation 
dynamics after implementation of the framework. There are, however, two regimes 
leading to a reduction in inflation persistence: the optimal state contingent rule81, which 
can be regarded as a successful implementation of inflation targeting based on trust in 
policy targets; and the regime attaching zero weight to output fluctuations in 
policymakers' loss function. Kuttner and Posen (1999) distinguished between the two 
regimes by identifying responses of long- and short-term interest rates to inflation shocks, 
interpreted as responses of expectations and policy instruments to supply shocks. Their 
results show a reduction in inflation persistence in the United Kingdom after the 
introduction of inflation targeting, combined with a milder response of the policy and 
expectations to macroeconomic shocks. Kuttner and Posen (1999) interpret this result as a 
shift towards a policy regime consistent with the optimal state contingent rule. Similar 
results are obtained for Canada, while the opposite conclusions are drawn for New 
Zealand, leading to a "chatty conservatism" interpretation of inflation targeting in this 
country, i.e. a regime where inflation targeting is only a dressing window for a more 
conservative stance in the monetary policy.
Another approach to the analysis of credibility in the inflation targeting 
framework is presented by Ruge-Murcia (2000), who estimated the inflation target zone 
model for Canada. Ruge-Murcia (2000) econometrically described inflation generating 
process, and derived forecasts consistent with this process and its implications for long
81 The optimal state contingent rule is defined in King (1997) as a rule allowing the central 
bank to offset macroeconomic shocks but in the same time commit to hit its inflation 
target rate on average.
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term interest rates under the rational expectations assumption. He used two forms of the 
inflation generating process: with fixed and stochastic bounds of the inflation target zone. 
The model with stochastic bounds indicates that the actual inflation target zone in Canada 
was significantly narrower than the official one. A potential drawback of this analysis, 
especially in applications to countries that adopted inflation targeting only recently, is that 
rational expectations assumption may be too strict at the initial stage of inflation 
targeting, when the learning process is not completed. More generally, the rational 
expectations framework does not allow for the analysis of credibility in the presence of 
asymmetric information between policymakers and the public.
The issue of marginal credibility of the targets has been taken up explicitly in 
earlier literature on credibility of policy announcements. For instance, Weber (1991) 
estimated the marginal credibility of policy announcements for the EMS. Expectations in 
his models are derived as a fitted value of a least-squares regression of the actual 
observable policy outcome on the announced targets and expected policy outcome 
conditional on past information. The main drawback of this analysis is that the estimated 
credibility (the coefficient of the announced targets) is constant over time. Another 
problem is a restrictive set of information used by the private sector in constructing their 
data-based forecasts (Weber (1991) uses univariate time series models). Nevertheless, the 
Weber (1991) approach is the closest to the methodology adopted in this paper.
6.3 Inflation targeting in Poland
6.3.1 Inflation targeting in emerging economies
Inflation targeting in emerging economies, defined as counfries introducing market 
reforms and embarking a closer integration with the world economy, raises some specific 
issues. As reported above, there is some supporting evidence that inflation targets have 
been able to anchor medium term inflationary expectations in the developed economies. 
In the initial phase of inflation targeting the effects of announcements on expectations 
were, however, rather weak. Since these disinflation periods were either short or the 
targeting was introduced when the inflation rate reached a low, stationary value, the role 
of announcements in disinflation was not the main topic of research in the literature on 
inflation targeting in these countries. In many emerging economies macroeconomic 
stabilizations have been achieved only recently. The inflation rates remain in a moderate
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range, making further disinflation more costly than the initial stabilization of the 
economy. In this context, the ability of targets to affect expectations and reduce the costs 
of disinflation is of a paramount importance. The attractiveness of inflation targeting also 
stems from relatively few other options for conducting monetary policy in a country 
increasingly integrated with the world financial markets. The influential proponents of 
polar exchange rate arrangements argue that only extreme forms of exchange rate fixing 
are sustainable, making the exchange rate anchor expensive in terms of policy responses 
to shocks. Floating exchange rate may be combined with money targets, but the speed of 
financial innovations and, in some cases, fresh memories of hypeinflationary episodes 
make the velocity of money hard to predict, rendering monetary targeting infeasible.
Given the potential benefits of inflation targeting for transition economies, it is not 
surprising that die history of targeting in this group of countries is as long as in the 
industrialized economies. Chile was the second country in the world adopting the 
framework, starting from the initial inflation rate of 29 percent in the last quarter of 1990 
and reaching the rate of 3.8 percent in the first quarter of 1999. Israel adopted inflation 
targeting in 1992, with the initial inflation level of 18.9 percent in the last quarter of 1991, 
reduced to 1.9 percent in the last quarter of 1999. The credibility of targets attracted a 
considerable attention of researchers in these two countries. A description of Latin 
American experience with inflation targeting can be found in Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2001), who studied the effects of targets on inflationary expectations in the case of
89Chile. They analyzed the credibility effect of the new regime by running counterfactual 
simulations from a small model of Chilean economy constructed in Corbo (1998), with an 
explicit modelling of inflationary expectations before and after the introduction of 
inflation targeting. The target is a significant factor in explaining the evolution of 
inflationary expectations after the introduction of the new framework. Simulations from 
the model with the inflationary expectation equation estimated before the regime change 
point to a substantial credibility bonus brought about by targeting. Inflation targeting in 
Israel is analyzed by Leiderman (1995), who assesses the effect of target announcements
82 Chilean experience with inflation targeting is also analysed in Landerretche et al
(2000) and Morande (2000). A discussion on inflation targeting in other emerging 
economies can be found in Mishkin (2000) and, in the broader framework of international 
experience with inflation targeting, in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and in Corbo 
et al. (2001)
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on inflationary expectations by comparing expectations derived from financial 
instruments shortly before and after the announcement of a new target. The targets seem 
to affect inflationary expectations, although this effect is not tested statistically.
6.3.2 Disinflation and Inflation Targeting in Poland
Adopting a full-fledged inflation targeting regime in Poland was a gradual process, 
resembling the approach taken by other emerging economies, most notably Chile and 
Israel. The discussion on the implementation of the inflation targeting strategy in Poland 
starts from a brief description of monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policy developments 
since the initial stabilization program at the beginning of 1990.
The initial macroeconomic stabilization package, adopted simultaneously with 
price liberalization, was based on exchange rate peg, combined with fiscal and monetary 
tightening and some heterodox measures such as credit rationing and restrictive income 
policy. Stabilization stage was successful, but the inflationary impact of price 
liberalization was stronger and more persistent than expected. Moreover, the real 
economy sharply contracted, bringing a relaxation of the policy in 1991 and consequently 
a slowdown in the disinflationary process. More expansionary policy eroded 
competitiveness and undermined the exchange rate peg, leading to devaluation in May 
1991 and a switch to crawling peg in October 1991. After two discretionary devaluations 
in February 1992 and August 1993 the rate of crawl was subsequently reduced in line 
with a disinflation strategy pursued by the National Bank of Poland (NBP).
Monetary expansion between 1992 and 1994 was fuelled by substantial fiscal 
deficits, financed mostly by the NBP and the banking system. While the National Bank of 
Poland enjoyed relatively high degree of statutory independence and the government 
borrowing from the NBP was formally restricted, the budget law regularly suspended the 
provisions of the central bank law, raising the borrowing limits. Despite the initially large 
monetary deficit financing and low real interest rates after 1993, some progress in 
reducing inflation was achieved due to later fiscal adjustments and a weak domestic 
demand.
The increasing net foreign reserves became the main source of monetary 
expansion since 1995, after the country gained favourable credit ratings from 
international agencies. Similarly to the strategy taken by Chile and Israel, a more flexible
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exchange rate system was introduced as a response to the increased capital inflow. The 
exchange rate peg was replaced by the target zone system in May 1995. As anticipated, 
the zloty appreciated after the introduction of the new system, but capital inflow 
continued and the zloty was persistently close to the upper bound of the zone. The inflow 
slowed down after interest rate cuts at the end of 1995 and further appreciation in 1996 
after die revaluation of the exchange rate band. The appreciation produced a strong anti- 
inflationary push. It not only affected the price setting behaviour of economic agents 
through competitive pressure, but also seemed to increase demand for real money 
balances. This increase was strong enough to absorb the monetary expansion created by 
growing international reserves (Duijasz and Kokoszczynski, 1998).
Greater exchange rate flexibility—combined with frequent policy changes and 
external shocks—increased the volatility of inflation. From mid-1996 foreign capital 
inflow abated, but low interest rates fuelled domestic credit expansion, calling for 
monetary tightening. The rates were increased several times since the end of 1996 and 
monetary policy was successful in exerting a downward pressure on inflation in 1997 and 
in 1998. The policy was loosened when inflation was reduced to one digit level and 
adverse external shocks (Russian and Asian crises) hit the economy. Central bank interest 
rates remained at a stable level for the first half of 1999 but higher inflation— 
overshooting the target for 1999—prompted monetary authorities to reverse the cuts 
starting from the second half of 1999. In 2000 interest rates were further increased but the 
inflation rate remained above the target for this year.
The process of disinflation was guided by inflation objectives specified in annual 
monetary policy guidelines, consistent with budgetary projections. These widely 
publicized forecasts can be regarded as early inflation targets. Indeed, this initial form of 
inflation targeting was remarkably close to the experience of Chile and Israel, where 
inflation targets co-existed with exchange rate pegs. First announcements of inflation 
targets in Israel were similarly regarded as forecasts consistent with the peg rather than 
official targets (Leiderman, 1995). Institutional changes in 1998 indicated a further 
progress towards the introduction of the inflation targeting strategy. The new law on the 
National Bank of Poland, adopted in January 1998, granted the NBP a high degree of 
independence guaranteed in the Constitutional Law, and established the Monetary Policy 
Council (MPC), a body responsible for conducting the NBP monetary policy. The newly
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formed MPC officially adopted inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy in 1999 
and published the Medium Term Financial Strategy, where the medium-term inflation 
target was set below the 4 percent level at the end of 2003.
Figure 6-1 explains the evolution of the disinflation strategy. Reported on the 
graph is the speed of disinflation implied by the Dec-to-Dec inflation targets, calculated 
under two assumptions: 1) the targeted inflation follows a smooth path, approximated by 
an AR1 process; 2) the targeted inflation asymptotically approaches a level consistent 
with price stability, here assumed to be 3 percent. Given these two assumptions it is 
straightforward to calibrate parameters of the autoregressive process consistent with the 
Dec-to-Dec inflation targets.83
Figure 6-1 Poland: Speed of disinflation implied by the Dec-to-Dec inflation targets and actual year- 
on-year CPI inflation.
CPI inflation (year-on-year) Speed of disinflation implied by the target
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Source: NBP and own calculations.
83 In all the calculations we use information sets currently available to the agents. Targets 
were usually announced in September. Agents knew July inflation rates at the time of 
announcement.
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A notable feature of the implied speed of disinflation is that in most cases annual 
targets extrapolated two years ahead is consistent with subsequent annual targets. In other 
words, for several consecutive years monetary authorities targeted a certain disinflation 
path and, if deviations from a given path had been encountered, there was an attempt to 
correct them in the following year. The first multi-period disinflation path runs from the 
end of 1992 to the end of 1995. Inflationary developments in 1993 seemed to be 
consistent with the targeted speed of disinflation: a blip at the end of 1993 could have 
been regarded as a temporary shock, justifying the choice of the target consistent with the 
same path for 1994. The increase in inflation proved to be long-lasting and the 1994 
target was exceeded by 6  per cent. Despite the growing evidence of a permanent change 
in the dynamics of inflation, the target for the following year again assumed a return to 
the disinflation paths implied by the previous targets and therefore an accelerated 
disinflation in 1995. The target was again missed by 4 percent, leading to an apparent 
revision of the disinflation strategy in the following years. The 1996 target implied a 
flatter disinflation path, accommodating the change in inflation dynamics observed in the 
previous years. Subsequently, the inflation targets proved to be easier to achieve in 1996- 
1998. The annual inflation rate was close to the target in 1996 and virtually hit the targets 
in 1997 and 1998.
In 1999, the first full year after the official adoption of inflation targeting, the target 
was again consistent with the 1996-1998 disinflation path. The Dec-to-Dec inflation at 
the end of this year, however, exceeded the upper bound of the target by 2  percent. 
Similarly, the 2000 target, still consistent with the previous disinflation path, was 
exceeded by 2 percent. The two subsequent failures led to a revision of the disinflation 
strategy and the target announced for 2 0 0 1  implied an upward shift of the disinflation 
path. Moreover, at the end of 1999 monetary policy was drastically tightened. The 
tightening, together with some external shocks, forced inflation back to the track 
consistent with the 1996-2000 targets.
6.4 Data and Methodology
In order to asses the effect of announcements on inflationary expectations, the paper 
collects three pieces of information: survey-based expectations, announced targets, and 
forecasts of future inflation generated from past data. The last piece is an empirical
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counterpart of private agents’ forecasts conditional on past information excluding policy 
targets. If survey-based inflationary expectations are relatively closer to the target than to 
the forecast, the target has a strong effect on expectations. Otherwise, the marginal 
credibility of the target is low.
The analysis uses a survey of professional forecasters conducted by Reuters as a 
measure of inflationary expectations. 84 The survey covers between fourteen and twenty 
financial institutions from Oct 1994 to Nov 2001. For each month the survey reports 
expected Dec-to-Dec inflation at the end of the current year. From Jan 1996, the survey 
also collects data on expected year-on-year inflation twelve-month ahead or, after Nov 
2 0 0 0 , eleven-month ahead.
Central bank’s targets are regarded as an alternative model, which can be 
potentially used by the public for forecasting inflation (a target model). Inflation targets 
before 1998 are Dec-to-Dec inflation projections published in the budget law. After the 
official adoption of inflation targeting in 1998, the Monetary Policy Council switched to a 
target zone. Since policymakers cannot control inflation perfectly, the predictive density 
from the target model is assumed to be non-degenerate even before the official 
introduction of the target zone. Instead, a normal distribution is assumed with mean equal 
to point projections before 1998 and to middle points of the target zone from 1998 
onwards. Standard deviation of this distribution is assumed to be an average percentage 
deviation of boundaries of the band from middle points for the post-1997 period.
Lastly, projections based on past economic developments are generated from an 
unconstrained VAR (data-based model). The VAR forecast corresponds to the third piece 
of information discussed above: it does not include any information about the future 
stance of monetary policy other than inferred from the past. Since the analysis of
o4
Inflationary expectations of other groups in the society are not analysed. Results from 
qualitative surveys suggest that households’ inflationary expectations are largely 
backward looking (Lyziak, 2003). Households’ expectations may derive from news 
reports on the views of professional forecasts (Carroll, 2003), so the effect of the target on 
these expectations may be delayed and indirect.
85 Since the CPI data are released with a lag, the twelve-month ahead forecast was 
effectively a thirteen-month ahead starting from the previous month. After November 
2 0 0 0  the respondents were inquired about the twelve-month ahead forecast starting from 
the previous month.
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credibility requires predictive densities rather than point forecasts, the VAR is estimated 
using Bayesian methods as in Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997). The basic system has four 
variables: CPI, average monthly exchange rate of PLN to the basket of DM and USD 
(with equal weights), M2 and the index of industrial production. All variables except 
interest rate are in logs and the model is estimated on 12-month differences. The basic 
specification imposes relatively tight Minessota-type priors on parameters, found to 
reduce the average inflation forecast RMSE compared to a non-Bayesian VAR. In order 
to check for the robustness of results, priors are relaxed and money is replaced by 
manufacturing wage index in alternative specifications. In all models, the estimation 
sample changes, mimicking information set available to the private sector. Since the CPI 
data are released with a lag of two months, in any given month forecasts are generated 
from models estimated on a sample ending two months earlier. Since the first observation 
from the survey of inflationary expectations is Oct 1994, the first estimation period for 
the VAR runs from Jan 1992 to Aug 1994.
Since the authorities set only Dec-to-Dec targets and the paper uses monthly data 
(the available annual series are too short), the marginal credibility of the target in 
analysed at different forecast horizons. Given the two-month lag in data availability, the 
longest forecast horizon is thirteen months, when the public forecasts Dec-to-Dec 
inflation using data until November of the previous year. The shortest forecast horizon is 
two months, when the public predicts Dec-to-Dec inflation using data until October of the 
same year.
In addition, the paper analyzes the credibility of twelve-month ahead87 implicit 
inflation targets, where the implicit disinflation path is defined as in section 6.3.2. The 
standard deviation of the distribution around the target is assumed to be the same as of 
end-of-year target. This approach allows for a more meaningful analysis of month-by- 
month changes in credibility.
Professional forecasters aggregate information from predictive densities generated 
by the data-based and the target model. The baseline analysis assumes that each forecaster
86 Estimating the model on levels with seasonal dummies produces similar results.
87After Nov 2000 the paper analyzes the credibility of eleven-month ahead implicit 
targets to be consistent with changes in the Reuters survey (see footnote 85).
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randomly and independently picks point forecasts from the two predictive densities. This 
assumption reflects uncertainty about agents’ loss functions and true models, and implies 
that diffuseness of forecasters’ predictive density is fully reflected in the degree of 
disagreement among forecasters. Zamowitz and Lambros (1987) provide some evidence 
against it—professional forecasters may have loss functions penalizing certain ranges of 
predictive densities, reflecting either their strategic behaviour or loss functions of their 
customers—but report that the degree of disagreement is nevertheless positively 
correlated with uncertainty surrounding the forecasts. 88 An alternative specification for 
checking the robustness of results assumes that forecasters choose points in the predictive 
density region between the 15th and 85th percentile. Finally, it is assumed that each 
agent’s point forecast of inflation is a weighted average of the point forecasts from the 
data-based model and the target-model. The weight attached to the target-model forecast 
is interpreted as a marginal credibility of the target and is a parameter to be estimated. 
The paper uses Bayesian numerical methods to estimate these parameters for each year. 
The posterior distribution of weights (pica \ influrve^ ) is proportional to:
<p((0,1 inrr") *  I ®,) = <«>, I <»/,“”") (»•!)
i=1
where cot is the weight attached to inflation target at time t, (p(a>t) is a prior distribution of 
cot , and / ( inf ]™rvey \cot) is the posterior predictive density of inflation conditional on cot 
evaluated at forecaster Vs survey expectations . Since it is assumed that survey
expectations are drawn independently from the same posterior predictive density, the 
likelihood function of inftsurvey = {inf^rvey ,...,inf™rvey)r is a product of predictive densities
evaluated at individual expectations ]^[" /  (inf™™6* \ cot). The posterior density of cot is
proportional to the product of the likelihood function and the prior density for the 
weights. The analytical expression for the posterior predictive density of inflation 
conditional on cot (denoted by/ {infe \cot)) is not known. Instead, the
OO
See Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) and references cited there for the analysis of 
strategic behaviour in forecasting.
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function f ( in fe \ cot) is simulated by drawing from cot * f iargel(infe) + (\-(Dt) * fVAR(infe), 
where f target(infe) is the predictive density of inflation from the target model and 
f VAR(infe) is the predictive density of inflation from the VAR model, and the resulting 
density is evaluated at inf™™1* . Finally, the mode of cot is estimated by searching for a 
maximum of the posterior density kernel fc(a>t \ infi'fsurvey) t and the 5* and 95th percentile of 
the distribution iorcot by deterministic integration (using trapezoidal rule) of the posterior 
density. A non-informative prior for cot is used, so that the posterior density kernel is 
equal to the likelihood function treated as a function of cot .
The weights cot are estimated using all available information in the survey data. In
particular, the analysis is not restricted to some moments, but uses all available 
information from the distribution of survey expectations. Similarly, information from the 
predictive density of inflation is fully used.
6.5 Estimation of the Credibility of Inflation Targets
Figure 6-2 shows modes of survey-based inflationary expectations, modes of predictive 
densities of inflation, and inflation targets for both Dec-to-Dec and year-on-year inflation 
twelve and—after November 2000—eleven months ahead. Although, as pointed out in 
the previous section, the aim is to use all information available in the sample, the 
graphical analysis checks if there is an economically interpretable relationship among 
these series.
There seems to be some effect of the target on expectations at the initial stage of 
inflation targeting, reinforced by the fuller implementation of the strategy. The mode of 
the expected Dec-to-Dec inflation is far from the target in 1994 and 1995 (Figure 6-2, 
upper panel). In the first half of 1995 it seems, however, that the relative distance to the 
target is shorter than to the VAR forecasts, pointing to the marginal credibility effect even 
at the early stage of inflation targeting. Although the target in 1995 was not fully 
believed, it could have had some influence on expectations given the large uncertainty 
surrounding data-based forecasts at the beginning of the sample. The distance between 
the target and expectations diminishes in 1996. As discussed in section 6.3.2, there 
seemed to be a change in the disinflation strategy in 1996 and the target for this year
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could have been regarded as more plausible by the private sector. Although the realization 
of the Dec-to-Dec inflation in 1996 was closer to the target than in previous years, 
expectations in 1997 were more in line with the data-based forecast than with the target. 
The 1997 target was missed only marginally, which could have had a positive effect on 
the credibility of the 1998 target. However, it is not apparent from the graph to what 
extent expectations were affected by the target. In 1999, the first full year after the official 
introduction of inflation targeting, the effect of the target on expectations seems to be 
strong: despite sudden changes in the inflation dynamics, the mode of survey expectations 
was fixed at the middle point of the target for most of the year. However, after a large 
deviation from the target at the end of the year, expectations for 2 0 0 0  followed the data- 
based forecasts. In 2001 inflationary expectations were close to the target at the beginning 
of the year, despite a large deviation from the target in 2000. The target for 2001 was 
probably regarded as relatively easy to achieve: the disinflation path implied by the target 
accommodated an apparent change in inflation dynamics in 2000. Survey-based 
expectations diverged from the target later in 2 0 0 1 .
The relationship among the targets, expectations and forecasts over the 
approximately year-ahead horizon is less clear, but seems to follow a similar pattern to 
the relationship to the Dec-to-Dec series (Figure 6-2, lower panel). The effect of the target 
seems to be weak at the beginning of the sample, stronger after the change in disinflation 
strategy in 1996 and further enhanced by the official inflation targeting in 1999. 
However, differences between forecasting horizons are evident at the end of the sample, 
when the year-ahead expectations are closer to the targets than their Dec-to-Dec 
counterparts.
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Figure 6-2 Poland: Expected Dec-to-Dec inflation from the Reuters survey, forecasted Dec-to-Dec 
inflation from the BVAR model, and inflation targets (upper panel), and expected year-on-year 
inflation one-year ahead from the Reuters survey, forecasted year-on-year inflation one-year ahead 
from the BVAR model and implicit targets (lower panel).
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Source: NBP, Reuters and own calculations.
The analysis of distributions of the survey data, inflation forecasts and targets starts from 
a graphical inspection for selected months. Figure 6-3 shows the predictive densities of 
Dec-to-Dec inflation at the beginning of each year starting from 1996, implicit densities 
around inflation targets and histograms of inflationary expectations from the Reuters 
survey.
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Figure 6-3 Poland: Predictive densities of Dec-to-Dec inflation from the BVAR model, implicit 
distributions around Dec-to-Dec inflation targets, and histogram of Dec-to-Dec inflationary 
expectations from the Reuters survey at the beginning of each year.
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Before 1999, Dec-to-Dec inflationary expectations at the beginning of the year are 
located between the modes of the predictive densities from the data-model and the target- 
model. Peaks of the 1996 and 1998 histograms are situated close to the target predictive 
density; although in both cases the histograms are skewed to the left, pointing to a weaker 
effect of the target on some forecasters. 1997 expectations are equally far from the target 
and the BVAR forecast.
The distribution of inflationary expectations after the official introduction of 
inflation targeting is more concentrated and relatively closer to the targets. In January 
1999 and in January 2001 there is a slight tendency for expectations to centre below the 
middle point of the target zone. Expectations are slightly above the target in Jan 2000.
-144-
Figure 6-4 Poland: Estimates of weights attached to targets in inflationary expectations from the 
Reuters survey.
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Figure 6-4 reports estimates of weights attached to targets in expectations estimated using 
the Bayesian method described above.
The econometric analysis confirms that the target credibility increased around the 
time of the introduction of inflation targeting in 1999. The interpretation of weights 
attached to Dec-to-Dec targets is difficult due to the time-varying forecast horizon—the 
effect of the target tends to fall towards the end of year, when inflation is clearly outside 
the control of monetary authorities. Taking into account this seasonal pattern, the 
credibility of the target seems to be relatively low at the beginning of 1995. There is a 
visible influence of the target on expectations for 1996, temporarily reversed at the 
beginning of 1997, when the weight attached to the data-based forecast is relatively 
higher. Credibility of the 1998 target was again high after monetary authorities had 
reached the 1997 target. The official introduction of inflation targeting in 1998, combined 
with hitting the target in this year, resulted in the record-high credibility of the 1999
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target. Interestingly, the weight attached to the target was high until nearly the end of this 
year. A large deviation from the target in 1999 hindered credibility, increasing the weight 
attached to the data-based forecasts at the beginning of 2000. In 2001 the weight attached 
to the target was again high at the beginning of the year, reflecting a less ambitious 
character of the target for this year.
The relationship among the targets, expectations and forecasts over the one-year 
ahead horizon is more pronounced than suggested by the graphical analysis above, and 
the pattern of estimated weights is similar to die Dec-to-Dec series. The main difference 
is that average weight attached to inflation targets is higher, indicating a high credibility 
of the central bank's disinflation strategy, even when the short-term targets are likely to be 
missed. A difference in dynamics appears at the end of the sample, after the official 
introduction of inflation targeting. Dec-to-Dec inflationary expectations clearly diverge 
from the target when it becomes evident that it will be missed at the end of 2001. One- 
year ahead expectations are still close to the implicit disinflation path in this period. 
Therefore, the official inflation targeting and the public announcement of the medium- 
term disinflation path seem to have a moderating effect on expectations.
In order to check the sensitivity of results to different specifications of the model 
used for generating predictive densities, the estimation is repeated with predictive 
densities from the baseline specification restricted to a region between the 15th and 85th 
percentile; predictive densities from the BVAR model with very weak priors; and 
predictive densities from the model with money replaced by manufacturing wage index. 
Figure 6-5 shows results from the alternative specifications, together with the baseline 
series. The results are similar, the only significant difference being a much lower 
credibility of the implicit disinflation path in 2 0 0 1  when using the model with restricted 
predictive density.
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Figure 6-5 Sensitivity analysis for estimates of weights attached to targets in inflationary expectations 
from the Reuters survey.
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6 . 6  Conclusions
The paper analyses the credibility of inflation targets in Poland, contributing to the 
literature on inflation targeting in emerging economies and, in particular, in the process of 
disinflation. The concept of credibility used in this paper is borrowed from Cukierman 
and Meltzer (1986), who emphasize a potential influence of the target on expectations. 
The marginal credibility is of a paramount importance in the process of disinflation, when 
credible targets can greatly reduce the costs of reducing inflation.
The proposed methodology combines survey data on inflationary expectations, 
predictive densities of inflation generated from a BVAR model, and implicit distributions 
around inflation targets. Intuitively, if the survey-based expectations are relatively closer 
to the target than to the data-based forecast, the marginal credibility of the target is high. 
The Bayesian approach to estimate weights attached to targets and data-based forecasts
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make an efficient use of available information and it provides an intuitive, time-varying 
measure of the credibility of the target
The evolution of estimated weights seems to depend on:
• Past deviations from the target. Achieving targets in die past boosts reputation and 
leads private agents to revise their mechanism of forming expectation by 
increasing the weight attached to the target. In case of Poland, a negative effect of 
past deviations can be observable in 2000 and, to a lesser extent, in 1997.
• Plausibility of the targeted disinflation path. Overly ambitious targets are not 
believed by the public, reducing the weight attached to the target. This effect is 
visible after changes in the disinflation path implied by the 1996 target and 
initially in 2 0 0 1 , when the less ambitious target seemed to increase the weight 
attached to the target.
• Institutional reforms. In 1998 the National Bank of Poland officially adopted 
inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework. The influence of the target on 
expectations seems to be particularly strong in 1999, the first full year of official 
inflation targeting. There is also a visible change in the influence of the target on 
expectations at one-year horizon: in 2 0 0 1  one-year ahead inflationary expectations 
remained close to the implicit target despite growing evidence that the Dec-to-Dec 
target would be missed. The market participants seemed to trust the NBP medium- 
term disinflation policy.
Short sample makes testing for the significance of each of these factors difficult, and also 
precludes analysis of some interesting issues related to credibility, such as a relationship 
between the marginal credibility and the costs of disinflation policy discussed above.
The main policy conclusion is that the targets had an effect on professional 
forecasters' expectations. The first two observations regarding the evolution of the 
weights are also important for policy-makers: there is a visible credibility effect after 
deviations from the targets and, perhaps less obvious, the plausibility of the target seems 
to have an effect on the marginal credibility. Although the paper does not provide firm 
arguments for the moderating effect of the official targeting regime on expectations, there 
is some evidence in the data pointing to this effect.
Although high credibility of the targets can reduce the costs of disinflation, there 
are also some potential dangers of the high marginal credibility for policy-making. 
Official press releases of the Monetary Policy Council put a lot of attention to the 
evolution of professional forecasters’ inflationary expectations, suggesting that policy­
makers’ decisions are to some extent influenced by this piece of information. This is no 
different from the practice of advanced inflation targeters, such as United Kingdom and
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New Zealand, where professional forecasters’ inflationary expectations take an important 
place in inflation reports. But results on forecast-based policies reported by Bemanke and 
Woodford (1997) are important in this context. If monetary policy relies solely on 
inflationary expectations of outsiders, and if these expectations are in turn based only on 
announced inflation targets, the model investigated by Bemanke and Woodford (1997) 
exhibits indeterminacy, potentially leading to undesirable economic equilibria. In this 
context, Bemanke and Woodford (1997) stress the importance of structural models in 
monetary policy making. Structural econometric modelling is difficult in the transition 
environment, making the use of survey-based expectations more tempting for the central 
bank. It is, however, indispensable in a serious implementation of the inflation targeting 
regime and the analysis of survey expectations can only be a building block in 
constructing such a model.
6.7 Appendix: Bayesian VAR Model
Following description in Kadiayala and Karlsson (1997), the VAR system has the 
following form:
yt = 2  Vt-iA + xfi + ut (8-2)t=i
where yt is lx m  vector of endogenous variables and xt is 1  xq  vector of exogenous 
variables at time t. A, and C are respectively m x m  and qxrn  parameter matrices. 
Equation (8.2) can be written as:
Vt = ztT +  ut (8-3)
where zt = {x t1yt_l1...iyt } and T is k(=q — p m ) x m  matrix given by 
Stacking the vectors yt,zt and ut for t = into Y ,Z  and U gives
the multivariate regression model:
Y  = ZT +  U (8.4)
Letting the subscript i denote the ith column vector, the equation for variable i is 
^  =  Zyi -f ut . Stacking the columns of Y, T and U into y, 7 , w, the system can be 
written as:
y =  (I 0  Z) y  +  u (8.5)
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Assuming that u ~  N(0, ® I ) , the likehhood is proportional to:
£(7 ,* ) a  IV T " exp{-tr[(r -  Z T f V 1 (Y -  ZT)} /  2}
(o-h)
a  iV(7 | 7 , ^  (8 ) (Z'Z)"1) x iW{%{y -  ZT)f(y -  ZY),T - k - m - 1 )
where f , 7  are OLS estimates of T, 7  and i Wdenotes inverse Wishart density.
Assuming conjugate (Normal-Wishart) priors:
7l$  N{7 ,^  0  (8.7)
the posterior distribution is given by:
7 |^f,y ~  7V (7,^0fi),^ |?/ ~  iW(ifr,T + a) (8 .8 )
where Q = (O" 1 +  Z 'Z ) - \ f  =  f i f f r 'f  +  Z'ZT) and
y = f'z'zf + f'fr1? + ^  + (r -  z t  )'(y -  zt) -  T'pr1 + z'z)r.
In the paper, prior means for parameters in F make each endogenous variable an 
AR1 process with autoregressive parameter a :
Vit =  a V i t - i  +  Uit (8.9)
Other parameters of the Normal-Wishart prior are set so that elements of W <g> Cl coincide 
with elements of the variance-covariance matrix specified for parameters in equation i as:
Var(7i) =
71\CT2 for parameters on lags of variable j
t o j  (8.10)
7r2crf for parameters on exogenous variables
where k is the lag length and crt is a scale factor accounting for different variability in 
endogenous variables, set to the residual standard error from p -lag univariate 
autoregression for variable i.
Priors for die baseline forecasting model used in the paper are 
7 7  =  0.1,7r2 =  10e5 and a = .99, resembling Minessota priors, but assuming stationary
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and persistent processes for all the series. Alternative specifications make this prior close 
to diffuse by setting =  10e5 .
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